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Abstract 
This thesis uses the notion of specialised publics in order to analyse 
whether the participation of civil society organisations in the European 
Convention contributed to make European publics more aware of this 
debate. In particular it asks whether activism by European civil society 
organisations about participatory democracy has contributed to a stronger 
linkage between the EU and Spanish and French general publics. 
 
The thesis analyses the role of a group of 22 civil society organisations in 
the agenda setting process where the discourse of the EU about 
participatory democracy was built ahead the Convention. Furthermore the 
role of 25 Spanish and French organisations active in the Convention is 
considered as well. 51 in-depth interviews with members of the 
Convention, officials of European institutions, European, French and 
Spanish civil society organisations have been conducted in the frame of 
the thesis. These provide abundant information about the way in which 
these organisations were involved in the Convention and more in general 
about biases in action at EU level between European and national 
organisations.  
 
The analysis of the evolution of the organisations‘ demands and 
justifications demonstrates that these consultations were an important 
agenda-setting process where the demands of civil society for 
institutionalisation were framed as a way to introduce participatory 
democracy arrangements in the EU. It is found that during the Convention 
participation was a strong priority for these organisations which had a 
great impact on article 47 of the TCE on civil society participation. It 
appears that contrary to expectations the Convention was not a meeting 
point for European and national organisations and contributed little to the 
diffusion of this debate beyond European specialised actors. Furthermore 
it appears that Spanish and French organisations had no motivation to 
―download‖ the Convention debates in the context of the national 
referenda. European organisations did not need to mobilise their members 
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to meet their objectives, Spanish organisations were stronger at the EU 
level than in the national debates and French organisations did not share 
most of the participatory frame elaborated the EU level.  
 
However it is found as well that national organisations did not ignore this 
topic. In this sense Spanish organisations shared it strongly although they 
had little effect on the national debate, whereas French organisations 
scepticism on the Convention's commitment to the question of civil society 
participation contributed to their involvement against the Treaty in the 
national campaign. In doing so they contributed to frame the French 
referendum as an occasion for citizens‘ participation in the EU, and thus 
circulated a version of the European frame.  
 
Albeit in an exceptional setting, the thesis finds that civil society 
organisations have a strong potential to contribute to Europeanising 
debates and to articulate participation in the EU.  These results contribute 
to a better understanding of the dynamic connections between different 
publics in the European public sphere by pointing to the importance of 
considering the political opportunity structure and the institutional barriers 
to the Europeanisation general publics. 
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From specialised groups to organised civil 
society 
 
I decided to keep the original title of the research proposal with which I 
started this PhD project in November 2008 because it is a good occasion 
to explain its origins, motivation and evolution. I hope that it be the 
occasion to introduce the reader into the rationale behind my project 
rather than deceive them about the content.  
 
Since the beginning of my post-graduate studies I was interested by the 
question of the European public sphere as a space where European 
citizens‘ could engage each other and build a common project and 
identities based on their own autonomy without renouncing to their own 
identities. However I felt it frustrating that this idea was always associated 
with academic dreams and put as a future project.  
 
I thus started looking at existing European public spheres. Historical 
narratives highlight the existence of such spheres among medieval 
monasteries, Renaissance artists or Enlightenment philosophers.  Others 
put forward the role of intellectuals who can articulate a European cause 
by coordinating their articles in quality newspapers. All these ideas 
remitted me to the notion that the European public sphere was not 
inexistent but rather strongly fragmented and driven by elites. 
 
Being interested in European governance it was difficult not to come 
across with expert meetings, consultative committees and specialised 
newsletters and journals where European integration was discussed in 
depth. I started realising that those were a good example of really 
existing public spaces where participants adapted their arguments to 
circumstances and to their public. The immediate question was what was 
the political relevance of these discussions and to what extent it served as 
a model or a catalyser for a more public sphere of all European citizens. 
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Having undertaken most of my specific EU studies in the aftermath of the 
failed ratification of the EU constitution, I was studying in Strasbourg on 
May 29th 2005 when the French people rejected the European constitution, 
it was interesting to analyse how the fora of European experts that was 
the Convention had resonated among the peoples of Europe who had been 
called to ratify the Treaty. Although in 2008 when I started my PhD the 
Convention was long gone and buried it looked as a good opportunity to 
take a step back from it, in particular as I felt that the question of the role 
of experts in raising constitutional debates in larger publics was not 
sufficiently addressed in the academic literature.  
 
Obviously this was still too general for a researchable individual project. 
However I realised that among the numerous types of experts that were 
called upon to intervene in the Convention, civil society organisations had 
a prominent role. Their inclusion was strongly related to the will of the EU 
to come closer to the citizens by becoming more participatory. This had 
been a salient topic in the leaflets promoting the European constitution. 
Analysing how the expert groups debated of a mechanism intending to 
make citizens more aware of the EU seemed to offer a perfect chance to 
study at the same time the broader debate on mechanisms of how to 
bring the citizens‘ closer and how these mechanisms were designed and 
work in very practical terms. It thus offered a very complete case study 
for the project.  
 
The rest of the story is inside the thesis. So despite referring to the role of 
experts the project is not about technical or scientific matters but rather 
about how EU specialised debates empower citizens and how participation 
in public debates is a relevant variable in the competition between 
different interests. 
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 In the thesis Treaty and Constitution are used indistinctly to refer to the TCE, except where explicitly 
mentioned. 
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Chapter 1 The European public sphere, a 
sphere of groups. Consequences for our 
understanding and research design 
 
1. The EU’s democratic legitimacy crisis and the public sphere 
Questions on the democratic legitimacy of the EU have sharply arisen ever 
since the troublesome ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The evolution 
of the academic debate can be linked to the political scenario of the EU. In 
this sense, until the debate on the future of the EU some arguments 
considered that the EU could not be legitimated by political will formation 
and political participation and that it should thus focus on producing 
successful policies making it legitimate thanks to the collective goods it 
produces (Scharpf 1999; Majone 2002; Moravcsik 2006). In these years, 
other authors argued that on the contrary the EU should be understood as 
a regular political system that suffered a democratic deficit problem 
related to its institutional design (Follesdal and Hix 2006). This approach 
assumes that input legitimacy problems are not irredeemable but linked to 
the institutional setup of the EU. 
However the rejection of the constitutional Treaty seems to have moved 
the debate beyond the issue of the EU‘s democratic deficit to point out to 
the EU‘s legitimacy crisis, which encompasses the existence of a 
democratic deficit with a structural lack of communication, trust and 
accountability (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Chopin 2010; Bertoncini 
and Chopin 2010). In this sense it is less a matter of objective 
institutional design but of a subjective perception, such as Max Weber 
conceived of legitimacy (de Castro Asarta 2011). Recently, it has been 
pointed out that the EU is becoming increasingly politicised and contested 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009; Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010; De Wilde 
2011) breaking the permissive consensus of public opinions on which 
European integration has rested since its inception. 
Additionally the consensus-prone nature of the European Union 
integration process has blurred traditional political frames (Eriksen 2000, 
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58–61). At EU level it is difficult to perceive and communicate a clear 
political framework beyond the traditional tension between member 
states‘ interests and more or less European integration. In this sense it is 
not surprising that contestation and EU politicisation have been mainly left 
to European federalists or emerged from generally eurosceptic national 
political parties and grassroots movements (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
The paradox of the debate on the democratic deficit is well summarised by 
the fact that every increase in the powers of the European Parliament has 
been matched by a new decrease in the participation in European 
Parliament elections (Costa 2009). The paradox of the EU‘s institutional 
discourse is that it has assumed the existence of a democratic legitimacy 
problem (European Commission 2001) but has tried to solve it through 
reforms focusing on the institutional system. For instance the Laeken 
declaration‘s mandate, which launched the European Convention, focused 
exclusively on the reform of the EU institutions. Even when the focus has 
been put on communication in order to breach the distance with the public 
it has strongly avoided the politicisation of the EU and opted for 
bureaucratic incremental procedures (Bee 2010). This does not mean that 
these sorts of procedures cannot create opportunities for deliberation and 
that output and input legitimacy are incompatible (Lindgren and Persson 
2011). However it remains highly technical as the aim is rather to raise 
the quality of the citizens‘ debates on the EU (Boucher 2007) rather than 
highlighting recognizable EU‘s political cleavages facilitating citizens‘ 
understanding and participation in the new polity (Hix 2005; Bertoncini 
and Chopin 2010). 
The thesis will rely heavily on literature on the role of civil society in the 
development of the European public sphere and it limits (François and 
Neveu 1999; Kaelble 2002; Chalmers 2003; Trenz and Eder 2004; Giorgi, 
Von Homeyer, and Parsons 2006; Fossum and Schlesinger 2007; Bee and 
Bozzini 2010). It can be argued that the notions of the public sphere, 
deliberation and civil society have been attractive to European Union 
scholars and institutions because they are not necessarily but historically 
linked to the nation state (J. Cohen and Arato 1992, 201), and they can 
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be employed to imagine a cosmopolitan political community not bound to 
the state but constructed by mutual recognition in the public sphere 
(Kaldor 1995; Habermas 2000). Thus Cohen and Arato‘s proposal of a 
theory of democratic legitimacy rooted in Habermas‘ discourse ethics 
requiring that "all the affected have an effective equality of chances to 
assume dialogue roles" (J. Cohen and Arato 1992, 348) seems particularly 
well suited to the EU‘s diversity of cultural and political traditions 
(Nicolaïdis 2003) and its long-lasting tradition of stakeholders‘ 
consultation (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). 
 
Some historians and sociologists have considered that the notion of the 
public sphere could be applied to the level of the EU without substantially 
modifying the focus on the long term emergence of a common European 
public as historically publics have emerged along new spheres of economic 
exchange and political power (Kaelble 2002; Delanty and Rumford 2005). 
However Schlesinger and Deirdre (2000, 220–221) have suggested that a 
quest for a common European public conduces to determinism about the 
inexistence of a European public sphere as long as the media and general 
publics do not pay attention to the EU (see Ward 2002; Delanty and 
Rumford 2005; de Swaan 2007 for examples of such determinism). 
Furthermore it may neglect the study of emergent processes and 
marginalise the role of actors other than the media and general publics 
(Trenz 2010, 29; van de Steeg 2010, 35–36). 
There are considerable differences between the emergent European public 
sphere and Habermas‘ original notion of a common public sphere 
(Schlesinger and Deirdre 2000). Thus most authors foresee the 
constitution of publics alongside the institutions and policies of the 
European Union rather than the emergence of a general European public 
(Schlesinger and Deirdre 2000; Giorgi, Von Homeyer, and Parsons 2006; 
Eriksen 2007; Bozzini 2010). Eriksen has suggested conceiving of the 
emergent European public sphere as a set of divided socio-political spaces 
in which the predominant actors differ (Eriksen 2007). Eriksen sees civil 
society organisations and expert fora (Zito 2001) as a segmented public 
intermediating between general publics, composed by individuals and 
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media at the national level, and the official debates within the institutions 
which are conceived as a strong public (Eriksen 2007). Ruzza (2004, 26–
28) points out as well the importance of designing a research strategy 
taking into account of the interrelated levels of governance. It is thus 
necessary to analyse the logics of each of these spaces and it is 
particularly important to consider their interrelations and communication 
flows. Recently some authors have applied similar approaches in trying to 
analyse and map the entrepreneurship of different actors for the 
Europeanisation of public spheres (Trenz 2010). Generally speaking 
contributions in Giorgi et al. (2006); Fossum and Schlesinger (2007); 
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2007); Bee and Bozzini (2010) tend to see a 
much stronger activism among civil society organisations than the media 
in linking different public spaces in the EU.  
The emergence of segmented publics in the form of specialists working on 
the EU and the rise of European issues in national public spheres (Eriksen 
and Fossum 2000; Fossum and Schlesinger 2007; Vetters, Jentges, and 
Trenz 2009; Trenz 2010), are seen as useful devices to legitimise 
European integration (Chalmers 2003; Trenz and Eder 2004; Giorgi, Von 
Homeyer, and Parsons 2006; Fossum and Schlesinger 2007; Bee and 
Bozzini 2010). However contrary to the expectation of European 
institutions (Bee 2010) it is noticeable that several of the actors 
contributing to the emergence of debates on the EU are not necessarily 
supportive of European integration (Feron 2006; Agrikoliansky 2007; 
Hooghe and Marks 2009). One of the aims of this thesis is to contribute to 
understanding better whether civil society organisations contribute to 
linking different public spaces and whether this may contribute to the 
legitimacy of the EU. 
2. Civil society and the public space 
Habermas‘ definition of public sphere as ―the sphere where private people 
come together as a public‖ (Habermas 1989, 27) emphasises its 
mediating role between private interests in civil society and the political 
realm. Both notions are thus closely linked and indeed rooted in each 
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other, so organised civil society can be seen as a key actor in the 
segmented European public. 
 
In their review of 4 distinct conceptions of European civil society Kohler-
Koch and Quittkat (2011) analyse a public discourse inspired definition: 
"Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent 
associations, organizations and movements that distil and transmit 
societal problems to the public sphere and are enhancing problem-solving 
discourses on questions of general interest" (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 
2011, 23–24). However one of the difficulties of such definition is that 
activism in the public sphere is only one of the manifestations of civil 
society. Take for instance Cohen and Arato‘s classical conception of civil 
society as "a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, 
composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the 
sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements and forms of public communication." (J. Cohen and Arato 
1992, ix). This definition suggests that often activity within each of these 
spheres does not entail publicity and may not be democratic, as workers 
and women movements for the democratisation of everyday life, including 
family life, have historically suggested (J. Cohen and Arato 1992). 
 
These definitions are very useful in that the focus is not limited to 
organisations promoting general interests versus private ones (Fazi and 
Smith 2006; Vázquez García 2010, 47) without however overstretching 
the notion as to include manifestations of the spheres between which civil 
society mediates such as economic activity or political parties (Vázquez 
García 2010; Pérez Díaz 1994a). This is particularly important considering 
that the very definition of civil society and whether it should be limited to 
the third sector has been an important policy issue opposing different 
groups and institutions as it will be discussed in the next chapter 
(Smismans 2003). The question of the definition is so sensitive that 
despite the potential contribution of civil society to the legitimacy of the 
EU the Commission does not adhere to any definition, despite having been 
sympathetic of the European Economic and Social Committee‘s descriptive 
definition (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2011). In this sense the Europa 
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website claims that: ―There is no commonly accepted or legal definition of 
the term 'civil society organisation'. [...] It should be noted that in its 
policy of consultation the Commission does not make a distinction 
between civil society organisations or other forms of interest groups. The 
Commission consults "interested parties", which comprises all those 
who wish to participate in consultations run by the Commission‖2. 
 
Research on European civil society has emphasised the contribution that 
civil society organisations can make to the legitimacy of the EU and in 
particular to the emergence of a European public sphere. The 
institutionalisation of civil society relations has generally been agreed by 
academic literature as a step in such direction (De Schutter 2002; 
Armstrong 2002; Joerges 2002; Fazi and Smith 2006; Eder and Trenz 
2007; Greenwood 2011a). The expectation that civil society organisations 
can be the link between international and European governance arenas 
and ordinary citizens (Steffek and Nanz 2008; Steffek and Hahn 2010) 
can be seen as a step to increase democratic legitimacy by associating 
civil society to the construction of an artificial public sphere (McLaverty 
2002), to be enlarged in due course. On the wake of the weak pan-
European mobilisations of ordinary citizens and media (Imig and Tarrow 
2001; Balme and Chabanet 2008; Trenz 2010) the EU has fostered the 
emergence of a pluralistic system of civil society relations which is 
expected to fulfil democratic functions such as the mutual check and 
balance of different interests, holding European institutions to account and 
fostering a public sphere (Greenwood 2011b, 201–202).  
 
These expectations on the role of civil society in the EU do not differ from 
the traditional association of civil society with the promotion of democracy 
in political theory since de Tocqueville‘s classical work and its influence in 
both politics and academia (Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). The turn 
of the EU towards civil society is not only due to its specific remoteness 
from ordinary citizens. Since the late 80's the reinforcement of civil 
society and citizen‘s participation is promoted as a consequence of 
                                       
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/apgen_en.htm#5, consulted on 27 November 2011, in bold in the 
original.  
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academic and political recognition of the decline in the quality of 
democracy (J. Cohen and Arato 1992) as expressed by forms of 
formalism, disinterest in politics and individualism (Barber 2003; Vázquez 
García 2010). In this sense, a more intense participation by citizens in 
civil society can both make democracy stronger by making it rest on more 
substantial foundations than liberal ones (Barber 2003) and by fostering 
civic virtues, in that the requirements of interest for public affairs, ability 
to speak up, trust and organisation that are required within associations 
are useful for the political realm as well (Warren 2001; Vázquez García 
2010). When it comes to the European Union, Monaghan summarises the 
democratic expectations on EU civil society in the categories of 
participation, representation and communication (Monaghan 2007). 
 
However the role of civil society in the promotion of a more substantial 
democracy has been discussed as well. Hannah Arendt is probably the 
strongest modern critic of civil society by pointing out its role in the 
promotion of privatism (Eliasoph 1998 has emphasised this point as well)  
and in making politics more oligarchical (J. Cohen and Arato 1992, 178–
199). More recently academic literature has suggested that participating 
in civil society organisations does not make citizens more civic and willing 
to participate but that instead there is a self-selection effect where the 
most civic citizens engage in these organisations and movements (Van 
Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). 
 
In the long debate between liberal and communitarian conceptions of civil 
society, the EU seems to have opted for a neo-pluralist system, if 
necessary by engineering it, where the main function of civil society 
organisation is the check and balance of each other to avoid routine 
domination by any of them (Greenwood 2011b). However the EU has also 
raised expectations linked to communitarian or republican traditions that 
European civil society can contribute to deliberation and empowerment of 
citizens (Armstrong 2002; Ruzza 2004, 177; Magnette 2006; Giorgi et al. 
2006), of which the emergence of participatory devices is a testimony. 
Although these approaches should not be contradictory per se, 
expectations that civil society‘s participation can make the EU more 
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legitimate have been matched by negative empirical appreciations. First of 
all the EU‘s civil society consultation model presents some weaknesses 
(Curtin 2003) as it overemphasises the production of outputs (Armstrong 
2002) and representativeness against organisations more active in the 
public sphere (Greenwood and Halpin 2007).  
 
Secondly research has highlighted the weakness of European civil society 
and its distance with citizens. In this sense different empirical 
assessments  point to the difficulty of civil society  organisations to bring 
citizens closer to European institutions (Warleigh 2001; Mahoney 2007; 
Monaghan 2007; Maloney and van Deth 2008) in particular because of the 
distance between these organisations and their grassroots (Sudbery 2003; 
Kohler-Koch 2010a; Kohler-Koch 2010b) which results among others from 
professionalization (Halpin and McLaverty 2010, 59; Buth 2011). The 
thesis will evaluate this distance with members and whether it influences 
the role that civil society organisations can play in the European public 
sphere.  
 
This section addresses first the institutionalisation of a system of civil 
society relations and then considers two heuristic models of how it can 
produce a contribution to the public sphere. One is a democratic 
functionalism model expecting a spill-over of deliberation from specialised 
to general publics the second being a model of participatory mobilisation 
in order to try to achieve an influence on policy making. 
 
2.1. The institutionalisation of dialogue with civil society 
organisations in the EU 
 
The EU institutions long tradition of openness towards social actors and 
interests has been related to the lack of specifically European 
constituencies and the limited staff and resources of the Commission 
(Greenwood 2011b). The most characteristic aspect of the civil society 
relations is its strong institutionalisation (Greenwood 2011b), although 
civil society organisations are able to hold both an institutional and protest 
regime (Ruzza 2004; Ruzza 2011).  
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One of the manifestations of the institutionalisation of this system of civil 
society relations that has attracted more attention is the creation of a 
system of structured relations (Smismans 2003) between the institutions, 
and in particular the Commission, and civil society organisations. The 
most noticeable aspect of this process to which this thesis will pay 
particular attention is the gradual attribution of input legitimacy objectives 
to these relations (Greenwood 2007a). In this sense, it has been pointed 
that these relations were not primarily oriented to increase the EU‘s input 
legitimacy but to contribute to better governance by improving the quality 
of governance (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Saurugger 2007; Michel 
2007; Monaghan 2007), and have increasingly acquired a participatory 
dimension (Greenwood 2011d). The role of civil society consultation as a 
source of legitimacy for the EU has been built incrementally (Armstrong 
2002; Sloat 2003; del Río Villar 2004; Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007; 
Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007; Saurugger 2010). However by emphasising 
the ―constructed aspect‖ of this process (Saurugger 2010) fails to point 
out a second noticeable aspect of the institutionalisation of civil dialogue 
to use the specialised jargon of the field (Fazi and Smith 2006): the role 
of civil society organisations themselves in the institutionalisation of their 
own role as part of the emergence of a participatory democracy model in 
the EU. Analysing this dimension is one of the core objectives of this 
thesis. Chapter 2 devotes particular attention to the ways in which civil 
society organisations and EU institutions have justified formalised contacts 
in order to verify whether those were aimed firstly at input or output 
legitimacy. This issue is of course recurrent in following chapters. 
 
The institutionalisation of this system of relations has consisted in a 
mutually advantageous exchange of funding and access for civil society 
against a supply of expertise and policy support for European integration 
in particular in the social and citizenship domains (Sánchez-Salgado 
2007a; Greenwood 2011b; Mahoney and Beckstrand 2011). This is very 
clearly exemplified by the European Social Policy Forum in 1996 where the 
Commission engaged with civil society organisations in the social domain 
and then supported and funded the creation of an umbrella organisation, 
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the Social Platform, which has since then supported further European 
integration in the policy domain. The creation of a specific statute for 
European civil society features prominently in this period (Will and Kendall 
2009, 309–311), but is quickly shadowed by the institutions‘ recognition 
of the need to institutionalise the consultation of civil society organisations 
which is referred to in a protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty and a 
Communication from the Commission (European Commission 1997). 
Although the legal status of this support, in particular the financial one, 
has been challenged (Ruzza 2004, 47), the majority of European civil 
society has supported these moves as evidenced by civil society‘s 1998 
―red card‖ campaign aimed at securing this source of income (Alhadeff 
and Wilson 2002).  
 
The decisive moment in the attribution of input legitimacy purposes to this 
process, which is analysed in further detail in chapter 2, is clearly the fall 
of the Santer Commission at the turning of the century. This event was 
followed by a process of administrative reform within the Commission 
which culminates in the White Paper on Governance where the strong 
relations with civil society are claimed as an input legitimacy device 
(Michel 2007). The European Economic and Social Committee made an 
even stronger turn by putting forward explicit definitions of civil society 
and precise mechanisms for its consultation in order to introduce 
participatory democracy in the EU (Smismans 2003; Greenwood 2007a; 
Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2011).  
 
The White Paper on Governance  and its subsequent rules for consultation 
(European Commission 2002c) aimed at improving the EU‘s input 
legitimacy by giving stakeholders and concerned organisations a bigger 
role in the policy making process and to structure the relations with civil 
society by norms about fairness and transparency in the consultation 
(Smismans 2003). The aim was to improve the opportunities of all 
relevant actors to have their say in order to achieve a balanced and broad 
policy debate and eventually to extend the debate beyond Brussels: ―In 
this context, civil society organisations play an important role as 
facilitators of a broad policy dialogue‖ (European Commission 2002c, 5). 
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However this process goes hand in hand with the philosophy of the ‗better 
regulation package‘ (European Commission 2002a; European Commission 
2002b) which considers that the stakeholders‘ contribution to the policy-
making process is their expertise which contributes to improving the 
quality of the policies, and thus remains in an output legitimacy logic. In 
addition to that the institutions have also recently considered dialogue 
with civil society as a way to enlarge the European public sphere and to 
engage in an interactive dialogue on EU policies with citizens (European 
Commission 2005; European Parliament 2008). 
 
The European Convention was a decisive moment both for the 
institutionalisation of civil dialogue and for the turn of consultation 
mechanisms into input legitimacy devices. Although the idea that the 
institutionalisation of civil society relations can legitimise the EU has been 
explicitly formulated by the Commission (European Commission 2001; 
European Commission 2002c; European Commission 2005) and despite 
previous references to the inclusion of a legal basis for civil dialogue in the 
Treaties (European Commission 2000, 12), it is not until the Convention 
that an article on the consultation of civil society was included in the 
Treaty under the heading of ―participatory democracy‖3. The European 
Convention thus constitutes a very interesting occasion for analysing the 
emergence of the institutionalisation of civil dialogue as a way to 
democratise the European Union. Additionally its openness to civil society 
and the salience of the Constitution debate evidenced by the multiplication 
of referenda and debates among general publics is an opportunity to 
analyse whether civil society involvement can contribute to the interest of 
citizens at large. 
 
2.2. Democratic functionalism 
 
The term democratic functionalism is borrowed from Eder and Trenz 
(Trenz and Eder 2004; Eder and Trenz 2007) who consider that debates 
                                       
3 The content of this article is the same in article 11 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union, although the words participatory democracy have disappeared, as a result of the 
symbolic de-constitutionalisation that was undertaken during the negotiations following the rejection 
of the TCE. 
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on the legitimacy of the EU in specialised fora such as the consultations on 
the White Paper on Governance and the Convention may become self-
sustaining and contribute to the democratisation of the EU by spilling over 
to general debates. Here the term is stretched and applied more generally 
to consider how the presence of civil society in debates may extend to 
more general publics. 
 
It is authors working on deliberation and deliberative democracy who have 
paid more attention to the presence of civil society organisations in 
specialised consultative fora. Some authors point out that by engaging in 
very intense information exchanges on specialised issues civil society 
organisations come to elaborate common answers with other groups 
(Joerges 2002; Chalmers 2003). Through this process organisations start 
to perceive each other as co-participants in a common project. In this 
sense civil society organisations‘ participation in policy making contributes 
to the emergence of a European public by reducing the distance and 
enhancing cooperation and mutual learning among civil society 
organisations.  
 
Other authors, in particular on the light of the Convention, have pointed 
the importance of participation in policy exchanges as a form of self-
determination in the sense that they contribute to shape the EU by 
participation in deliberative venues (Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Chalmers 
2003; Magnette 2004; Fossum and Schlesinger 2007). Some authors 
have particularly pointed out that such participation may contribute to the 
emergence of a European civic identity by focusing on issues of 
democracy in the EU (Warleigh 2003). Counter intuitively, by pointing out 
the insufficient democratic credentials of the EU, civil society organisations 
contribute to democratise EU integration by putting the issue on the public 
agenda (Trenz and Eder 2004; Eder and Trenz 2007).  
 
However different criticisms can be addressed to this literature. The first 
one is that it seems to identify interest on the EU with consensus about it, 
which does cannot accommodate the abovementioned turn towards EU 
politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010; 
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De Wilde 2011). Secondly, it can be argued that most often than not 
debates in these spaces are on highly technical regulatory legislation 
which is unlikely to spark the interest of the ―ordinary citizen‖. Finally, the 
most significant criticism is that it focuses on deliberation by elite actors 
without sufficiently focusing on how this deliberation spills over to general 
publics (Trenz and Eder 2004; Giorgi et al. 2006).  
 
2.3. A model of participatory mobilisation 
 
The second model consists in a contribution to the emergence of a public 
sphere not by raising debates but by promoting their members and 
generally citizens‘ formal and informal political participation (Vázquez 
García 2010). In particular it can be asked to what extent the 
characterisation of civil society participation as participatory democracy 
can revert the legitimacy crisis and attract citizens‘ attention.   
 
In doing this the key issue is to analyse whether and how organised civil 
society‘s privileged position in the public sphere, in touch with ordinary 
citizens and with institutions, allows it to connect these distant publics. 
Different aspects of European civil society organisations‘ activity may 
contribute to this linkage process (Monaghan 2007). 
  
One possibility is via ―outside lobbying‖. In this sense if organisations 
were to rely on members‘ mobilisation to try to achieve an impact on 
policymakers they could contribute to the diffusion of information about 
the EU. However empirical analysis finds that this is relatively rare among 
EU organisations (Monaghan 2007; Mahoney 2008a). However the 
European Citizens‘ Initiative (ECI), included within the participatory 
democracy article by the Convention, may revitalise this approach. That 
said this mechanism will require a non-negligible ability to mobilise 
members that more established organisations seem unlikely to have. It 
may thus be more attractive for outsider and more eurosceptic 
organisations, making them more prone to participate in EU politics 
(Bouza Garcia 2012).  
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A second way of citizens‘ mobilisation and participation could be achieved 
by ordinary citizens‘ participation in internal decision making within 
organisations participating in European deliberation. Although the 
contributions in (Steffek and Hahn 2010) suggest that there is no 
consensus about these internal democracy mechanisms, it is worth 
analysing the participatory model which has emerged in the EU in the last 
decade in terms of its mobilisation potential. 
 
In this sense authors examining whether civil dialogue makes grassroots 
members interested find the same disconnection between European 
organisations and their members that has already been mentioned. The 
civil dialogue scheme does not seem capable to foster debate beyond well 
established organisations already interested in European policy-making. 
According to Kohler-Koch ―Organised civil society, contributes little to the 
formation of a grass roots based European civil society; it is instrumental 
to ‗better legislation‘ and in order to be efficient and effective it is 
becoming part of the EU elite system‖ (Kohler-Koch 2010b, 13).  
Additionally (Friedrich and Rodekamp 2011) point that even when 
organisations try to inform and mobilise their own members they find 
them disinterested. 
It could be asked whereas increasing usage of digital fora as a 
complement to stakeholders‘ consultation (Michailidou 2010; Bozzini 
2011; Quittkat 2011) could compensate for such tendency. That said it 
seems that these instruments suffer from the same problems of 
‗conventional‘ civil dialogue.  Kohler-Koch reports that practices are very 
variable from one DG to another in particular regarding inclusion of the 
general public: ―The market-related DGs have been hesitant to use the 
instrument of online-consultations and when they use it the consultation is 
mostly addressed to ‗stakeholders‘ and not to the ‗general public‘. General 
Directorates with a broader reach such as employment and social affairs 
or are in charge of a newly established EU policy field such as culture or 
public health are eager to engage the wider public in their consultations 
and, accordingly, use online-consultations and open hearings and 
conferences extensively.‖ (Kohler-Koch 2010b, 9). In addition Michailidou 
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finds that online consultation has been designed as an information and 
communication tool rather than a participatory one (Michailidou 2010), 
since it remains weakly interactive and provides unclear evidence of 
empowerment.  
Associating civil society institutionalisation with participatory democracy 
has a risk that could be called participatory autopoeisis. This happens 
when by the mere inclusion of an existing practice in the Treaty is 
expected to transform a governance inspired tool into a participatory 
mechanism bringing the EU closer to the citizens of being included in the 
Treaty. Civil dialogue is a relevant instrument for building relations and 
trust between EU officials and civil society organisations, convey expertise 
and provide transparent access to the institutions at a relevant moment of 
the policy making process. However it does not seem to entail wider 
participation by grassroots citizens. 
3. Alternatives to direct contact with citizens? On the specificities 
of a space of groups 
The fragmentation of the public sphere into multiple publics (François and 
Neveu 1999; Schlesinger and Deirdre 2000, 209) is not necessarily a 
reformulation of Habermas‘ concept neither an effect of European 
integration since the author associates this fragmentation with the 
consequences of modernisation and mass political and cultural 
participation in the late XIXth century (Habermas 1989, 159 – 175). 
However in the case of the EU, the question of the contribution of civil 
society to democracy must accommodate two distinct aspects. The first 
one is the predominance of groups in the European public sphere in 
contrast to Habermas‘ classical definition‘s emphasis on the participation 
of all individuals. Surprisingly, there are relatively little theoretical 
reflections on the different types of public spheres that can result of civil 
society activism (see Monaghan (2007); Maloney and van Deth (2008) for 
notable exceptions). In this sense the content and effect of a public 
sphere organically promoted by civil society are likely to differ from those 
of a public sphere promoted and articulated by institutions and 
organisations (McLaverty 2002, 312). In this sense one of the objectives 
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of this thesis is to provide an empirical insight on the impact of European 
civil society activism on different sections of the European public sphere. 
 
Another specificity of European civil society activism in the public sphere is 
the abovementioned distance with citizens and grassroots movements. It 
has recently been asked whether the activism of European civil society 
organisations can contribute to democratisation and even to the public 
space despite their lack of direct contact with citizens.  
 
In this sense emphasis has been put on the role of civil society 
organisations in representing causes, members and even citizens in the 
broadest sense (Kohler-Koch 2010a; Ruzza 2011, 462–465). However the 
abovementioned distance with members has also an effect on civil society 
organisations‘ ability to represent them in the sense of formal 
authorisation (Pitkin 1972, 38–59). The EU has strongly encouraged the 
creation of leading European umbrella organisations which can easily 
claim a geographical representation (Greenwood and Halpin 2007: 201). 
This entrusts most European organisations as trustees for their members 
who have given them a formal authorisation to speak on their behalf at EU 
level, but does not provide evidence of their ability to act as delegates as 
few European civil society organisations can really rely on a mandate from 
their members before acting (Monaghan 2007, 190–192; Kohler-Koch 
2010a; Friedrich and Rodekamp 2011), in particular in the short time 
constraints imposed by consultation deadlines (Fazi and Smith 2006; 
Ruzza 2011, 464). As it will be discussed in the following chapters 
representativeness this has been an important issue of contention 
between the social partners and citizen interest groups4. Business groups 
and trade unions, which have traditional internal consultation structures, 
have raised the stakes very high in particular via the EESC (Smismans 
2003), up to the point of suggesting representativeness criteria based on 
their own internal structures (Michel 2007). See for instance UNICE‘s, the 
                                       
4
 This notion will be preferred here to that of NGOs, since social partners are non-governmental 
organizations “strictu senso”. See (Ruzza 2004; Greenwood 2007a) for the explanation of this term. It 
is used in order to avoid the exclusion of social partners and in particular business interests all in 
acknowledging differences between organizations defending particular interests and those acting on 
behalf of visions of the general interest. 
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main business organisation at the EU level, stringent criteria in UNICE 
(2002, 2). 
It can be discussed to what extent representativeness criteria can be 
associated to participatory mechanisms. It has been suggested that when 
they contribute to consultation processes organisations are claiming a 
voice but not a vote (Fazi and Smith 2006: 20), and that thus they are 
simply expressing their freedom of expression. However, the form in 
which civil dialogue is organised and takes place implies that a selection of 
organisations has to take place. Although the Commission has never 
created formal accreditation systems as they exist in the USA, the UN or 
the Council of Europe (Fazi and Smith 2006: 25-26) it has created a de 
facto system relying on ―formalised set of procedures for exchanges with 
outside interests designed to address asymmetries of power‖ (Greenwood 
and Halpin 2007: 206), even though these subtle mechanisms have 
become more open in the decade spanning the CONNECS database and 
the reform of the Transparency Register (Greenwood 2011a, de Castro 
Asarta 2011). Since it will never be possible for every organisation to 
express their point of view in an open market of ideas, even online 
consultation operate on de facto access barriers (Quitkatt and Kotzian 
2011), a criterion that contributions are representative of a wider 
constituency seems reasonable if participation is to reach beyond the 
consultation room. That said it cannot impose a single type of 
representativeness criteria and should take account of the differences 
between membership and cause organisations (Greenwood and Halpin 
2007; Halpin and McLaverty 2010). 
 
As a consequence it has been suggested that civil society organisations 
can play a different representative function in that their function is not to 
act as formally elected representatives nor as delegates, but rather that 
their function is to be active in the public space as representatives of 
causes and interests that would otherwise not be heard (Greenwood and 
Halpin 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010a; Halpin and McLaverty 2010). The 
alternative dimensions of representation, symbolic, descriptive and acting 
for, put forward by Pitkin (1972) in her classical typology have been used 
by several authors to suggest that even in the absence of a clear mandate 
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from members civil society organisations‘ activism is legitimate and fulfils 
an important democratic role in the EU. Castiglione and Warren (2006) 
have argued that it is frequent that in transnational contexts civil society 
actors promote causes without a formal authorisation from members, 
acting for a cause or constituency. That said, representation practices 
vary between different sectors, as Ruzza notes that environmentalists are 
more prone to claim to act for together with an authorisation from 
members whereas pro-minority groups tend to put forward descriptive 
representativeness (Ruzza 2011, 462–463).  
 
Traditional representativeness criteria based on geographical spread or 
number of members often associated with civil society consultation 
mechanisms in the EU (Greenwood and Halpin 2007) are seen as 
irrelevant or even counterproductive when it comes to the role of civil 
society in the public sphere in that they may marginalise cause actors 
(Greenwood and Halpin 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010a; Halpin and McLaverty 
2010). According to Buth one of the reasons of European civil society 
organisations‘ distance with their members, their strong 
professionalisation, provides them with stronger resources and incentives 
to rely on advancing causes in the public space (Buth 2011). Ruzza points 
out that deliberation has been suggested as well as an alternative to 
consultation with members (Ruzza 2011, 464).  
 
In this sense it is not rare that several European organisations have 
adopted an attitude consisting in saying that their representativeness is 
more related to their expertise in a certain domain than to their relation 
with a constituency. In some cases European organisations have 
formulated these strong conceptions of their activity as representatives as 
that of a trustee who acts independently on behalf of an interest but 
without the need to consult it:  
―In general, however, interviewees repeatedly stressed that the 
high level of expertise and experience of EU policy processes held 
by key officers in Brussels means that they are accorded a large 
degree of independence and are ‗more or less left to get on with the 
job‘. ‗EU work‘, stated one interviewee ‗is largely seen as work for 
specialists‘.  Actively seeking to involve supporters in the 
formulation of policy was generally viewed by interviewees as time-
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consuming and rather unrealistic, given the degree of knowledge 
necessary to make an effective contribution.‖ (Sudbery 2003: 90). 
 
The formulation of the debate in these terms suggests that the tensions 
can be understood along the traditional paradigms of the roles of 
delegates versus those of trustees and that of formal versus forms of 
social representativeness. However both dimensions have to be judged 
against empirical assessments of the role of civil society organisations in 
the European institutional system and in the public sphere. In this sense it 
can be suggested that the difficulties of European civil society to formally 
represent their members can act as a difficulty as well to play a role in the 
public sphere. In this sense the notion of representation of causes in the 
public sphere have been criticised as failing to satisfactorily associate 
citizens to policy making (Monaghan 2007, 181). Although it can be 
expected that in a neo-pluralistic setting such as the EU all the 
constituencies having a stake in the EU integration process will be 
mobilised to the result that all the relevant interests will be represented 
(Greenwood 2007b), it can as well be highlighted that different 
constituencies have been mobilised very differently at EU level as a result 
of different collective action problems and access barriers (Balme and 
Chabanet 2008). It can thus be asked to what extent the activism of 
organisations at the EU level without a contact with their own members is 
representative, even in an approximate way, of the concerns of the 
European citizens.  
 
Furthermore the role of civil society organisations as trustees has certainly 
a positive outcome for the defence of the interest they represent, but 
precisely because of this independence from that interest and grassroots 
constituencies it can be challenged to what extent it contributes to making 
the public aware of their activity and thus foster their ―social 
representativeness‖ (Buth 2011). In this sense some civil society 
organisations raise issues in specialised and strong publics without 
promoting them in general publics. As a consequence, whereas it 
undoubtedly has a democratic legitimacy potential, it remains as a 
manifestation of governance with and for the people (V. A. Schmidt 2009) 
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which does not however substantially reach ordinary citizens. Thus 
acknowledging the potential of alternative representation does not 
necessarily contradict that where possible organisations maintain a 
working relation with members ensuring that claims of representativeness 
are grounded on a solid social reality, be it a formal or informal 
representativeness. For instance the ability to raise one million signatures 
in Europe (ECI) could be considered as a relevant demonstration of the 
ability to act for a cause (Bouza Garcia 2010).  
 
4. The European Convention’s agenda on participatory democracy. 
Civil society and the public sphere.  
The previous section has suggested that the European Convention was the 
culminating point of two major evolutions in the system of relations 
between the European institutions and civil society: the institutionalisation 
of consultation via a reference in a Treaty article and the conceptualisation 
of this mechanism as a form of participatory democracy. It has however 
already been highlighted that both tendencies were being addressed in 
different policy exchanges since the mid-90s. It is thus highly expectable 
that this topic was far from new for the Convention and hence it is 
advisable to address the role of civil society organisations in the agenda-
setting process that lead to the consideration of this topic by European 
institutions and then by the Convention. 
It has not been until recently that agenda setting processes have been 
systematically assessed in the EU, although civil society organisations 
have received little attention (Princen 2009). Regarding this, Greenwood 
introduces a distinction between extremely rare influence on policy 
initiation (see Greenwood (2011d) for rare examples about the European 
Women‘s Lobby, the European Round Table of industrialists or ALTER-EU) 
and concrete drafting once the decision to advance a policy has been 
taken. Agenda setting studies do critically analyse collective action and 
ideas and their diffusion (Kingdon 2003, 17). Thus despite the rare 
influence in terms of ―arm-twisting‖ (Kingdon 2003, 17) the literature 
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points to the influence of civil society organisations5 and expert groups in 
the longer term by introducing and promoting ideas in the agenda setting 
process (Haas 1992; Sabatier 1998; Zito 2001; Ruzza 2007; Engel 2007; 
Dreger 2008; Princen 2009). These authors use the notions of epistemic 
communities, policy networks or advocacy coalitions to point out the 
importance exchanges within given sets of organisations for the 
advancement of ideas in the policy agenda. These communities are 
constituted by agents active in the same domain who ―read the same 
publications, go to the same conferences and meetings and in these ways 
develop shared understandings of policy problems and the available policy 
options to deal with them‖ (Princen 2009, 151–152). These and similar 
approaches will be used in order to analyse the way in which ideas of civil 
society consultation and participatory democracy made it to the 
Convention. 
 
The available literature on the role and objectives of civil society during 
the European Convention (del Río Villar 2004; Kværk 2007; Lombardo 
2007; Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007; Clerck-Sachsse 2011) presents 
two main weaknesses that this thesis would contribute to address: a lack 
of in-depth empirical analysis about concrete mechanisms of influence for 
civil society and a neglect of the way in which civil society contributed to 
link the Convention to the public sphere (notable exceptions on both 
registers are Will et al. (2005); Monaghan (2007); A. Cohen and Vauchez 
(2007).  
 
Whereas there are a few analyses of the role of civil society in the 
Convention, they frequently pay more attention to its general role in the 
Convention, its inability to influence and the insufficiency of the access 
mechanisms than to the agenda setting process or to the analysis of 
influence on concrete decisions (Will et al. 2005; Pérez Solórzano-
Borragán 2007; Kværk 2007; Lombardo 2007). In this sense it is frequent 
to attribute the article on participatory democracy to civil society activism 
(del Río Villar 2004, 282–283; 311; Will et al. 2005; Pérez Solórzano-
                                       
5  More usually labeled as interest groups or social actors in this literature 
35 
 
Borragán 2007; Lombardo 2007; Monaghan 2007; del Río Villar 2008; 
Clerck-Sachsse 2011), but most of the empirical analysis focuses on the 
ECI and does not address the paragraphs on civil dialogue, not to say 
provide a comprehensive account of the discussion.  
 
In terms of agenda setting the analysis of the discussions on civil dialogue 
and participatory democracy from the mid-90s to the Convention is 
interesting for different reasons. Firstly it provides the opportunity to 
analyse the entrepreneurship, in Kingdon‘s classical sense (Kingdon 2003, 
180), of civil society organisations and officials in introducing, framing and 
diffusing the issue in the different public spaces. It then provides 
opportunities to analyse whether collective action registers and framing 
varied according to variables such as salience, venue, number and kinds 
of actors (see Mahoney (2007) and Princen (2009), 155–156 for a 
discussion of the importance of these variables in EU agenda-setting). 
Finally it is an interesting case study as the Convention was generally 
perceived as a new phase of the construction of the European Union in 
which citizens would have a much bigger say both in the Treaty reform 
and in its ratification, providing for opportunities for the emergence of a 
wider public sphere (Habermas 2001; Magnette 2004; Castiglione 2007). 
It has been seen as an important opportunity for a real 
constitutionalisation of the EU (Closa Montero 2008a; Menéndez 2010). 
Analysing the role of civil society organisations in framing the issue in 
general publics is thus an important way to analyse precisely how it 
contributes to linking the different public spaces of the Union. In doing 
this it is useful to focus on countries where a referendum was held, and 
the thesis will do so for Spain and France (see a discussion of the 
methodology further on in this chapter).  
 
Regarding the analysis of the role of the Convention in the public sphere, 
whereas national debates on the constitution have been discussed 
extensively (Sauger, Brouard, and Grossman 2007; Lehingue 2007; Mateo 
Gonzalez 2008; Font Fábregas and Rodríguez Ortiz 2007; Glencross and 
Trechsel 2011) mostly for studies on Spain and France), there are few 
analyses on the role of civil organisations in national debates (Seidendorf 
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2010; Dufour 2010) or on transnational mobilisation during the 
Convention (Radaelli and Lucarelli 2004; Trenz 2007; Cook 2008; Liebert 
2011), leaving the question of whether the Convention contributed to link 
the EU and general publics depend exclusively on its impact on the public 
sphere (Maatsch 2007; Vetters, Jentges, and Trenz 2009) and of its 
official listening mechanisms (Cammaerts 2006; Monaghan 2007). 
 
An interesting source of information are firsthand accounts of the 
Convention written by French and Spanish Convention themselves 
(Lamassoure 2004; Borrell Fontelles et al. 2003; Méndez de Vigo 2005) 
close observers such as officials (Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005), civil 
society activists (Alhadeff and Wilson 2002) and journalists (Norman 
2005).   
 
In particular it will build on contributions on the national debates and 
referenda in Spain (Anduiza 2005; Font Fábregas and Rodríguez Ortiz 
2007; Closa Montero 2008b; Mateo Gonzalez 2008), in France 
(Agrikoliansky 2007; Sauger, Brouard, and Grossman 2007; Lehingue 
2007; Chopin 2008; Dufour 2010) or comparing different referenda 
(Radaelli and Lucarelli 2004; Seidendorf 2010; Glencross and Trechsel 
2011) that tend to show the disconnection between the debate the EU 
level and the national one, and the role of some activist civil society 
organisations in framing these debates (Agrikoliansky 2007; Seidendorf 
2010; Dufour 2010).  
 
5. Analysing the effects of civil society activism and the European 
public spheres: agenda setting, frame creation and diffusion 
Conceiving the European public sphere as a series of different public 
spaces with varying actors‘ configurations and focusing on the role of civil 
society as a segmented public between the institutions and European 
citizens makes it possible to use research frameworks on the interaction 
between groups and between them and institutions for understanding the 
functioning of the European public sphere. This will allow using empirical 
observations on the behaviour of European civil society organisations 
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during the Convention to try to explain how and under which conditions 
they contribute to link different publics. 
 
In this sense, the thesis will build on well developed insights on the 
political sociology of the European political system and in particular 
regarding the role of civil society within it. Despite some caricature 
depictions in the media, resources are not enough for lobbies to promote 
or stop legislation (Kingdon 2003, 51–53; Baumgartner et al. 2009), 
much less in the EU (Mahoney 2008b). Instead research on civil society 
organisations in the EU suggests that their role is rather explained by their 
functional contribution to European integration in terms of input of 
expertise and legitimacy. 
 
The long established relation between civil society and institutions has 
undoubtedly influenced the preference of European civil society 
organisations for an insider collective action register (Ruzza 2004; 
Mahoney 2007; Kriesi 2007; Mahoney 2008a; Balme and Chabanet 2008). 
In this sense, trust and reputation among policy makers and with other 
organisations is a very relevant resource for civil society influence which is 
achieved by long lasting involvement in the policy arena (Quittkat and 
Kotzian 2011; Greenwood 2011b). 
 
In theoretical terms this suggests the appropriateness of a sociological 
institutionalism approach in order to try to understand how organisations 
build reputation and trust. In this sense, the debates between civil society 
organisations about civil dialogue suggest that a set of organisations were 
promoting a policy that would grant them advantages in the EU 
institutional system. The characteristics of the existence of different 
organisations and institutions promoting a policy for different reasons, 
secure access for organisations, legitimacy for the Commission, reacting 
to each others‘ proposals, along a well defined set of formal and informal 
―rules of the game‖ resonates  with Pierre Bourdieu‘s idea of a social field 
(Bourdieu 1981; Bourdieu 1984). The notion of organisational field 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65–66; Scott 2008, 185–190), which has 
since been applied to EU politics and mobilisations (Stone Sweet, 
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Fligstein, and Sandholtz 2001; Ruzza 2007; Dufour 2010) may be useful 
to explain the patterns of relations between the participants of the field 
and with publics outside of it. Additionally neo-institutional theory may be 
particularly useful for this analysis given its recent focus on the influence 
of ideas and discourses in organisations (Scott 2008; V. Schmidt 2010). 
 
An important aspect of the process of promotion of ideas by civil society 
organisations in the EU is framing (Ruzza 2004; Ruzza 2007; Bozzini 
2010). Both advocacy coalition and frame analysis coincide in pointing out 
that organisations have a set of core values and demands which tend to 
vary only on the long term, whereas those are accompanied or framed by 
more accessory demands. In this sense framing is characteristically a 
process where these core ideas and values are presented differently in 
different circumstances and publics (Snow et al. 1986; Zald 1996). 
 
As it has been said direct mobilisation of the public and supporters in 
media campaigns or mass demonstrations is definitely an exception in the 
collective action registers of organisations active in the EU (Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Balme and Chabanet 2008; Della Porta 2007). On the 
contrary, it seems that the organisation of coalitions and involvement in 
networks promoting the inclusion of ideas and causes in the EU‘s agenda 
is a frequent activity of EU civil society organisations  (Ruzza 2004; 
Mahoney 2007; Ruzza 2011; Greenwood 2011b) although it is rarely 
asked how these entrepreneurs contribute to amplify the frameworks 
which they promote beyond these segmented publics (Snow et al. 1986; 
Kingdon 2003; Muller 2005). This thesis benefits from the relatively high 
salience of the Convention and the Constitution for reconstructing this 
dimension for the case of the debate on participatory democracy in the 
European Union. Obviously if this question is rarely addressed in the 
context of the EU it is because of the abovementioned disconnection 
between the different publics of the EU. Thus, in relation with Mahoney‘s 
(2007) and Princen (2009) findings it is important to ask how the 
institutional setup of the policy venues influences the strategic choices of 
the actors and thus the degree to which these actors address the public.  
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6. Research objectives and hypotheses 
In order to address several of the questions that have been identified 
above, the thesis asks the following research question: did European civil 
society organisations have an influence in raising the issue of participatory 
democracy during the European Convention and in this case did that 
foster the interest of Spanish and French civil society organisations for this 
debate? 
 
On the grounds of the analysis of the literature on agenda setting and civil 
society activism and institutionalisation in the EU, two questions have to 
be asked about the role of civil society organisations in the Convention. 
Did the previous debates on civil society institutionalisation contribute to 
shape the agenda and foster civil society cooperation on the issue? What 
was the objective that organisations sought to achieve in this process? 
How did civil society organisations bring this issue to the Convention? The 
review of literature on the institutionalisation of civil dialogue suggests 
that it is necessary to analyse the consultations on civil dialogue (1997-
2002) and the Convention as a sequence. 
 
In relation to the first question the hypothesis is that the Convention‘s 
agenda on participatory democracy was influenced by the previous 
discussions on civil dialogue. As a result of these successive changes in 
venues and varying emphasis on different policy issues along these 
discussions an important variation in the framing of the issue and on the 
constellation of actors can be expected. In relation to framing it should be 
asked how arguments about democracy and citizenship evolved according 
to advocacy and coalition making strategies in the different moments. It 
has been pointed above that the institutions have used unstable 
justifications and strategic objectives for the institutionalisation of 
consultation such as the promotion of a European public sphere, civil 
dialogue or participatory democracy. In this sense it must be asked 
whether organisations had stable core demands and frames or whether 
these were adapted to the venue. 
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It can as well be expected that these previous consultations fostered the 
emergence of coalitions of actors advocating similar positions. For doing 
so the emergence of formal and informal coalitions and the rationale 
behind those will be analysed. Given that institutionalisation of civil 
dialogue is largely seen as reinforcing the position of civil society in the EU 
(Fazi and Smith 2006) and the strong profile that the Commission has 
taken in its promotion (Sánchez-Salgado 2007a), it is not expectable to 
find a strongly organised opposition to the principle, but rather a 
discussion on details, above all on representativeness requirements. 
 
In relation to the second question on the ways of advocacy, there are 
reasons to expect that the main register along the process was 
participation in formal events and consultations by sending written 
statements and. This regular involvement is likely to create trust and 
grant organisations access to more informal consultations or at least give 
them a leadership role making their contributions more salient. It can 
however be expected that the change of venue from the Commission 
consultations to the Convention significantly changed ways of advocacy 
(Princen 2009). Whereas civil society organisations maintained this 
strategy during the Convention, it could be expected that they had to 
innovate on their register. In particular given the salience and the political 
expectations of the Convention it could be expected that organisations 
had a stronger recourse to outside lobbying and in general to more public 
mobilisation-based registers (Mahoney 2008a). In terms of ways of access 
to the Convention, it can be expected that the large number of 
participants made formal events relatively weaker in comparison to 
Commission consultations and that informal contacts mattered more. In 
this sense it is expected that the Commission was civil society 
organisations‘ main interlocutor on this topic during the Convention. 
The second question to be addressed is whether the Convention created 
the conditions making civil society organisations prone to address the 
general public. Competitive pressures and claims have been identified as 
the main drivers or the politicisation of civil society claims making and of 
the recourse of civil society organisations to strategies of mobilisation 
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(Giorgi et al. 2006; Della Porta 2007). The large number of participants in 
the Convention could have constituted such a pressure. In this sense the 
two main questions are whether European organisations addressed the 
general public through their own members and supporters at the national 
level and whether the debate on participatory democracy fostered interest 
among Spanish and French organisations. For the same reasons that it 
was decided to focus on the organisations strongly involved in the 
agenda-setting process rather than on the perception of participatory 
democracy by a random sample of organisations it was considered that 
trying to link civil society activism in the Convention to the salience of a 
topic in the general media would probably be inconclusive. This is why this 
thesis will focus on the impact of national civil society organisations as 
intermediates for general publics. It should already be clear from the 
theoretical framework that civil society organisations belong to specialised 
publics and can thus not be considered as proxies or substitutes of 
general publics, since the fact that civil society engages with an issue does 
not mean that it is representative of the general publics concerns (see 
section 3 on this respect). However it is possible to analyse whether 
national organisations assumed European frames and whether they 
engaged in activism for diffusing these frames among general publics 
during the national debates. Eventually frame circulation from the 
Convention to the ratification debates by the intermediary of national 
organisations would constitute a precise example of how civil society 
contributes to link European specialised and general publics. It will thus 
analyse whether the activism on consultation and civil dialogue by 
European civil society organisations attracted the interest of Spanish and 
French organisations. It will consider whether they shared the framing of 
European organisations and whether they contributed to diffuse it among 
national publics. It will as well have to be asked if European organisations 
did themselves contribute to raise the issue among European publics 
along one of the two models outlined above. 
 
In assessing the way in which this activism was diffused to general publics 
it will be important as well to consider which national organisations 
participated in the Convention. This could mean that the Convention 
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attracted new actors and thus contributed to enlarge debates on European 
issues in contrast with the importance of long-standing involvement and 
trust that is suggested by the literature (Balme and Chabanet 2008; 
Quittkat and Kotzian 2011). In this sense the hypotheses is that 
participatory democracy may not have been relevant for most national 
organisations, because the actual content of the debate consisted in the 
institutionalisation of access for European organisations. However the 
increased presence of national organisations, and in particular of 
potentially euro-sceptic groups, may have acted as a competitive pressure 
for European organisations to ―go public‖ during the Convention (Della 
Porta 2007).  
 
Finally, regarding the question of the legitimacy of European integration 
and the increasing politicisation of contestation, it will be asked whether 
the framing about participatory democracy in European and national 
debates contributed to the emergence of a politically contested discussion 
on European integration in the sense that participation would be linked to 
ways of promoting alternative political projects rather than to the 
institutional rationale of the need to achieve a large consultation. This 
seems unlikely in that the main content of the discussion was the 
institutionalisation of an elite public, which could hardly be reframed as a 
way to introduce alternatives in the EU and to allow participation by 
outsiders.  
7. Hypotheses operationalisation, data review and methodology  
These questions will be operationalised by focusing on different variables 
and their interrelation. Given its focus on a concrete subject of discussion 
and more precisely on how it was introduced and framed in the agenda 
the research will mainly follow a qualitative approach, although some of 
these data will be formalised quantitatively to provide a precise account of 
the evolution of framing and of the networking relations between the 
organisations considered. 
 
One of the relevant features of the debate about participatory democracy 
in the Convention is that it can be traced back to a series of exchanges of 
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views on these topics between civil society organisations and European 
institutions. These exchanges constitute a number of discourses on civil 
society and participatory democracy in the EU. Given the wide use of the 
notion of discourse, it is important to make it explicit how it is understood 
in this work. The critical realist approach of Fairclough will be followed in 
the sense that discourse will not be taken as the whole or even only social 
activity as it is usually understood in constructivist approaches. 
Although the proposal of participatory democracy as a way to revert the 
criticisms of the lack of democratic legitimacy is a social construction, as it 
is the idea of civil society consultation as a model of participatory 
democracy, this construction takes place in a social environment which is 
not totally flexible but constrained by resource availability (Fairclough 
2005, 931). In this case the constraints are the possibilities to secure 
channels of access to the institutions. Organisations‘ ability to construct 
social reality is thus fundamentally mediated by their embeddedness in an 
institutional system. 
 
In this sense discourses, in the plural as Fairclough emphasises, are 
understood here as particular ways of representing, talking about and 
understanding the world or aspects of the world (see (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002, 1; Fairclough 2003, 24) for very similar definitions). In this 
sense different discourses on participatory democracy will be identified 
and compared, with a particular focus on the emergence of shared 
discourses, similarities and differences and convergences and divergences 
between organisations‘ discourses. 
 
Discourses are both means of advocacy and their manifestation. They will 
be understood in a strategic way, that is, as ―frames acting as a way for 
social groups to advance their interests and projects‖ (Howarth 2000, 3). 
The aim of the thesis will be to understand how the evolution of the 
discourses in the context of the organisations‘ collective action. In this 
sense the evolution of the discourse will be linked to the different ways in 
which organisations are active in the social field, or to use Goffman's 
(2006) classical terminology, to understand what is going on and to act in 
the different scenarios where they are active. The aim is to understand 
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how the frames evolve and flow to different actors in relation to the 
objectives that these actors were trying to achieve.  
 
In this sense, analysis of the activity of organised civil society during the 
Convention cannot be limited to the evolution of the way in which they 
framed their activity. Thus the thesis will analyse civil society‘s forms of 
collective action during the agenda-setting process, the Convention and 
its aftermath. The activities that will be considered are thus the 
participation in the formal consultation events, the submission of written 
documents to these exercises, the establishment of informal contacts with 
officials, relations with other groups and with their members and 
participation in formal and informal coalitions. Particular attention will be 
paid to activism in national debates, in particular by diffusing information 
about participatory democracy to the general public and to putting it in 
practice by articulating citizens‘ participation in the ratification debates in 
different forms going from organising debate evenings to issuing voting 
recommendations. 
7.1. Research design: sample selection and time frame 
The choice to analyse the agenda setting process preceding the 
Convention influences the time frame. The importance attributed to action 
in the public sphere, to framing and to collective action suggests the 
necessity to focus on public consultations, the need to understand 
informal contacts notwithstanding.  
As it has been said the first public consultation on the role of organised 
civil society in fostering the EU‘s social dimension was the social forum 
organised in 1996, followed by a communication in 1997 which was open 
for stakeholders comments (European Commission 1997). The question of 
the role of civil society in the EU and its position in the institutional system 
is addressed by Commission communications in 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
Interestingly the Laeken declaration (European Council 2001) follows up 
this approach by referring to the need to make the EU more democratic 
and granting it an access to the Convention which would include in its final 
version in July 2003 an article on participatory democracy with an explicit 
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reference to civil society consultation. The time frame, extending from 
1996 to 2003, is thus sufficient to observe the emergence, evolution and 
inclusion of the issue in the agenda, and represents a sufficiently large 
number of actors and institutions to have a comprehensive picture on the 
process. Additionally it was chosen to analyse the effect of these 
specialised fora among national publics. For obvious reasons the analysis 
had to be limited geographically. The choice was to analyse countries 
where ratification had proceeded via referendum, since this can be 
considered as the best example of a debate reaching every individual 
citizens on a salient issue. It was considered important as well to focus on 
debates having produced opposite results in order to consider different 
dynamics. The choice of Spain and France combined these requisites with 
the author‘s skills.  
Given the relatively long time frame and the high number of organisations 
taking part in the consultation - 800 only for the Convention according to 
(Kværk 2007) - it is impossible to consider the entire population. In this 
sense it will be necessary to choose a limited number of civil society 
actors and analyse their contribution. However, given the choice to 
analyse a specific aspect of agenda setting (participatory democracy), 
doing this by studying a representative random sample of the entire 
population of organisations active in the Convention would be highly 
inconclusive, because for a large number of organisations in such sample 
the contribution to these contributions would not be necessarily on the 
aspects of the agenda that it is being considered. Instead, the thesis 
analyses the role of the most active organisations in the process. In this 
sense it has been decided to analyse only the role of organisations active 
during the Convention and in two of the other previous consultation 
processes. This arbitrary ―boundary‖ avoids thus the bias that would be 
introduced by a selection by the author according to reputation or 
―snowballing‖. The result is a picture composed by some of the core 
organisations of Brussels civil society but with a fair representation of 
other groups such as business or regional interest organisations. The only 
exceptions that have been applied to the selection of European groups 
regards 3 organisations which failed to meet this threshold but that are 
46 
 
pointed out as particularly important in the process. Those are ETUC as a 
social partner, CSCG as the broadest umbrella organisation of citizens‘ 
interests and IRI, insistently pointed out as the main driver of the debate 
on the ECI (Lamassoure 2004; del Río Villar 2004; Clerck-Sachsse 2011). 
The result is a constituency of about 22 organisations, the list of which 
can be consulted in annex number 2.  
A similar logic is followed for national organisations, in that the thesis 
focuses on Spanish and French organisations that were involved in the 
Convention‘s preparatory group on citizens and institutions where issues 
on the role of civil society organisations were addressed. Additionally, the 
Spanish and French members of the European organisations selected were 
contacted as a way to analyse the relations between EU groups and their 
members in the two countries of the focus of the study. Very few 
organisations reported on any sort of exchange and were included in this 
way. See annexes 3 and 4 for a list of 26 national organisations and the 
rationale of their inclusion in the study.  
The result is a sample of 48 organisations that were involved in the 
Convention. The bias effects of this sample must be discussed in order to 
understand the conclusions that can and cannot be derived from its 
analysis. The first bias is that it cannot be claim to represent civil society 
activity during the Convention. It represents a group of organisations 
particularly active and undoubtedly having privileged links to institutions 
and officials. Neither is it representative of the access mechanisms, issue 
focus and framing of the civil society organisations which participated in 
the Convention and in the previous consultations. However it can provide 
a very detailed picture of what civil society organisations expected to 
achieve by repeated involvement in these consultations. It is thus the best 
way to analyse the influence of organisations in the agenda-setting 
process since all the actors that are likely to have been involved will be 
included and it is possible to analyse this in depth. Additionally it is the 
best procedure to analyse precisely the connection between civil society 
and the other publics, that is, the institutions and general public. To 
summarise, in terms of bias the preference is put on analysing how 
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organisations able to interact with institutions engage with the general 
public, even if the result will not be directly generalisable. This is because 
most of the expectations on the ability of civil society to mediate between 
EU institutions and citizens rest on active organisations and not on those 
involved occasionally. 
7.2. Data 
These questions suggest putting the research focus upon two broad 
categories of data, firstly organisations‘ demands, expectations and 
discourses and secondly their actions and activism in the different 
scenarios.  
 
Since the aim of the frame is to communicate organisations‘ preferences 
to the institutions and other organisations, it is important to analyse how 
discourses and frames are built and evolve in these public documents. In 
order to do this, the written contributions submitted by every organisation 
for these consultations has been analysed in detail and coded in order to 
map the discourses which framed the discussion during this process. The 
data available are 206 position papers, that is 14 papers for the 2000 
consultation, 17 for the 2001, 13 for the 2002 and 162 for the 
Convention, of which 79 correspond to EU groups, 44 to Spanish ones and 
39 to French organisations. Additionally 112 official documents have been 
analysed in order to analyse their relation with civil society framing. This 
were the 4 communications by the Commission, 18 Commission staff 
reports on the works of the Convention, 9 documents from the Secretariat 
of the Convention, 18 reports on the hearings of organised civil society 
held at the EESC during the Convention, 61 amendments by members of 
the Convention to the article on participatory democracy and 2 reports 
from national Conventions. 
  
Although these documents are usually publicly available, two problems 
were encountered when gathering documents. The documents for the 
1997 consultation were not publicly available, but access was obtained to 
first hand reports on the condition not to reproduce them. More seriously, 
the documents submitted by civil society to the Convention were not 
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publicly available and the Commission, which was responsible for the 
administration of that website, was unable to produce them. This 
important shortcoming was partially overcome thanks to access to these 
data provided from other researchers and from the archive of some civil 
society organisations. The result is that papers from 16 out of 22 
organisations were finally available, thus significantly reducing this 
difficulty. Interviews have also provided very complete data about 20 of 
the 22 organisations.  
 
On a second topic, it was necessary to gain access to data about how the 
organisations promoted their points of view at the EU and national level, 
as well as what were the patterns of relation between them. This has been 
done by using both primary and secondary sources. Firstly, all available 
observations about participation in fora, coalitions or consultative groups 
available in consultation websites have been used. Additionally, it was 
decided to carry out in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
representatives of all the organisations and with officials active in the 
process in order to understand how each organisation participated in the 
process and what its relations with the national public were. These were 
conducted with a broad list of topics rather than a detailed and strict 
questionnaire in order to avoid missing information from the interviewees 
by imposing a closed list of questions. The list of themes always 
addressed the way in which organisations participated in the process, 
what they sought to achieve, in particular by asking explicitly what was 
the rationale for promoting (or eventually opposing) the inclusion of the 
participatory democracy principle in the Treaty and what were their 
relations with members in Spain and France. 51 interviews have been 
carried out, of which 13 correspond to officials and members of the 
Convention (including 2 Spanish national civil servants), 8 to French 
organisations, 11 to Spanish organisations and 19 to European 
organisations. The response rate was very high, with about 80% of the 
target organisations responding positively. These interviews were carried 
in English or French, to the choice of the interviewee, with European 
organisations and in Spanish and French with national organisations in 
order to allow interviewees to be more comfortable and maximise the 
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information obtained. All recorded interviews were fully transcribed and 
analysed in the language of origin.  
 
Finally, a questionnaire asking interviewees about their contacts about 
participatory democracy (from exchange of opinions to common action) 
with the other organisations of the sample was circulated among them in 
order to complete the information about collective action that was being 
gathered from documents and interviews. The response rate for this 
source was lower than for interview demands but still acceptable (42%). 
 
This combination of research methods raises the issue of possible 
contradictions between different sources as well as the eventual bias 
introduced in interviews as a result of the time lapse between the time 
frame of focus (1996 – 2005) and the field work (2009-2011). These 
issues are discussed at the end of this chapter. 
 
7.3. Analysis method 
 
The method followed in this thesis consists in an in-depth analysis of both 
discourses and collective action which will then be cross-analysed to gain 
understanding of whether the question of participatory democracy in the 
EU reached the general public.  
 
The discourses produced in the public documents have been analysed 
along some established practice in the field (Ruzza 2007; Princen 2009; 
Bozzini 2010) by coding the data into common categories that can then be 
compared. In order to analyse the individual discourses and the collective 
frames, as well as to avoid imposing the author‘s interpretive schemes 
since the first approach to the data, these have been coded in two 
different ways. Firstly, a descriptive coding approach where the data were 
coded inductively was followed, and the codes were organised 
chronologically. On a second phase a more analytical coding was 
produced. This reduced the number of codes by organising them in more 
general categories. These regroup positions on questions of detail of the 
consultation process, on the need and ways to institutionalise 
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consultation, the political rationale for this institutionalisation and 
eventually references to participatory democracy. Additionally, they 
include references to different aspects of what is European civil society, 
who belongs to it and how it contribute to European integration. 
Additionally, issues of relations with national organisations and citizens in 
general and other forms of direct citizens‘ participation emerged during 
the Convention. In order to analyse the emergence of the frame and 
compare the discourse, it was noted how many and which organisations 
were taking positions in each case and the aggregate evolution of 
attention to an issue and positions was analysed. In terms of the content, 
it is very noticeable that organisations tend to employ the same notions 
as institutions. These notions were analysed literally without modifying 
them; thus, for instance, in no case ―civil dialogue‖ was analysed as 
―participatory democracy‖ if this aspect was not elaborated in the data. In 
this sense, aspects of more detailed discourse-centred analysis have been 
applied to key issues such as evolutions from civil society to citizens, and 
about conceptions of representativeness. See chapter 2 for the details 
about the coding method.  
 
Collective action has been analysed with a special focus on access to 
institutions and to coalition behaviour and networking. In this sense, it is 
analysed how organisations promoted their views, what were the formal 
and informal ways of access. Interviews with officials are valuable sources 
in this respect. Finally, analysis of the relations between organisations has 
been done via network analysis, in particular by focusing on individual 
actor centralities, that is, the position of actors in the network as well as 
structural similarities in order to analyse the types of behaviour that 
similar actors adopted. Particular attention was paid to contacts between 
national and European organisations, to networks of communication and 
to the specific common action networking in contrast with simple 
exchanges of opinions. Furthermore, when analysing the choice of 
partners and of strategies of collective action the kind of actors which 
contributed to the eventual diffusion of discourses about participatory 
democracy was considered, that is, whether the organisations lobbying 
more actively were as well those contributing to the diffusion. 
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Additionally, these different approaches will have to be combined and 
cross-analysed. The correspondence between discourses on participatory 
democracy and patterns of coalition between organisations will be 
assessed in order to address the question of the influence of organisations 
in the diffusion of discourses. Secondly, the correspondence between 
discourses on participatory democracy and choices of advocacy strategies 
will be addressed. This will be done for each type of discourse, and will 
allow checking whether the attitudes of civil society towards participatory 
democracy correspond to a more intense usage of participatory strategies.  
 
7.4. Epistemology 
This research builds on a strongly emerging approach which seeks to use 
discourse analysis in order to understand organisational and institutional 
processes and characteristics (D. Grant, Hardy, and Putnam 2004; 
Fairclough 2005; Scott 2008; V. Schmidt 2010).  
 
In this sense the aim of the research is to understand whether and how 
arguing publicly and discourse as a strategy of civil society links the 
different segments of the public sphere. In this sense although the 
strategies and goals of organisations are considered the emphasis is put 
on the effects of organisations activism. The primary aim is not to 
interpret whether groups were advancing their interests or their ideologies 
with their activism on participatory democracy (Ruzza 2011, 461), but 
rather to understand the effects of that activism. In particular, as it will be 
seen in chapter 2 ideological elements about participation in the discourse 
of civil society organisations strongly coincide with their own interests, 
since the notion of participation is strongly related to the involvement of 
organised groups.  
 
It can be said that this project relies on a positivist rationale that 
considers it possible to discern, characterise and analyse an objective 
action by organisations. Public discourse is understood as a form of action 
of organisations, but not the only one. In this sense it is argued that not 
all the activities of organisations are shaped by discourses as some of 
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their interests are formed independently of the way in which discourse is 
formulated. On the contrary, discourse expresses ways to justify those 
interests. Chapter 2 offers strong evidence for this, since it shows clearly 
that organisations have a set of core objectives which remain stable while 
the manner in which the legitimacy of such objectives is presented 
evolves quite clearly. Frame analysis appears thus as the most useful 
analytical framework. This approach relies on ―empirically derived data to 
identify patterns and regularities within the discursive interactions of 
various organizational actors‖ (D. Grant, Hardy, and Putnam 2004, 15) 
and thus finds itself in the positivist side of discursive approaches. These 
conceptions have been criticised as unable to uncover the power struggles 
related to these processes of convergence. 
 
However this last criticism seems not to make much sense in the context 
of this research, as the aim is precisely to understand the power struggles 
and interests that are conveyed by organisations‘ discourse. Additionally it 
does take discourse seriously and not merely in a descriptive and 
rhetorical manner, as on the contrary emphasis is put on the role of public 
discourse and publicity in the transformation of the relations between 
organisations. In this sense, the bounded rationality context imposed on 
actors‘ strategies in terms of seeking selfish objectives is an important 
factor that affects individual organisations‘ preferred outcomes and 
strategies. In this sense the positivist approach to discourse does thus not 
necessarily imply a realist or rationalist analytical approach relying on 
mere interest calculation by the actors. Thus emphasis is put in achieving 
a reliable and replicable research framework by using inasmuch as 
possible a clear perspective on organisations‘ activism. It is argued that 
this does not hinder but rather enhances a better understanding of such 
power struggles. Furthermore, this approach does not diminish the 
importance of discourse as obviously organisations formulate and justify 
their strategies discursively. The thesis provides evidence that the way in 
which organisations frame their demands has unexpected effects in the 
results of their advocacy. 
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In relation to interviews, according to this positivist approach it is 
assumed ―that the accounts provided by respondents are an accurate and 
honest reflection of their beliefs, activities and opinions‖ (Monaghan 2007, 
46) rather than a contextual interaction between the interviewer and 
interviewee. When doing this, the obvious implication is that the 
information provided by the interviewee may not always be accurate. In 
addition to the possibility that the interviewee would not like to disclose 
their opinion and activities, this research faces the fact that a non-
negligible time had elapsed between the moments addressed in the 
interviews (1996-2005) and the field work (2009-2011). The first risk was 
that interviewees could have difficulties in retrieving the processes, in 
particular those for whom the question of participatory democracy was not 
a primary question. The second and more subtle was that interviewees 
would retrospectively justify or reconstruct their positions, in order to 
adjust it to their current organisation‘s position on the issue.  
 
In order to address these issues, a control mechanism has been 
established consisting in a triangulation of the data. In fact, two sorts of 
triangulations have been established: triangulation between primary and 
secondary sources and a triangulation between the information provided 
by different interviewees. When interview data or accounts from the 
actors are used, that is, in the context of subjective behaviour, the data 
were always analysed in the context of the general action, rather than 
merely in terms of the behaviour of a single actor. This allows for 
comparisons making it possible to interpret what organisations‘ were 
trying to achieve. Whenever possible this is compared to position papers 
as well. Whenever the aim is to analyse organisations‘ discourse, the data 
are not triangulated. In that case the aim is to analyse the evolution, and 
thus changes of opinions are analysed in relation to the time frame rather 
than as contradictions. Only in a few cases the discourse in interviews and 
in position papers is compared and contradictions highlighted (such as in 
the case of the complex notion of representativeness). It has generally 
appeared that the data were very reliable as there were very few 
contradictions between the different sources and the interviewees. 
Whenever contradictions appear those are highlighted and interpreted. 
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In compliance with professional practice and Robert Gordon University‘s 
ethical assessment requirements, interviews were recorded with the 
explicit agreement of interviewees, who agreed to being quoted without 
being identified. When the interviewee did not consent, notes were taken 
and only comments on general processes were used. All interview data 
have been anonymised to protect the interviewees‘ identity. Additionally, 
biographical data and similar have been omitted from the transcriptions 
for the same reasons. It turns out that none of these data are necessary 
for the presentation of the results. The rest of the data were either 
available in the public domain or obtained from legitimate sources such as 
archives and repositories of EU institutions, civil society organisations or 
other researchers.  
 
8. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis follows inasmuch as possible a chronological and an inductive 
approach analysing concrete data and situations to try to use them for the 
general discussion. Chapter 2 examines the creation of a frame on 
participatory democracy in exchanges between institutions and civil 
society before the Convention and relates this to the policy objectives of 
each actor. Chapter 3 analyses the role of civil society organisations in the 
Convention‘s debate on participatory democracy, paying particular 
attention to the agenda setting process and the relation of these 
discussions with the abovementioned frame. Chapter 4 addresses the 
objectives of organisations and institutions in this process in order to 
understand which collective action dynamics were in place and suggests 
that the process going from the mid-nineties to the Convention was that 
of the creation of an organisational field of specialists on civil society 
consultation. Chapter 5 analyses the contacts between European and 
national organisations in the Convention and the role that Spanish and 
French groups played in this venue. Chapter 6 analyses the position of 
national organisations on participatory democracy and whether and how 
European and national civil society organisations contributed to circulate 
this frame during the ratification debates in Spain (February 2005) and 
France (May 2005). Chapter 7 analyses the participation of these 
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organisations in the national ratification debates with particular attention 
to their role in framing debates and in articulating the participation of their 
members in the referenda. Chapter 8 addresses the questions raised in 
this chapter and answers them on the basis of the findings, producing a 
general reflection on the strong role of groups in the European public 
sphere and how to analyse the conditions in which different European 
publics relate to each other. 
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Chapter 2: The making of the EU’s 
participatory democracy agenda, 1997-2003.  
This chapter addresses the hypotheses raised about civil society in the 
consultations on civil society dialogue preceding the Convention. In 
particular it will ask how organisations participated and what they were 
trying to achieve in this process, whereas the next chapters will analyse 
how these issues were brought to the Convention and which cooperation 
relations were established among organisations.  
Chapter 1 has raised some expectations in relation to this, the main one 
being that these consultations were decisive in setting the Convention‘s 
agenda on EU - civil society relations. In relation to this it is expected that 
the core demand of European civil society organisations consisted in 
institutionalising their role in the policy-making process rather than 
defining a participatory model for the EU (del Río Villar 2004). The 
rationale for this expectation is twofold. Firstly, the strong 
institutionalisation of the system of EU-civil society relations advantages 
citizens‘ interests (Fazi and Smith 2006) and is a way to balance private 
interest representation organisations (Greenwood 2011b). Secondly, it 
has already been highlighted that the EU‘s agenda on participatory 
democracy was fostered by elite institutional, political and academic 
actors promoting their own position in the institutional system in the EU 
(Saurugger 2010). Given the salience of civil society in this discourse, it 
can thus be expected that civil society organisations‘ contribution to the 
agenda setting was as well aimed at promoting their own role by using 
arguments about participation as a way to make them more legitimate.  
 
It is also expected to find a significant variance in terms of involved actors 
and framing in the different consultations taken into account before the 
Convention (1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002). It must be borne in mind that 
consultations are reactive processes where organisations reply to the 
focus of the Commission on different policy issues. And this focus is 
volatile: although all the consultations include the question of which rules 
should be applied to organised civil society consultation, this is only the 
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central question in the 2002 and to a lesser extent of the 2000 
consultation, whereas the 2001White Paper has a higher political profile 
and the 1997 consultation was firstly aimed to promote civil society in 
Europe in the context of enlargement.  
 
This is why it must be asked whether a clear and stable demand by 
organisations emerges, or whether their contributions are reactive to the 
Commission‘s focus. This is particularly important as changing rationales 
have been used in order to justify the institutionalisation of consultation 
procedures. Some of these legitimatory frames are the European public 
sphere, civil dialogue or participatory democracy. Particular importance 
will thus be paid to the way in which the organisations‘ demands are 
justified and argued in this segmented public space. Although key aspects 
of the agenda setting process are undoubtedly informal, in the context of 
public consultations are organisations need to argue for their demands in 
terms that are acceptable for the rest of the actors (Naurin 2007, 20–24). 
It is thus important to analyse whether arguments about democracy and 
citizenship were used to frame the demands and whether those evolved 
according to advocacy and coalition making strategies in the different 
moments. It can be argued that the framing process contributed to frame 
existing civil society consultation mechanisms as elements of a model of 
participatory democracy in the EU (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007). 
The chapter proceeds by analysing what organisations demanded and how 
they spoke and argued publicly about participation and democracy. This is 
done via an in depth analysis of organisations‘ discourses which, as it was 
said in chapter 1, are understood here as ways of making sense of the 
social reality operating as frames which actors use to promote their 
interests and projects (Howarth 2000, 3). In this sense emphasis is put on 
the way in which the actors formulate their demands along the 
consultation process. Since it is expected that organisations have a key 
objective in this process, it is necessary to operate a distinction between 
core demands and beliefs, which are usually stable, and more strategic 
aspects and changing elements of the discourse (Snow et al. 1986; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hula 1999). In this sense, frame 
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analysis is useful to analyse internal variations in the discourse along 
time, by pointing to stable and evolving elements and analysing the 
mechanisms and rationales of change.  
An important distinction is thus operated between core aspects of the 
discourse or masterframes (Ruzza 2004, 150), and more variable frames 
and justifications. The most straightforward way to recognise core aspects 
in the discourse is to focus on the number of references and on the 
persistence of a code across time. The analysis thus focuses on these 
collective masterframes, that is, on identifying which demands and issues 
organisations discuss consistently across the process and how those are 
formulated and evolve. Rather than analysing individual framing 
processes, that is, which discursive mechanisms organisations use to 
present their demands in the most favourable way, the objective is to 
understand on which topics organisations focus collectively as a result of 
collective action. This chapter focuses on the analysis of 19 frames that 
are present albeit with different intensities across the 4 consultations. 
These categories have been grouped in the 3 following dimensions: 
conception of civil society, conceptions of participatory democracy in the 
EU and role of civil society organisations in the EU institutional 
architecture. These codes are not classifications established from a 
theoretical point of departure where the organisations‘ discourses are 
classified with varying scores, but are inductively created from the data. 
As the results are similar but not identical framings, the codes were 
refined and made more general, tending to be constructed as alternative 
positions, for instance for or against civil dialogue (see how these frames 
have been built from the empirical material in annex 7). Frame analysis 
has thus basically consisted in coding the relevant parts of European 
organisations into 76 frames (19 frames for each of the 4 consultations), 
creating as a result 1596 possible positions. The analysis of these 
positions in terms of which organisations issue the demands, in which 
moment and how often along the time frame provides an accurate 
description of the aims that the organisations were seeking to promote 
and how they were justifying them. 
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It is important as well to analyse how many, and which organisations 
share the notions, and how they evolve, converge and diverge. 
Associations of terms and values are examined as well, that is, whereas 
an element is presented and justified as coherent with another one (frame 
bridging), or whereas new interpretations and meanings are associated to 
existing frames (frame amplification). The NVIVO 9 software package has 
been used to create and analyse the codes which then been used to 
generate the collective frames. This allowed crossing the codes with 
variables such as the type of document (interviews vs public document), 
the type of interest represented, membership in coalitions, organisations‘ 
primary level of action (national or European) and the degree of 
involvement of each actor in the process (in terms of date of involvement 
and number of contributions). 
As it was said in chapter 1, the methodological choice is an inductive 
approach to the discourses of the organisations as expressed mainly in 
their position papers, whereas interviews focused on understanding the 
rationale behind organisations‘ activism. The analysis proceeds by 
inductively coding the explicit formulations of the demands and 
justifications provided by the actors in the different consultations into 
categories common to several organisations and which are comparable 
along the time frame. The analytical method is thus fairly simple. The key 
aspect when deciding whether to code sections of the discourse is the 
preciseness of the reference, that is, how close the discourse is to the 
content already established in the coding. Otherwise a new code is 
created.  
The emphasis on explicit formulations and common aspects implies 
obviously a trade off between making sense of a large number of data and 
the consideration of detailed nuances. In this sense the strategy is not to 
interpret what organisations were trying to achieve, but what they were 
saying in each context. In order to compensate for this, a more in-depth 
interpretive analysis has been carried out when notions were particularly 
complex and in the case of decisive frame transformations. The general 
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focus of contributions and the general objectives and characteristics of 
organisations, are considered in making these interpretations.  
1. Framing participation from 1997 to the Convention 
When civil society organisations speak about the participation of citizens 
and groups in EU policy making, they tend to speak about 3 main 
questions comprising a number of subtopics. Firstly, they put forward 
different conceptions of civil society, both in relation to the definition of 
the notion and towards its role in EU. Secondly, they discuss different 
mechanisms of participation in the EU and they provide different 
justificatory rationales, of which participatory democracy finally emerges 
successfully. Additionally, the organisations put forward different 
proposals regarding the position of civil society organisations in the EU‘s 
institutional framework. The analysis of the contributions to the debates 
which preceded the Convention show that the focus on each of these 
dimensions evolves along the time frame. 
Figure 1 Evolution of the civil society organisations references6 
 
Figure 1 above shows a strong variation in the emphasis on the different 
frames, which suggests that civil society organisations were trying to 
achieve different things in different moments (Snow et al. 1986). However 
the in-depth analysis of their positions suggests that the core of their 
                                       
6  Unlike the rest of the figures in this chapter, figure 1 does not represent the number of 
organizations referring to one code but to cumulated number of references to all the codes. It is 
based on the detailed coding of each consultation process rather than on the coding of the common 
aspects.  
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demands remains quite stable. This may be explained by the re-framing 
efforts of civil society organisations in each moment, as organisations try 
to formulate their demands in the way corresponding better to what they 
perceived as the expectations of the EU institutions. In order to evaluate 
this hypothesis, this section analyses the core of the discourse and 
demands of the organisations in each of the 3 dimensions and presents 
how these were adapted to each stage of the debate (see annex number 7 
for the complete codebook and instances of the material coded).  
2. Conception of civil society 
Monaghan has summarised the main functions of European civil society 
organisations as their ability to communicate, represent and promote 
participation (Monaghan 2007). Frame analysis highlights that 
organisations are well aware of these capacities and that they put them 
forward quite clearly. 
2.1. The role of civil society organisations in EU integration 
References to the contribution of civil society organisations to making 
citizens aware of EU integration can be summarised in 2 major aspects 
which evolve along time. Figure 2 below indicates that at the beginning of 
the process organisations‘ main claim was that they can be a link between 
the EU institutions and citizens, whereas from 2001 the focus is more 
frequently put on their ability to give a voice to the citizens‘ concerns, 
values and rights‘ claims. This resonates strongly with the focus of the 
Commission‘s agenda on participation in the 2001 and 2002. However the 
idea that civil society links the EU and the public comes back strongly 
during the Convention, albeit by adding that it is civil society consultation 
which contributes to inform the public. 
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Figure 2: Organisations referring to the role of civil society 
organisations in EU integration 
 
As the difference between these frames may appear subtle, it is worth 
highlighting some of their differences. Compare the frames as formulated 
in the 2000 position paper of the Commission. The paper raises 
expectations that CSO involvement can have two types of effects. One 
regards public opinion at large: 
―By encouraging national NGOs to work together to achieve 
common goals, the European NGO networks are making an 
important contribution to the formation of a "European public 
opinion" usually seen as a pre-requisite to the establishment of a 
true European political entity. At the same time this also contributes 
to promoting European integration in a practical way and often at 
grassroots level.‖ (European Commission 2000) 
The second type of effect has to do with the idea that participating in an 
association can itself be a way to contribute to shape EU integration:  
―The decision making process in the EU is first and foremost 
legitimised by the elected representatives of the European people. 
However, NGOs can make a contribution to in fostering a more 
participatory democracy both within the European Union and 
beyond. 
[… ] 
Belonging to an association provides an opportunity for citizens to 
participate actively in new ways other than or in addition to 
involvement in political parties or trade unions. (European 
Commission 2000)‖ 
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As to the manifestation of this difference in organisations‘ discourses, 
compare them in the two following statements by the Social Platform in its 
contribution to the 2002 consultation: 
 
―We regret that the role of European NGOs in stimulating debates 
among national NGOs and contributing to the emergence of a 
European thinking has not been highlighted. If consultation is to be 
effective and useful, then the need to fund spaces for discussions 
both at a national and European level should be acknowledged.  
[…] 
We believe that in recognition of the reality of millions of people 
within the European Union experiencing poverty, exclusion and 
inequalities, particular recognition should be given to the expertise 
that emerges from that part of civil society which organises to 
represent the interest of those people and in which they participate. 
(Contribution of the Social Platform to the 2002 consultation on the 
minimal standards of consultation)‖ 
Despite the strong bias towards EU umbrella groups in the agenda setting 
phase it is possible to see a relevant difference between those 
organisations and the rest in the way in which these claims are voiced. 
The figure below shows clearly that EU umbrella groups which voiced 
more strongly the participatory dimension whereas all the other 
organisations kept justifying the importance of civil society organisations 
in terms of their ability to engage the public. 
Figure 3 Position on role of CSO by type of organisation (number 
of words coded)7 
 
                                       
7
 In order to visualize the differences better this graph represents the number of words coded instead 
of the  number of organizations referring to one f the aspects.  
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Obviously both dimensions are not opposed, but they certainly convey 
different types of expectations as to the contribution of civil society 
organisations to the legitimacy of the EU. This is why it is significant to 
find an evolution of the emphasis of organizations in each of these 
dimensions. These distinctions deserve some qualitative exploration, in 
that they suggest an evolution in the justificatory rationale provided by 
organisations for their own role.  
The argument that organisations can play an important role in raising 
awareness about the EU policies among the public is often used to justify 
a closer relation between them and institutions. However, this argument is 
built in a very abstract way which tends to make a direct equivalence 
between the presence of civil society organisations in policy dialogue and 
debate between organisations from different countries and increased 
interest of public opinion for EU affairs:  
 ―As the Commission has itself acknowledged, ‗European citizens have 
little sense of ownership over the structures that govern their lives‘ 
(‗Shaping the new Europe‘, COM (2000) 154). NGOs help to reduce 
the gap between the governing and the governed by awareness 
raising with the public concerning the purpose, policies, and actions of 
the European Union.‖ (Social Platform‘s contribution to the consultation 
on the White Paper on Governance). 
These arguments have such a resonance with some of the arguments of 
the literature about civil society‘s ability to bring the EU closer to the 
citizens that were reviewed in the previous chapter (Armstrong 2002; 
Eder and Trenz 2004; Steffek and Nanz 2008) that it has been suggested 
that academic thinking had an influence in this agenda setting process 
(Saurugger 2010). Few organisations mention specific mechanisms such 
as the ability of organisations to provide information to their members 
(EFC) or their contribution to communication on EU affairs (Polish Office): 
―The role of civil society organisations as facilitators of information 
flow on EU policy should be encouraged. Foundations themselves have 
acted as information and dialogue facilitators to help address and 
devise effective responses to social, environmental, educational, 
scientific and economic challenges facing European citizens. (EFC 
Office contribution to the 2001 White Paper on Governance)‖ 
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―The Office made a translation of the White Paper into Polish available 
to Polish non-governmental organisations (NGOs) last summer. It also 
elaborated a summary and brief comments, especially regarding those 
sections that concern civil society or are relevant to the concerns of 
NGOs in Poland. Our interest in this topic is an extension of the work of 
Poland‘s NGOs to improve the manner in which its citizens live and are 
governed. (Polish Office contribution to the 2001 White Paper on 
Governance)‖ 
In this sense, it is noticeable that organisations tend to introduce the 
claim that they can contribute to raising awareness among the public 
without further elaboration of the ways in which this can happen. 
Furthermore the fact that none of the organisations argued about their 
contribution to the public sphere in all the consultations suggests that this 
idea is not at the core of the organisations‘ self-conceptions. Interviews 
seem to suggest that what organisations mean by that is that they are 
bringing in a new perspective based on their expertise and members‘ 
concern rather than contributing to generalise the debate among their 
members or the media. It is even suggested that this is not the role of 
civil society. This approach seems to be linked to the issue of whether and 
how organisations represent their members when engaging in policy 
discussions (see next section).  
The evolution of these two dimensions shows that the frames evolve 
according to the forum addressed and the Commission‘s civil society 
agenda. The idea that civil society organisations are able to communicate 
with the European public, which was not present in 1997, is formulated 
strongly on the wake of the insistence on communication weaknesses 
following the resignation of the Santer Commission (Bastin 2002; 
Georgakakis 2004) whereas the subsequent change of focus indicates that 
civil society organisations endorse the White Paper on Governance and the 
Laeken declaration participatory overtones. In this sense organisations 
seem to accept a stronger role in claiming to be vehicles for citizens‘ 
participation and contribute to the formation of the EU‘s general interest 
rather than merely being voices in a pluralistic setting. These roles have 
some distinctive features in terms of internal democracy requirements and 
which actors can fulfil them (Halpin and McLaverty 2010, 58–61), which 
are examined in the following section. 
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2.2. Characteristics of legitimate actors 
The frame on the role of civil society in the European Union serves as well 
to introduce proposals on the characteristics that make actors legitimate 
to be consulted by EU institutions. This debate is characterised as well by 
an evolution along the time frame and a significant shift during the 
Convention. In the previous fora the debate focused on the definition of 
what is civil society and secondly which groups should be consulted. This 
is quite a heated and detailed debate where all the organisations put 
forward their own characteristics as those of a legitimate actor (Michel 
2007).  
Figure 4: Number of organisations referring to characteristics of 
legitimate actors  
 
The figure above shows issues related to the definition of civil society 
disappear on the wake of the Convention whereas the main legitimacy 
factor of civil society organisations becomes their ability to represent their 
members or causes, although significant differences remain between 
different types of organisations. The following paragraphs analyse the 
evolution of each of these variables.  
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2.2.1. Expertise 
This is one of the rare items where the conceptions of different 
organisations coincide. Both citizens organisations and business groups 
say that civil society organisations can contribute to the policy making 
process by providing specialised knowledge on a particular field. 
Furthermore, this is explicitly formulated by many organisations as a 
necessary criterion for participating in consultations and policy dialogues, 
being implicit for almost all the organisations. Interestingly, this is one of 
the topics where the reference is made once and again more often by the 
same organisation, as up to 5 organisations repeatedly formulated this 
point. Although there is a slight decline during the Convention, the turn 
towards participatory democracy does not challenge the consensus that 
civil society organisations contribute to the quality of European policy 
making thanks to their independent expertise. Interviews reveal that the 
notion of expertise is not only limited to technical knowledge but as well 
to grassroots experiences.  
―We know that we have a very precious expertise which is unique, 
and we, you know that there is all these associations in Brussels 
working with marginal, undocumented people.‖ (interview 3 with a 
representative of the Social Platform). 
The centrality of expertise suggests that there is not a complete turn 
towards an input-legitimacy oriented system but rather an adaptation of 
existing mechanisms to different purposes. Civil society organisations do 
not challenge the ―dominant ethos of the institutionalised European 
project as it has developed historically: an ethos that rewards cost-benefit 
analysis, the professionalism of lobbyists, the quality of the information 
that these provide to policy-makers and an ability to address policy issues 
systematically and technically‖ (Ruzza 2004, 7). 
2.2.2. Conceptions of representation 
The idea that organisations represent their members remains stable 
during the process with a very strong peak in 2002 (see figure 4 above). 
However the ability of civil society organisations to represent their 
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members is a contentious issue. Questions of representation and 
representativeness convey alternative conceptions of the role of civil 
society organisations in a democracy and have important practical 
implications.  
As the idea of the creation of civil dialogue is advanced, the Commission 
points out that, since the participants will have to be selected beforehand, 
a criterion for deciding who should be consulted would have to be 
elaborated. In this respect, it suggests that organisations participating in 
consultations should be representative. This is probably the most disputed 
topic in the first moments of the process and one on which the promoters 
of civil dialogue appear most divided. The reaction of a part of the core 
group of promoters is quite heated at the beginning: they argue that 
unlike the members of trade unions or political parties they stand for weak 
groups that cannot cast a mandate, and that in any case groups should be 
invited according to their capacities and skills rather than on their number 
of members. To put it on the words of ECAS: ―There is little point in public 
authorities dancing with a representative partner who has nothing to say.‖ 
(ECAS 2002, 3). On the other hand, social partners stand for the definition 
of such criteria, the best example being UNICE which proposes a series of 
principles tailored on its own structure (Michel 2007).  
On the other hand the social partners (the business organisations Unice 
and UEAPME and the European Trade Union Confederation) actively 
insisted that civil society organisations participating in policy consultations 
must be representative of a constituency. The cleavage is quite interesting 
as it contains both an organisational and a strategic distinction.  
Table 1 Organisations' position on representativeness 
Constant agreement Constant rejection Shifts 
1. ETUC  
2. ELO 
3. UEAPME 
4. UNICE 
5. Eurocommerce 
6. Eurodiaconia – 
Caritas 
7.  EFC  
1. Polish NGO office 
2. PFCS 
3. CONCORD 
4. ECAS 
1. CEDAG 
2. Cittadaninza Attiva 
– ACN 
3. CSCG 
4. European 
Environment 
Bureau – EEB 
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8. COFACE 5. Social Platform 
 
As table 1 above shows, ETUC, business organisations and 3 EU citizens‘ 
interests‘ umbrella organisations show constant support for this principle 
whereas 4 EU citizens‘ interests‘ umbrella organisations show constant 
disagreement. The distinction between a first group containing mostly 
membership organisations against a second one composed 
representatives of causes is substantial (Greenwood and Halpin 2007; 
Halpin and McLaverty 2010; Kohler-Koch 2010a). That said, it also seems 
that EU NGOs platform adopt a strategic stance on this topic as a number 
of them adopt opposite positions in different moments. In this sense there 
is an interesting evolution of the discourse of citizens‘ organisations where 
they evolve from claiming to represent minority views and particular 
causes to represent large numbers of citizens and broad causes. The best 
evidence for the difficulty of many NGOs to take a side is provided by the 
changes of position of the Social Platform, from its initial argument in 
favour of alternative criteria in 2000 to its openness to discuss this 
criterion in 2001 as it appears in the quotes below: 
 ―However, the Commission uses the term ‗representativeness‘  
with relation to NGOs on several occasions throughout the 
document, particularly in section 2.2. Whilst the Platform agrees 
that geographical representativeness is an important feature for 
European NGOs, it is not the role of NGOs to act as elected 
representatives, but to advance the interests of their 
constituencies. The term ‗representativeness‘, when applied to 
NGOs, thus seems ambiguous because their ―representativeness‖ is 
primarily qualitative: it is deep-rooted in the nature of the 
relationships established by NGOs on the ground. NGOs promote 
minority needs and opinion, giving the means of expression to 
some of the ‗voiceless‘ within society, and even advancing the 
interests of those whom by reason of various handicaps 
(intellectual, cultural, or other forms of marginalisation and 
exclusion) need advocates to defend their interests and needs. The 
Platform therefore prefers to emphasise the need for transparency 
in the functioning of NGOs. A real transparency permits a 
knowledge of who is representing people, groups, actors and ideas. 
It should be the right of minority groups to be represented by the 
NGO of their choice.‖ (Social Platform‘s contribution to the 
consultation on the 2000 paper). 
 
  ―We therefore propose that the Secretariat General of the 
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Commission should, together with European NGOs, examine the 
criteria applied in relation to NGOs in the framework of the 
structured civil dialogue, with regard to representativeness, 
transparency, accountability, and track-record.‖ (Social Platform‘s 
contribution to the consultation on the 2001 paper). 
 
Table 2 below shows that organisations‘ approach to representativeness is 
quite volatile as organisations adopted very different notions in different 
moments. In addition statements against representativeness by 
interviewees of the Social Platform, CSCG and PFCS suggest that the 
usage of the notion in the Convention was highly strategic and that the 
principle is not yet generally accepted as a criterion for evaluating 
contributions to consultations. 
Table 2 Number of position papers making points on 
representation 
 CEDAG 
Cittadaninza 
Attiva - ACN CSCG 
European 
Environment 
Bureau - 
EEB 
Social 
Platform 
 Alternative 
ways 2 2 1 0 3 
 Formal sense 1 1 2 3 6 
No 
representation 3 3 1 1 2 
The strategic dimension is thus important in this reframing process. 
Interestingly it is during the Convention when representation becomes 
more salient as only CEDAG and the regional organisations reject it and 3 
organisations assume it for the first time.  
It can be argued as well that the evolution towards a more generalised 
acceptance of representation is a sort of negotiation between different 
interests. In this sense, the Social Platform‘s turn towards acceptance of 
representativeness can be due to the strong insistence on this topic by the 
social partners. If the purpose of the discursive evolution was a way of 
making the demand more acceptable by approximating it to existing 
practices and demands by the social partners, it is a manifestation of 
institutional isomorphism. This suggests as well that the promotion of civil 
dialogue did not go unnoticed and that some attempts were done at 
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putting it within a more ―traditional‖ frame. In this sense, the mention of 
―representative associations‖ in article 47, now art. 11 TUE, is probably 
the counterpart of the generalised acceptance of the recognition of civil 
society and the legal rank for its consultation.  
This is also related with the high political salience of the Convention, 
which was underpinned by the eventuality of a referendum. Since the aim 
of the Convention was to bring citizens closer to the EU, the ―force of 
numbers‖ becomes one of the most determinant strengths of 
organisations during the Convention, as expressed in these two quotes:  
―MILLIONS of Europeans represented by our organisations would 
appreciate it if the European Convention finds the missing articles and 
integrates them into Article 8 of the new European Constitution.‖8 
―This contribution represents the views and aspirations of millions of 
people in Europe and we call on each individual member of the 
Convention to listen to these voices as they begin to discuss their 
priorities for the future of Europe.”9 
That said, in these quotes organisations are not claiming to have received 
a mandate from their members authorising them to represent their 
constituency at EU level, as the social partners would demand, but simply 
to stand for the interests of citizens and convey causes at EU level. The 
idea that civil society brings the EU closer to the citizens by bringing 
causes and interests to the attention of EU institutions (Steffek and Nanz 
2008) gains weight along the process. It thus appears that civil society 
organisations do not formally represent citizens or categories of the 
population, but that they are representative of their expectations (Kohler-
Koch 2010a).  
These quotes are thus interesting examples of how organisations claim to 
be representative without necessarily arguing to represent their members 
but rather some sort of social representativeness beyond their own 
organisations. This turn is interesting since it is related to the difficulty of 
linking participation and representation at EU level because most 
                                       
8 Position paper submitted to the Convention‘s Forum by the EEB and 7 other 
environmental organizations, bold in the original.  
9 ―(un)CONVENTIONAL EUROPE‖, position paper submitted to the Convention‘s Forum by 
the Social Platform 
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European organisations would have difficulties in providing evidence of 
regular involvement of their members in decision making (Friedrich and 
Rodekamp 2011). The tensions between participation and representation 
mandate versus independence, and different conceptions of the role of a 
representative, formalistic versus descriptive or symbolic notions, can be 
addressed with reference to the discussion of these dimensions by Hannah 
Pitkin (1972).  
The notion that organisations have to be representative of and able to 
consult a European constituency conveys the idea that representation is 
the result of a formalised authorisation from members and is strongly 
linked with ideas that organisations have to be in touch with their 
members and actively consult them before responding to consultations, 
thus approximating the position of organisations to that of a delegate. On 
the other hand it is equally suggested that such an approach marginalises 
organisations that stand for causes or constituencies who cannot cast a 
mandate (Greenwood and Halpin 2007; Halpin and McLaverty 2010) 
because they are weak or are an idea or a cause. In this sense ideas of 
representation tend to imply that an organisation standing for nature or 
the rights of marginal people have to act as trustees, thus defining by 
themselves the interests of such a constituency. The preference of most 
European organisations for this conception of representation before the 
Convention is related to their insistence on the importance of expertise 
that was discussed above. Pitkin points out that ―the more a theorist sees 
political issues as questions of knowledge, to which it is possible to find 
correct, objectively valid answers, the more inclined he will be to regard 
the representative as an expert and to find the opinion of the constituency 
irrelevant. If political issues are like scientific or even mathematical 
problems, it is foolish to try to solve them by counting noses in the 
constituency.‖ (Pitkin 1972: 211).  
Arguments that organisations contributing to participatory mechanisms 
have to be representative are founded on the fact that otherwise 
participation is limited to the persons who actually take part in the process 
on behalf an organisation without an actual linkage to members. In this 
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sense, accepting representativeness criteria can be a way to stress the 
ownership over the consultation process of EU groups, the only 
representative organisations in the geographical sense at EU level 
(Greenwood and Halpin 2007). 
It seems that the evolution of the frame from the representation of 
particular constituencies to the representation of general causes and 
interests in a more politically salient environment contributed to the 
evolution of the organisations framing of the issue making them more 
prone to accept the idea that they represent their members in a formal 
sense. 
2.2.3. Economic vs. general interest groups and European vs. 
national organisations 
Before the Convention the most contentious topic within this variable, 
regarding both the number of references and in relation to the differences 
in opinions, concerned the question of whether organisations representing 
economic interests should be included in the definition of civil society, and 
thus involved in the civil society consultation mechanisms and given the 
same institutional recognition sought by citizens‘ organisations. It must be 
noted as well that the Commission‘s approach seems to leave several 
organisations unsatisfied, in that it seems to give precedence to NGOs and 
non economic interests without really excluding business groups or trade 
unions. Still today the Commission does not adhere to any definition when 
carrying out consultations10. Whereas it is true that some academics 
include economic life in the civil society sphere (Pérez Díaz 1994b), this 
can be related as well to a strategy of reframing interest representation as 
civil society for legitimisation purposes (Saurugger 2007). 
Business organisations, UEAPME, Eurocommerce and Unice, repeatedly 
rejected the eventuality of their exclusion from consultations, which 
should gather all relevant stakeholders. In this sense, as it will be said 
later on, they insist on the relevance of expertise as the main 
characteristic of a legitimate partner of EU institutions. On the other hand, 
                                       
10 http://ec.europa.eu/civil_society/apgen_en.htm#5, consulted on 16/01/2011 
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almost all citizens‘ interests‘ organisations11 insist that the working 
definition of civil society to be used when deciding who should be 
consulted should be limited to groups promoting a cause or general 
interest, or being part of the third sector. Interestingly, although the 
number of references is very high, here again there are few organisations 
referring systematically to this topic. These contending definitions were 
almost always followed by proposals of alternative criteria and 
characteristics that should be met by organisations.  
However in the moment of the Convention the attention shifts and there is 
virtually no references to this topic. When one considers the change of 
venue that the Convention meant this is less surprising than implied on 
the first account by the importance of this topic to organisations. This 
topic is at the core of the debates between the organisations and the 
Commission since the focus of these consultations consisted in how to 
organise the existing practice (Greenwood 2007a, 44; Pérez Solórzano-
Borragán 2007). However, the Convention was a more political forum and 
thus not suited for a detailed debate on the notion of European civil 
society but rather for a discussion on the broad contribution of civil society 
to European integration. In this sense, the organisations left the debate 
on the definition and the characteristics of legitimate partners on ―stand 
by‖ to concentrate on the principles and recognition. 
The question of the role that national organisations are to play is a 
detailed one but it provides interesting data for analysing the 
organisations‘ discourse and objectives. At the beginning of the period 
under consideration, the group of organisations involved for a longer time 
in the promotion of civil dialogue are either not concerned about this 
(CEDAG, CONCORD) or opposed to it (Social Platform and COFACE), with 
the only exception of the EFC. This may appear as an attempt from 
Brussels based groups at centralising the dialogue. However, their position 
seems to change, and after 2002 all these organisations have supported 
the principle that local and national organisations should have their say in 
                                       
11 Up to 9 different organisations in different consultations 
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EU level consultations, whereas there are only 2 sceptical references 
coming from business organisations.  
This suggests, as it was the case as well about citizens‘ direct 
participation, that framing has an effect on the strategy of organisations 
because of the bridging and amplification effect. In this sense the usage of 
the frame on participatory democracy to promote the institutionalisation 
of civil society consultation has as a consequence that it becomes difficult 
for organisations to reject issues which are strongly linked with this frame, 
such as the idea of inclusiveness (Smith 2009; Parés 2009). That said, the 
evolution registered is even more relevant, since organisations argue in 
favour of inclusiveness rather than abstaining from opposing to it. This is 
probably a manifestation of a certain degree of control by national 
organisations, or at least of the awareness by European organisations that 
strategically they still need to be able to act as access doors to their 
members to EU institutions. 
3. Conception and role of participatory democracy in EU  
This section analyses how civil society organisations have justified the 
need to be involved in the policy-making process and how the notion of 
participatory democracy came to the fore. It must be noted that in most 
contributions this term is not explicit until a late stage of the agenda 
setting process, in particular until the White Paper on Governance 
(European Commission 2001), despite the usage of ―participatory 
democracy‖ by the Commission in the 2000 discussion paper. Thus, this 
section approaches the conception of participatory democracy by 
analysing firstly the justifications that organisations provide for 
consultation of civil society organisations and secondly the emergence of a 
more general frame on participation and participatory democracy. 
3.1. Political justification of civil society consultation 
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Figure 5: Number of organisations referring to rationale for 
consultation 
 
Figure 5 above shows that organisations have provided alternative 
justifications for their own participation in EU policy making via 
consultation. In conceptual terms these are clearly distinct proposals. The 
idea that participation improves policy-making corresponds to an output 
legitimacy approach, whereas the consideration that participation directly 
makes the EU more legitimate corresponds to an input legitimacy 
rationale, to use Scharpf‘s (1999) typology. It suggests as well that 
justifications in terms of input legitimacy were also made independently of 
the participatory democracy frame. Finally, the graph shows clearly the 
ductility of the frame: organisations adapt their arguments to the venue 
and the institution (Princen 2009) in that the White Paper on governance 
and the Convention are more oriented towards input legitimacy 
(Monaghan 2007, 27–28) whereas the 2002 consultation is essentially on 
how to use external contributions to improve policy-making.  
Civil society arguments that they help European institutions to improve 
policy making suggest that they provide the Commission with grassroots 
experience of the policy field and a measure of expertise which is not 
always available for EU civil servants (Greenwood 2011b). This topic is 
strongly correlated to arguments that a degree of expertise is one of the 
legitimacy thresholds to be met by any organisation. This argument is 
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shared by all the business organisations, but it is made as well by citizens‘ 
groups which are active in policy implementation or technical fields. In 
this sense, it is not participation per se which makes the EU more 
legitimate, but the quality of the input that civil society organisations 
make to the policy making process. The evolution of this topic, peaking in 
the 2002 consultation on minimal rules of consultation and then 
decreasing on the wake of the Convention suggests that there is a general 
politicisation of the frame evolving towards a justification of civil society 
involvement in a participatory perspective.  
On the other hand, the majority of organisations consider that the 
consultation of civil society organisations makes the EU more legitimate, 
as it helps it to be in touch with citizens‘ concerns. This topic has large 
support as it is uttered by up to 8 organisations in the 2001 consultation 
on governance with no group against it (see CSO consultation as 
empowerment in annexes 7 and 8). That said this strong emergence in 
2001 and the Convention is certainly linked to the political nature of these 
debates, whereas the frequency of this topic falls in the previous and 
following consultation. As additional evidence for the importance of the 
Commission‘s influence on the discourse of the organisations, it appears 
that still in 2000 a group such as the Social Platform did not refer to the 
contribution of civil society consultation to the legitimacy of the EU. A 
majority of organisations, including business groups such as 
Eurocommerce or UNICE consider that their participation in consultation 
has a political nature as well and may contribute to making the EU more 
legitimate, although this position is clearly influenced by the venue where 
it is formulated.  
However the most relevant feature regarding the content of this variable 
is that even during the Convention organisations tended to formulate the 
expectation that their involvement would directly make the EU more 
legitimate without necessarily framing it as participatory democracy. This 
has two significant implications. The first one is that the participatory 
democracy frame was not unanimous among civil society, although as it 
will be seen immediately it became the most frequent justification during 
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the Convention. But it also implies that the elaboration of the notion of 
participatory democracy is clear form of frame bridging (Snow et al. 
1986). By arguing that their involvement could contribute to bring the EU 
closer to the citizens, organisations created the context where their 
participation could be characterised as a democratic mechanism. 
3.2. Conceptions of participation 
The previous section has shown that along the entire process 
organisations have sought to provide a political justification for their 
participation in the policy-making process via consultation. The evolution 
of the demands on civil dialogue, one of the most recurrent notions in the 
agenda of citizens‘ organisations, is quite telling about the way in which 
organisations reframed their demands as participatory democracy devices. 
Although the demands to create a specific procedure for dialogue with civil 
society remain stable (see next section), figure 6 below shows a clear 
evolution in the justification rationale. References to the original notion of 
―civil dialogue‖ decline and civil society consultation emerges as a form of 
participation at the same time as there is a consolidation of the 
participatory democracy frame and a strong emergence of proposals 
focusing on direct participation by citizens rather than organisations. In 
this sense, the collective construction of the notion of participatory 
democracy which started before the Convention (Saurugger 2010) is 
clearly influential in the reframing of the demands of the organisations. 
This section examines in detail how the process of bridging civil society 
participation and democracy occurred.   
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Figure 6 Rationales of civil society participation 
 
 
3.2.1. Civil dialogue  
The notion of civil dialogue is on the agenda since the first discussions in 
1996 and 1997 on how to build a stronger relation between civil society 
organisations and EU institutions, yet it is enormously ambiguous (Fazi 
and Smith 2006). On the one hand, in the most limited interpretation it 
may just mean any dialogue between civil society and the EU institutions. 
On the other, the most ambitious version considers it as a form of 
formalised dialogue (similar to the social dialogue) on political and 
horizontal issues, and not just on the thematic questions addressed in 
dialogue with particular DGs. This distinction is clear as well for the 
officials, as it appears in this quote of an official of the EESC: 
―You have the so-called horizontal civil dialogue and the sector-
specific civil dialogue sector, that's two different issues.‖ (interview 
20 with a representative of the EESC).  
Although the organisations do not always make their claims explicit, the 
content of their demands implies that they propose the creation of a 
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stable framework for direct dialogue between organisations and the 
Commission, thus going beyond ―ad hoc‖ consultation. 
―European NGOs welcome Romano Prodi‘s recognition of the value 
of civil society to Europe. However although it is unquestioned that 
we are an important part of the economy and have found ways of 
making our voices heard, we would argue that it would be more 
correct to say that we participate in the organisation of society, 
rather than being involved of the running of society. We believe 
that the development of good government necessitates the full 
participation of its citizens at all stages, and the establishment of a 
structured dialogue between organised civil society and the 
different levels of government. Such a structured civil dialogue 
should not detract from the importance of the political dialogue, nor 
from the necessity of taking action to strengthen political structures 
and institutions.‖12 
Despite its ambiguous content, civil dialogue seems to encompass all the 
demands by citizen interests‘ groups for a secure access to institutions 
and it is thus at the core of their demands.  
―The importance of formalising the dialogue between civil 
society and the EU institutions by including an article 
guaranteeing the legal basis for such a "Civil dialogue" in the next 
Treaty of the European Union, through a Council Regulation or 
some other appropriate legal instrument. It is likely and appropriate 
that the dialogue will take different forms from sector to sector, but 
the general principle should be estabished as a formal requirement 
in policy areas.‖ 13 
The documental analysis provides good evidence about the aim of 
organisations in promoting this topic. After 2002 a number of 
organisations insist that consultation is not just a formal exercise to be 
carried out for improving the legitimacy of the EU (Fazi and Smith 2006, 
48–49) but must provide them with opportunities to significantly influence 
the policy making process. It implies that organisations perceived 
consultation as a politically important stage for the Commission, in that 
this institution would tend to consult civil society in order to obtain 
legitimacy from such relation but try as well to deny political influence to 
                                       
12 ―Democracy, governance and European NGOs‖, Contribution of the Social 
Platform to the 2001 White Paper on Governance, March 2001, page 5 
13 CLONG (antecessor of CONCORD) contribution to the consultation ―Commission 
and Non Governmental Organisations: Building a stronger partnership‖, April 
2000: 2  
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organisations. They thus call the Commission to consult before taking any 
definitive decision which appears as an explicit recognition that 
organisations are above all seeking political influence. 
Civil dialogue is thus a recurrent demand by the organisations that have 
been involved for a longer time in the debate and one that, unlike other 
questions, creates a degree of disagreement among the organisations. In 
this sense, it is present in all the papers of the Social Platform, the 
European Foundation Centre and CEDAG from 1997 to the Convention. 
Additionally, it is supported by 9 organisations at different moments, and 
rejected by 4 business organisations, in particular on the grounds that the 
uncertain representativity of NGOs makes them unable to claim a status 
such as the social partners‘. This position is close to that of EU institutions 
that have insisted on the importance of representativeness criteria, as 
expressed in this quote: 
―If you want to influence the course of European development or of 
European integration generally, that's what horizontal civil dialogue 
is about […] and if you want to do so as an organisation this 
organisation must have some legitimacy for being able to influence 
the course they want to give to European integration. And that‘s 
very different of the Social Platform approach which is ‗let every 
organisation do as they want‘ ‖. (Interview 20 with a representative 
of the EESC). 
This suggests that institutions see the need to agree with the claim of 
institutionalising civil dialogue, but that it must be done according to more 
traditional procedures. This brings civil society organisations to accept 
representativeness as part of this process of building consensus on civil 
dialogue. 
Whereas the core of the demand remains rather stable and is shared by a 
number of organisations, it is worth noting an evolution in the way in 
which it is formulated. In a first stage (1996-2000) the Social Platform, 
the main actor in this demand, formulates it as a way to improve social 
policies, without linking it to the EU‘s legitimacy. It is only in 2001, when 
the Commission expresses a need to reinforce its legitimacy, when civil 
society consultation appears in the civil society organisations‘ discourse as 
a way to give the citizens a bigger say in EU policies, as it appears in 
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figure 6 above with the strong increase in the number of references to 
civil dialogue as a way to bring citizens closer to the EU. The Convention 
appears as a further step in this reframing process, since the references 
to the need of a structured dialogue remain at the core, but this is no 
longer called ―civil dialogue‖, but it is formulated as a mechanism of 
participatory democracy. 
3.2.2. Civil society consultation as participatory democracy 
Figure 6 above shows clearly that despite the reference to participatory 
democracy in the Commission‘s 2000 paper (European Commission 2000, 
4), organisations do not really start using this notion until late in the 
process. General references during the Convention to the need of a bigger 
role for citizens (table 3 below) are very interesting in that they suggest 
that whereas the need of more participation by citizens was clearly in the 
agenda on the wake of the Laeken declaration, the notion of participatory 
democracy is clearly a specific frame more present among specialised 
organisations. In this sense it appears that references to a bigger role for 
citizens without explicitly mentioning of participatory democracy are much 
more frequent among national than European organisations.  
Table 3 Differentiated references to participation and to 
participatory democracy 
 European National 
Bigger role for citizens - general references to 
participation 15 11 
Participatory democracy 28 4 
Beyond the usage of the notion of participatory democracy, it is more 
relevant that organisations reframe their demand to be consulted as a 
form of citizens‘ empowerment. This quote from CEDAG‘s paper to the 
Convention is a good example of this evolution:  
―One element of this participation is civil dialogue between European 
institutions and the organisations of civil society since citizens express 
themselves through the organisations in which they are active.‖ 
(CEDAG 2003, 1) 
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This evolution is coherent with that reported in the previous section on the 
evolution towards an increased insistence on the importance of civil 
society organisations as promoters of participation rather than as 
promoters of debates. It thus appears that civil society organisations 
adapted different aspects of their discourse to the emergent frame on 
participatory democracy as a response to the EU legitimacy deficit that the 
EU institutions elaborated at the turning point of the century (Saurugger 
2010).  
Although several civil society organisations mention that civil society 
consultation is a way to bring the citizens‘ close to the EU (figure 6), most 
of them only elaborate on the idea that this mechanism is a form of 
participatory democracy after 2001. This may be caused by two reasons. 
Firstly, since participatory democracy is an emergent topic civil society 
organisations need some time to include it in their discourse. In this sense 
the evolution towards participatory democracy is more profound than it 
seems in that civil dialogue focuses on the participation of civil society‘s 
Brussels‘ offices whereas considering this as a mechanism of participation 
by citizens would imply that civil society organisations have themselves a 
participatory structure and represent their members, which is difficult 
considering organisations‘ initial reluctance to consider themselves as 
representatives of their members and empirical assessments of their 
relations with members (Sudbery 2003; Friedrich and Rodekamp 2011). 
The difficulty of the Social Platform to assume participatory democracy, 
which does not appear in its papers until April 2002, is very telling of the 
difficulty of bridging the frames of civil society participation and the need 
of a stronger participation by citizens: 
―Now we are reviewing that, because we wonder how that comes 
with participatory democracy, but I think that‘s a different idea, 
participatory democracy with civil dialogue, I don‘t know, we have 
to define it. So we still have to adopt our position in our general 
assembly this year, and I think we still continue to use civil 
dialogue, because we see civil dialogue, we love participatory 
democracy a lot, and if you see in the Convention it‘s participatory 
democracy, in the sense of opening up a kind of participatory 
processes were you bring all stakeholders together, it‘s not civil 
dialogue, it‘s more participatory democracy, I don‘t know, maybe 
we are… Do you know the distinction between participatory 
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democracy and civil dialogue?‖ (Interview number 3 with a 
representative of the Social Platform) 
This quote, as well as interview number 27 (CEDAG), confirms that the 
difficulty in assuming the enlargement of the frame is related to the fact 
that civil society organisations consider that they have a bigger say in civil 
dialogue than participatory democracy, which is open to more actors and 
includes different procedures such as the ECI. 
The second reason why the frame of participatory democracy was 
particularly used during the White Paper on Governance and the 
Convention is certainly the higher political salience of these venues 
(Monaghan 2007; Princen 2009,  on the importance of this variable in the 
EU). In this sense, there is a clear evolution from a series of discussions 
dominated by an administrative reform frame (Michel 2007) to more 
politicised venues. It is clear that participatory democracy as a policy 
proposal is coherent with the problem identification of the previous 
consultations and the Laeken declaration and it was pushed as well by 
institutional actors. In this sense the opportunities for frame bridging in 
terms of ideological closeness were clearly present, and the Convention 
was a window of opportunity for raising civil dialogue‘s profile as it would 
be enshrined into a Treaty article.  
3.2.3. Citizens’ participation rights 
Finally, it is very interesting to point out that there is a small but 
significant increase in the references to forms of direct participation by 
citizens rather than through civil society organisations. Whereas before 
the Convention only three groups (ECAS, European Foundation Centre and 
European Environment Bureau) argue in favour of the recognition of 
participatory mechanisms such as initiative rights or a right to receive 
information as a right of European citizens and not a prerogative of 
organisations, this kind of demands became more frequent among 
organisations actively promoting ―civil dialogue‖ during the Convention. 
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―In its paper, ECAS advocated a ―right to be heard based on 
citizenship, of which all NGO‘s, as organizations of citizens would 
take advantage.‖14 
This is a clear amplification of the frame (Snow et al. 1986, 469), in that 
the usage of the frame of participatory democracy offered opportunities to 
introduce a series of ideas traditionally associated with it. However, it is 
noticeable that the only individual direct participation right recognised by 
the Convention, the European Citizens‘ Initiative, was the result of the 
campaign of the Initiative and Referendum Institute – Europe and Mehr 
Demokratie (del Río Villar 2004; Lamassoure 2004; Clerck-Sachsse 2011), 
two organisations which had not previously taken part in the agenda 
setting process. 
Overall, the emergence of the participatory democracy frame is very 
significant, in that despite the stability of the demands (see next section) 
the justificatory frame evolves from a focus on the legitimacy of civil 
society and its ability to contribute to better policy making via the notion 
of civil dialogue to a focus on participatory democracy which concentrates 
on the importance of bringing the EU closer to citizens where 
organisations are an interface with citizens. In this sense it is clearly a 
process of frame bridging (Snow et al. 1986, 469) where the previously 
bureaucratic oriented tools (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007) are identified 
with mechanisms of democracy and participation. This evolution is the 
result of the politicisation of the venues and serves to bypass the rejection 
by some business organisations. In addition, it facilitates the expression of 
demands focusing on direct participation by citizens. Ruzza argues that 
frame-bridging can arise as a result of " low intensity modifications and 
re-definitions of policy discourses in which cross-fertilisation occurs 
between political institutions (and this is typically the case of consensus 
formation)‖ or as responses to crises (Ruzza 2004, 151). In this case it is 
clearly the result of a consensus construction process where the demands 
from organisations are adopted by the political system as a response to a 
different objective than its original one.  
                                       
14 ECAS (2002) comments on the paper ―Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue – proposal for general principles and minimum 
standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commisson‖, p. 1  
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4. Position of civil society organisations in the EU institutional 
architecture  
The topics regrouped in this variable express civil society organisations 
claims for a bigger role in the EU‘s institutional architecture. This demand 
has been expressed by the organisations involved in consultations since 
the mid-90s and has been quite persistent in all the subsequent 
consultations. The section presents firstly these demands and the ways in 
which they have been formulated and secondly it looks at some relevant 
details about the ways in which these groups envisage the way in which 
their participation in the EU should be organised. 
Figure 7: Position of civil society organisations in the EU 
institutional architecture 
 
4.1. Main demands: recognition and legal rank for consultation 
The call to be recognised at the EU level is the oldest demand. In its 
original form it is strongly linked to the projects of the last Delors 
Commission for strengthening the third or voluntary sector at European 
level (Will and Kendall 2009). It is formulated as particularistic demands 
in the responses to the 1997 communication by the Commission in that 
each kind of organisation hopes to obtain the recognition of its specificity. 
Although the focus becomes slightly more general in 2001, the 
particularistic claims remain strong in the Convention. For instance, 
CEDAG demanded recognition of the economic importance of the third 
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sector whereas the EFC would have liked to see a specific recognition of 
the peculiarities of foundations. The move of the political initiative for 
Commission – civil society relations from DG Enterprise to the General 
Secretariat after 1997 as well as the decay of the proposal of a European 
association statute (Will and Kendall 2009) suggests that the initial 
approach by the Commission in this field was a failure.  
Despite this, claims for civil society recognition became more frequent in 
2001, acquire a new significance as they are no longer limited to the 
status of European association but seek to secure a consultation role in 
the process. The strong decline of this topic in the 2002 consultation can 
be linked to the technical nature of that consultation, which was not about 
the principle of consultation but about who should be consulted in 
concrete terms. However the topic re-emerges very strongly during the 
Convention, and in the discourse of citizens‘ organisations it is clearly 
linked to the legal status of consultation, that is, claims for recognition are 
demands to be recognised as consultation partners. The high number of 
demands during the Convention (virtually all organisations) means that all 
the organisations used the new venue as an opportunity to raise their 
profile and to obtain a privileged status. Interviews show that there is a 
clear competition among sectors and individual organisations for a specific 
recognition, which suggests the strategic importance of this agenda 
setting process (see chapter 3). 
The specificity of citizens‘ groups consisted in linking their demand to 
acquire a role in the policy making process to the legal status for 
consultation, which is the second demand at the core of their discourse. 
This demand has been supported by the Commission since 2000 
(European Commission 2000), although it did not succeed in including it in 
the Nice ICG in 2001. This suggests that the claims by civil society for a 
strengthened and legally binding consultation meet the Commission‘s 
intention to derive input legitimacy from its relations with civil society 
organisations (Monaghan 2007, 27–28).  This is important for the 
organisations at least for two reasons. Firstly, it would make civil dialogue 
mandatory, and thus ensure civil society organisations a way of access to 
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EU affairs without depending on the Commission‘s goodwill. Secondly, it 
recognises the legitimacy of one of the main elements of these 
organisations‘ collective action repertoire, that is, direct access to decision 
makers (Kohler-Koch 2007; Mahoney 2007; Balme and Chabanet 2008), 
but at the same time distinguishing it from conventional lobbying as a sort 
of  ―structured relation‖ (Smismans 2004) entrusted with a higher degree 
of legitimacy. The following quote summarises the whole range of 
expectations on the ECI: 
―19. A legal basis makes consultation mechanisms more 
predictable. Predictability and accountability of policy procedures 
are important principles.  
20. A legal status safeguards the process against organisational 
changes of personnel in the Commission.  
21. The Commission‘s proposal can then be extended to cover the 
Council and Parliament in the further development of consultation 
mechanisms in European policy-making.  
22. This can then also put pressure on national and regional 
authorities to develop their own consultation mechanisms with civil 
society.‖15  
This recurrent demand by citizens‘ organisations was very strongly 
promoted by the Social Platform and later on by the CSCG, an alliance set 
up by the largest citizens‘ interest umbrella organisations in the wake of 
the Convention which expressed some of the core demands of the 
organisations. In the context of the Convention this demand is clearly 
formulated as the need of a legal base for civil society consultation in the 
Treaty. On the other hand business organisations and ETUC have been 
sceptical on the creation of an article on consultation in the Treaty. This 
quote from Eurocommerce‘s contribution to the consultation on the 2000 
paper is the most straightforward formulation:  
―EUROCOMMERCE sees no need to adopt the American system of 
accreditation and wonders how a legal basis in the Treaty could 
concretely contribute to improve the way these consultation forums 
operate‖ (Eurocommerce 2000, 3). 
However the endorsement of this demand by the Commission and its 
expression under the irresistible frame of participatory democracy 
                                       
15 Caritas – Eurodiaconia Joint position on the ―Consultation Document: Towards 
a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue‖, p. 4 
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contributed to diminish the expressions of outright rejection and carried 
the social partners to put their efforts at influencing the details on the 
development of this principle (see chapter 4). The role of the EESC is for 
instance one of the stakes of the discussions among these two emerging 
coalitions. 
4.2. The role of the Economic and Social Committee 
The role of the Committee in the EU‘s dialogue with civil society is among 
the most controversial issues in the process. The Committee has sought to 
raise its profile in the wake of the debate on governance by trying to 
become the key venue for participation in the EU (Smismans 2003). 
During this period it offered its ―good offices‖ to the Commission and civil 
society organisations in order to provide expertise and even to be the 
institution where civil dialogue would take place. The Committee‘s success 
in organising a regular contact between the Convention and civil society 
(Monaghan 2007, 100) exemplifies this strategy. 
However, the citizens‘ interests‘ organisations which promoted civil 
dialogue in the first years of the process rejected proposals to 
institutionalise dialogue in the EESC. This confirms that for these 
organisations civil dialogue is essentially a way of access to decision-
makers that would be weakened if it was to be limited to participation in a 
mere ―talking shop‖ as the EESC is often perceived by these 
organisations. Another argument is that in any event the Committee is not 
representative of civil society since it is nominated by member states and 
composed essentially of representatives of trade unions and employers. 
The following quote summarises how citizens‘ interests‘ organisations 
perceived the EESC and the strategy to have it as the seat of civil 
dialogue:  
―The Economic and Social Committee does not represent civil 
society and we oppose attributing such a role to it. Whether 
ECOSOC continues to have value for the social partners 
(employers and trade unions) is a matter for them to address. For 
our part, we prefer to devote our energies to attempting to inform 
and influence the decisionmaking institutions rather than to 
engage with a government-appointed, consensus-based advisory 
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body.‖16  
On the other hand representatives of local and regional governments and 
business organisations which expressed the need to subordinate 
participatory democracy to representative democracy proposed to use the 
EESC as the forum for civil dialogue. 
―The Economic and Social Committee is the place for civil dialogue. 
When discussing its role and status, it is essential to avoid any 
confusion between civil dialogue and social dialogue, which is an 
autonomous process between the social partners and takes place 
outside the Economic and Social Committee.‖17 
There is thus a clear cleavage between citizens‘ interest groups and the 
other organisations. In this sense the caricature of the EESC as a useless 
forum is a typical belief amplification process consisting in constructing a 
stereotypical opponent in order to strengthen the coherence of the 
alternative frame (Snow et al. 1986, 470). 
Inasmuch as they reject the idea of instituting the EESC as the ―house of 
civil society‖, the organisations that promoted civil dialogue insisted in 
creating additional consultation mechanisms with other EU institutions, in 
particular the Council and the Parliament which are pointed out as the 
most inaccessible institutions (figure 7 above).  
―CEDAG particularly wishes to see a strengthening of the dialogue 
between civil society and the European Parliament, this being the 
body that represents the citizens of Europe, through more 
systematic consultations, particularly by means of intergroups.‖ 
(CEDAG 2003: 2) 
This appears as further evidence supporting that by promoting 
participatory ideas, civil society organisations are seeking to multiply and 
institutionalise their access points to the EU decision making bodies. Thus 
organisations‘ alternative strategies for recognition were also evident in 
their proposals on how civil society consultation should take place.  
                                       
16 Initial Contribution to the Convention on the Future of Europe By Birdlife 
International, Climate Action Network Europe, European Environmental Bureau, 
Friends of Nature International, European Federation for Transport and 
Environment, Friends of the Earth Europe, Greenpeace and WWF, p. 4 
17 Convention on the Future of Europe, UNICE comments, 17-06-2002, page 7 
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5. Evolution of the frame 
Regarding the conception of civil society and its contribution to European 
integration there is a clear evolution from an initial discourse in which 
organisations put forward a particularistic claim where civil society stands 
for marginal interests or causes and whose main contribution to the policy 
making process is their expertise towards a conception of civil society as 
promoters of general concerns and values of citizens and representatives 
of millions of people across Europe (del Río Villar 2004, 281; 283). That 
said the chapter has shown that the discourse and practices of 
organisations remain highly influenced by the importance of expertise, 
which is the dominant ethos in the close contacts between EU institutions 
and external interests (Ruzza 2004; Balme and Chabanet 2008). This is 
clearly one of the legacies of the origins of the existing mechanisms as 
ways of improving the policy-making rather than as ways to promote 
participation. 
The importance of the frame setting process could be challenged with 
insights on the organisational questions of European civil society 
organisations, in particular by pointing the importance of turnover in 
organisations‘ members of staff. It is quite well known that one of the 
effects of the strong expertise required by European civil society 
organisations is that their qualified personnel usually takes on better 
remunerated opportunities after a few years, or actually consider work in 
civil society organisations as an opportunity for a further career in 
Brussels (Baisnée 2007; Greenwood 2011c). In this sense it could be 
argued that it is difficult to see a clear continuity in organisations‘ frame 
and discourses‘ evolution could be related to internal organisational 
change. However, and although this may be true, this chapter has shown 
that evolutions in organisations‘ demands and framing tend to happen 
collectively, that is, that framing processes tended to be aligned. 
Furthermore interviews have shown that turnover in the Convention did 
not substantially affect mid to senior positions, and that these moves 
tended to happen among organisations in the same coalition, which may 
contribute to the circulation of the frame rather than to its instability.  
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Regarding the second variable on notions of participation it appears that 
the usage of the notion of participatory democracy to qualify their own 
proposals, in particular civil dialogue, is strongly influenced by the 
Commission‘s position in this respect. Hence the organisations include the 
contribution to the EU‘s legitimacy as an additional virtue of their core 
position on civil society consultation, whose previous justification was its 
contribution to a more social union and better policy-making, thus a 
contribution to the EU‘s output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). 
It has appeared very strongly that when organisations refer to 
participatory democracy they mean to a very large extent civil dialogue. It 
has been highlighted that this was a way of bridging the institutions 
problem identification (democracy) with a policy proposal by civil society 
and their allies in the institutions (civil society consultation). In this sense 
the most notable discursive evolution is the formulation of civil dialogue, 
to a large extent an existing mechanism (Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007) 
as a form of a new model of participatory democracy. The impreciseness 
of the notion as to the focus of such dialogue (Fazi and Smith 2006) 
contributes to its generalisation (Ruzza 2004, 57–58 on the contribution of 
ambiguity to the generalisation of frames ; Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005, 
48–49 as an example of how this happened in the usage of the word 
Constitution by the Convention). However, presenting civil society 
consultation as a way of citizens‘ participation can be problematic from a 
normative perspective. It can be considered as a form of indirect 
participation, inasmuch as organisations represent their members. 
However, if these organisations consider that they are just contributing 
their expertise, it appears that civil dialogue is an extremely elitist 
conception of participatory democracy, where only the Brussels based 
specialists do actually participate (Kohler-Koch 2010b). Interestingly this 
is precisely the way in which the frame evolved, as organisations 
integrated claims of representing their members and citizens in general 
into their discourse despite their original rejection.  
Thus by promoting participatory democracy organisations were putting 
forward  a demand to give civil society organisations a more important 
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role in the EU, distinct from that of the social partners and other lobby 
groups and with a horizontal and political nature. On the other hand even 
if proposals for citizens‘ direct participation rights were not totally absent 
of these organisations‘ proposals, IRI, the organisation that managed to 
convince convention members to include the citizens‘ initiative in the 
Treaty (del Río Villar 2004; Lamassoure 2004; IRI 2004) had not been 
involved at all in the agenda setting process.  
As for the third variable, the organisations associated with the Social 
Platform and the CSCG shared to a large extent a discourse on the way in 
which the institutional profile of civil society organisations had to be 
promoted. The most distinctive features of this discourse are the inclusion 
of a legal base making it mandatory for the EU institutions to consult civil 
society organisations. Such dialogue should take place early in the policy 
making cycle and consist of meetings with decision making officials. As a 
consequence, these organisations strongly reject the possibility to hold 
this dialogue at the Economic and Social Committee. Additionally, and 
after some hesitation, they consider that such dialogue should be open to 
national organisations. 
It is noticeable that almost all the organisations agreed on the need to 
structure the relations between the institutions and civil society 
organisations and used this as a chance to promote their own profile. 
Although the central demand of institutionalising civil society consultation 
is not unanimously shared and even meets some opposition, it was easily 
taken on board by the Commission and the Convention itself. However it 
is necessary to analyse how this frame was put on Convention‘s agenda, 
as it cannot be simply expected that the ―time of the idea had come‖ 
(Kingdon 2003), in particular because of the change of venue. It can be 
expected that this is the result of the coincidence of the advocacy of civil 
society organisations with the new discourse of the Commission, where 
transparency and governance are the new keywords.  
However, the opposition to civil dialogue can build on one of the critical 
aspects of the civil society organisations discourse on which the 
organisations appear unable to come to a compromise: the 
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representativeness of organisations involved in civil dialogue. Although it 
has not been thoroughly discussed here, this may be one of the reasons 
why the article on consultation (11 TUE) does not grant these 
organisations the privileged role that they were seeking as it engages EU 
institutions to consult ―representative associations and civil society‖, thus 
possibly allowing for the existence of diverse forms of consultation (see 
chapters 3 and 4). 
The chapter has shown that citizens‘ interests‘ organisations were active 
in promoting and institutionalising their own influence or to protect it from 
the ―attacks‖ from the social partners and especially business 
organisations. This is clearly evidenced by the structure of the 
organisations‘ discourse: whereas there is a clear evolution towards the 
participatory democracy frame in relation to the conception of civil society 
and of the political justification of consultation, it is strongly coherent and 
subject to little changes in relation to the third variable, that is, the ways 
in which the role of civil society organisations should be institutionalised.  
In relation to the expectations on the ductility of the strategies, the 
qualitative analysis shows that this is true for the discursive strategies: 
organisations are successful in adapting the frame of their discourses 
without substantially modifying their demands in relation to their role in 
the EU. However organisations‘ influence strategies are remarkably stable 
along the time frame considered. In this sense, with very few exceptions, 
it appears that organisations preferred insider strategies, consisting 
basically in the participation in structured consultation processes and 
lobbying the officials, with the relevant exception of the red card 
campaign in 1998 (Alhadeff and Wilson 2002). The next chapter examines 
whether the Convention provided an opportunity to use a different 
repertoire of action. 
The findings that organisations‘ adapt their frames to the Commission‘s 
one albeit emphasising demands for access are very similar to those of 
(Ruzza 2007, 56) for three different advocacy coalitions. This does not 
mean that these results are generalisable per se but it suggests as well 
that that they are not a sample effect. It thus appears that these debates 
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reproduce a common practice in the field of Commission – civil society 
relations, that is, organisations perceive that possibilities for access and 
influence come with meeting institutions‘ expectations rather than 
confronting them.  
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Chapter 3 The role of civil society in the 
debate about participatory democracy in the 
European Convention 
Since article 47 on participatory democracy was essentially a way of 
raising the profile of an existing mechanism (Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 
2007, 281), it has been suggested that it was little more than a way of 
making the Convention more popular (Lombardo 2007). Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that civil society had little say in this process since 
the EU‘s focus on participatory democracy is the result of the ―continued 
activism of an elite forum of political, administrative and academic actors‖ 
(Saurugger 2010, 471).  
On the other hand the previous chapter has highlighted that participatory 
democracy was used in the consultations that preceded the Convention to 
frame the self-interested demands by civil society organisations. It thus 
can be asked if this process influenced the Convention‘s debate on 
participatory democracy. This chapter analyses how civil society 
organisations formulated their claims on participatory democracy to the 
Convention and how these were received and debated in order to 
understand the agenda-setting process. 
Firstly it analyses which demands on participation are acknowledged by 
interviewees and compares them to those already identified in the 
previous sections. The expectation is that they voiced the demand to 
recognise civil society consultation as a form of participatory democracy.  
Secondly, it uses interview data and official documents to analyse how 
organisations introduced their demands to the Convention. It is expected 
that organisations were active in putting this demand to the Convention 
by using the formal contact opportunities (Monaghan 2007, 68–75) and 
informal contacts. It is expected as well that the Commission was active in 
formulating the demand because it had included it in its agenda. The 
question of whether organisations used external lobbying tactics by 
mobilising their supporters is explored in chapter 5 when contacts with 
their members and other national organisations are considered. 
97 
 
Thirdly, sections 5 and 6 examine how the Convention received these 
demands and how they were discussed by their members. The last section 
discusses the agenda setting process and what organisations were trying 
to achieve along the entire agenda setting process. 
1. Content of the demands of civil society organisations 
Whereas the previous chapter has focused on the more discursive aspects 
of the way in which the demands were framed, the aim of this section is 
to understand how civil society organisations formulated their demands on 
participatory democracy during the Convention. It is important to analyse 
the eventual mechanisms of linkage between the previous debates and 
the Convention, and in particular the frame of participatory democracy, 
for at least two reasons. Firstly unlike the previous fora, the Convention 
was not limited to issues of participation, but organisations could express 
demands on the substance of their main domain of activism i.e. 
environment or social questions. It thus must be asked whether they 
expressed the same demands on participation or whether they prioritised 
different issues. Secondly, this would allow understanding how the issue 
moved from the status of a demand by outside interests to a matter in the 
Convention‘s agenda, since it cannot be assumed that because the issue 
had been raised previously this was a sufficient condition for being 
included in the institutional agenda (Kingdon 2003; Princen 2009). 
As it happened in relation to the previous venues the main demands are 
the creation of a legal basis for civil society consultation which was framed 
as a participatory democracy mechanism. The usage of this frame 
favoured the emergence of new demands for direct citizens‘ participation 
which were expressed more intensely during the Convention. 
1.1.   Institutionalisation of consultation 
Interviews with civil society organisations confirm that the inclusion of an 
article on civil society consultation in the Treaty was a key issue for them. 
Table 4 below presents all the references made by interviewees to the 
expression of a demand by civil society for the institutionalisation of civil 
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dialogue. According to the table, almost all citizens‘ interest groups 
acknowledged that demands on the institutionalisation of consultation 
were at the core of their demands on participatory democracy. Against 
this perception, only one interviewee (Polish Office) thought that civil 
society organisations were not concerned about participatory democracy 
issues. 
Table 4 Interviewees acknowledging a common demand by civil 
society organisations on consultation 
Name References 
Interview 03 - Soc. Pla. 1 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 2 
Interview 10 – EFC 1 
Interview 11 – COFACE 2 
Interview 18 – CSCG 2 
Interview 21 - CONCORD 2 
Interview 23 – ECAS 1 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 1 
Interview 27 – CEDAG 1 
Interview 31 – ETUC 1 
Interview 36 - EEB 1 
However, the analysis of the position papers submitted to the Convention 
(table 5 below) reveals that the number of organisations demanding the 
inclusion of an article on civil society consultation in the Treaty is smaller 
than suggested by interviews (table above). It is the same number as in 
the 2000 consultation (5 organisations) and smaller than in the 2001 
consultation (7 organisations).  
Table 5 Demands on structured consultation and legal rank in 
position paper 
Name References 
European Foundation Centre 2 
CEDAG 2 
Social Platform 3 
CSCG 1 
Caritas - Eurodiaconia 2 
Permanent Forum of Civil Society 3 
The significant number of interviewees pointing out common action on the 
recognition of civil dialogue tends to deny any possible retrospective 
explanation by individual actors. The importance of this demand is 
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confirmed as well by official reports on civil society consultation during the 
Convention (see section 5). Furthermore, the position papers of 
organisations that supported this demand in the previous process such as 
COFACE and CEV could not be retrieved.  
The difference between interviews and position papers does thus not 
necessarily reveal a contradiction between the different sources. This 
difference has rather to be interpreted in terms of the different roles 
played within a coalition, where the most salient members and those 
involved for a longer time are more central in voicing this demand. In this 
sense it is very noticeable that all the organisations in the table above 
have been involved since the first moments of the agenda setting process 
or are basically coalitions. Furthermore almost all citizens‘ organisations 
made references to participatory demands, although maybe not 
necessarily to civil dialogue. The involvement of the CSCG may have 
encouraged some of its members such as the EEB and CONCORD to 
acquire a smaller role in the central demand of consultation 
institutionalisation.  
On a more detailed note, there are some interesting evolutions in the 
ways in which the demand to recognise consultation took place. In this 
sense some demands are no longer limited to asking a Treaty article but 
formulate additional legal demands. The most relevant try is EFC‘s and 
the Social Platform‘s demand to include civil society organisations right to 
be consulted in the Charter of fundamental rights whereas the Permanent 
Forum would like consultation to be recognised as one of the values of the 
Union (del Río Villar 2004, 285–286). This could be a way to grant 
consultation a super-constitutional status as a single reference in the 
Treaty may not be sufficient to enforce it in court: ―The European Court of 
Justice should in the future determine to what extent the inobservance of 
these procedural practices could be challenged by civil society 
organisations as an infringement of the principles of participatory 
democracy.‖ (Cuesta López 2010, 135) 
Additionally, references to recognition of civil society other than in terms 
of consultation were very frequent in contrast with the relatively small 
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number of demands on civil dialogue. Table 6 below shows that 11 out of 
the 16 available position papers demanded a sort of recognition as 
relevant partners of the EU. These demands are not exclusive of citizens‘ 
organisations and the content is extremely telling about the importance of 
the process for the organisations. This issue is examined in greater detail 
in the next chapter. 
Table 6 Position papers demanding recognition of civil society 
 
1.2. Citizens’ participation rights  
In addition the Convention saw clearly a blossom of demands of forms of 
participation focusing on individual rights rather than on organisations‘ 
involvement, the most evident of which is certainly the European Citizens‘ 
Initiative. Position papers show different demands for a greater focus on 
the participation of individual citizens, be it by demanding that citizens 
and civil society organisations be granted access to the European Court of 
Justice (EEB and Permanent Forum of Civil Society), the creation of a right 
to access information (EEB, EFC, ECAS and Permanent Forum of Civil 
Society) or that the Constitution be ratified via referenda (ATTAC Europe, 
ACN, ETUC and Permanent Forum of Civil Society). Regarding the last 
aspect, whereas ATTAC motivation is quite clear, obtain opportunities to 
block the implementation of the Constitution, ETUC‘s or the Permanent 
Forum is interesting, since they assume the risk of failure in order to bring 
the text closer to public opinions. These 2 organisations consider that the 
                                       
18 All the position papers submitted to the Convention by these regional organisations were written in 
common.  
 
Name References 
Eurocities – CEMR - CPMR18 3 
European Foundation Centre 4 
CEDAG 2 
Caritas - Eurodiaconia 1 
CSCG 1 
Permanent Forum of Civil Society 1 
Social Platform 2 
Active Citizenship Network 3 
UNICE 2 
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referendum should be at the EU level, whereas ATTAC considers that it 
must take place in as many national public spaces as possible. 
Different demands of this nature were put forward in papers by EEB, the 
PFCS, ECAS, EFC, ACN, ATTAC Europe and ETUC. IRI is not in this group 
because its‘ position papers are not available. The comparison of this list 
with that of table 5 on civil society dialogue above is very suggestive, as it 
suggests that among the organisations demanding the recognition of 
consultation more actively, only two (the PFCS and EFC) did also demand 
direct participation mechanisms. Significantly none of these organisations 
belong to the Social Platform or the CSCG. This suggests that there is 
clearly a subdivision within the citizens‘ interest organisations‘. Firstly, a 
core consisting in organisations involved for a longer time focused almost 
exclusively on advancing civil society consultation as form of participatory 
democracy. On the margins, a number of organisations amplify demands 
on participatory beyond the institutionalisation of civil society, albeit 
supporting this core demand.  
It is thus less surprising that interviews point out that the ECI is the result 
of an entirely differentiated mobilisation as most of the civil society 
organisations that demanded consultation to be recognised affirm that 
they were not involved at all in activism for the ECI.  
―One example of the openness of the process was the citizens‘ 
initiative. It was not our idea, but we were very happy that it was 
included‖ (interview 3 with a representative of the Social Platform) 
The literature has credited IRI with this achievement (Lamassoure 2004; 
del Río Villar 2004, 331–333; Clerck-Sachsse 2011), pointing out a 
lobbying campaign that turned the tide after a ―a last minute fight‖ 
(interview 4 with Mr Lamassoure, interview 5 with a member of the 
Secretariat, personal communication number 7 and interview 37 with Mr 
Hänsch).  
However, an interview with a representative of IRI, challenges accounts 
about the ECI as a boldly innovative idea promoted by a bunch of 
outsiders. The interviewee reports that the organisation convinced Italian 
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and Austrian ministers who proposed the idea to the Amsterdam 
intergovernmental conference back in 1996. Furthermore the interviewee 
reports running an informal working group with Convention members on 
issues of direct democracy during the entire Convention. This suggests 
that although the principle was accepted only lately, it had undergone an 
agenda setting process comparable to the one on civil society 
consultation, which suggests that this was far from being an action run by 
outsiders (Clerck-Sachsse 2011). 
Furthermore, the single attribution of the ECI to IRI is not unanimous 
among interviewees since ECAS and especially the Permanent Forum of 
Civil Society claim to be behind the Convention‘s proposal. The PFCS 
position papers support the interviewee‘s claim. Furthermore, as it was 
said above, the idea had already been tabled by Spanish socialist 
conventioneers. On a different approach, CEDAG asked that civil society 
organisations, rather than a group of individual citizens, be granted a right 
to demand the Commission to launch initiatives. This demand, which is 
telling about citizen‘s organisations‘ difficulty to mobilise citizens 
(Warleigh 2001; Sudbery 2003), confirms that the core organisations like 
CEDAG, sought to use the emerging frame on participatory democracy to 
obtain different ways of access to the EU. It is a further confirmation 
about the different focus of organisations advocating for citizen‘s direct 
involvement and those working for a stronger role for organisations.  
1.3. Civil society claims for influence 
Several of the organisations having demanded the inclusion of civil society 
consultation in the Treaty are convinced about their influence in the 
recognition of this principle. This is noticeable since interviewees do not 
easily claim success. It rather seems that participatory democracy is one 
of the rare aspects that they mention as a victory for civil society. In this 
sense up to 6 interviewees mentioned that finally not much was achieved 
in substantial terms by comparison with other treaties negotiated by 
traditional IGCs. In particular, little progress was seen in the social 
domain and 5 interviewees mentioned a defensive attitude by 
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environmental organisations which saw risks of de-communitarisation of 
the policy. 
Regarding the process of inclusion in the Treaty it seems that differences 
in arguments and interests notwithstanding, citizens‘ organisations made 
an almost unanimous claim for participatory democracy that was easily 
included in the agenda: 
 ―There was a one day hearing, where you had people coming from 
NGOs and from different actors at European level to talk to Valery 
Giscard d‘Estaing and all that. What happened that day is that we 
had some coordination beforehand and everyone asked things on 
the content and asked for civil dialogue to be recognised. And it was 
amazing, because they came the one after the other saying: ―We 
want civil dialogue, we want civil dialogue, we want civil dialogue to 
be in the Treaty‖, the Presidium started thinking, ―OK we have to 
do something because they seem to be asking all the same.‖ And I 
think that‘s where they started looking at it.‖ (Interview number 3, 
Social Platform). 
Although there is no definitive evidence about the author and the rationale 
behind article 47 it is most noticeable that civil society influence is largely 
recognised by up to 5 officials and members of the Convention, who admit 
that the article on participatory democracy was a way to respond to civil 
society demands: 
―Luis Bouza García:  I was wondering if this idea came directly from 
the Presidium, members of the Convention or perhaps directly from 
hearings with civil society? 
Jean-Luc Dehaene: It‘s hard to say, the technical formulation was 
certainly made by the Secretariat, but let it be clear that this 
element of democratic participation, citizens‘ participation, to be 
accurate, was widely supported by civil society, this is clear.‖ 
(Interview 1 with Jean-Luc Dehaene) 
At the same time almost all these interviewees point out that this was a 
low-profile debate for the Convention.  
It thus seems that the role of civil society was stronger in building the 
participatory democracy frame than in influencing concrete decisions 
about the content or the specific wording of aspects of the text. The main 
reason is the uncertainty about the limits of civil society organisations 
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influence reported by the interviewees (see table 7 below). The 
Convention was a new venue which included a significant number of new 
personnel, in particular national MPs, and with a number of very high 
stakes, as the ―prize‖ for lobbying efforts could be influence in a new 
Treaty. Interviewees provided several examples about this uncertainty: 
―we did not know how much we could ask for‖ (interviewee number 3) 
―we didn‘t dare to ask for it‖ (interviewee number 3) ―Everybody who is 
involved hopes and tries and sees itself as, as, as an important part,‖ 
(interviewee number 12) ―it‘s difficult to see if we had a clear impact or 
not.‖ (interview number 15), and more significantly, about the relation 
between the pressure by civil society organisations and the inclusion of 
the article in the text: 
―I think different stories have actually emerged, I mean, it was 
clearly pushed by the Social Platform, by the Contact Group, by 
other NGOs as well who thought that NGOs had to be recognised, I 
think that, you know, if you look to the Laeken declaration which 
stressed the need to have an inclusive and engaging process, it 
would have been difficult for the Convention to come up with 
something that didn‘t include any way of taking that forward. It was 
the result just of the way in which the Convention was set up. I 
think in terms of whether there‘d be or not an article on civil 
dialogue, it‘s very difficult to say because it came back to the way 
in which the Praesidium and Giscard worked, which was not the 
most transparent… So several stories have emerged but I don‘t 
think it is possible to claim credit for a particular group for having 
added that to the text.‖ (Interview number 9 with a representative 
of the Social Platform) 
Table 7 Uncertainty about the effectiveness of advocacy 
Name References 
Interview 03 - Soc. Pla. 2 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 1 
Interview 12 - IRI 2 
Interview 15 -  ELO 2 
Interview 18 - CSCG 6 
Interview 18 - Poli. Off. 1 
Interview 22 - Forum of Civil Society 2 
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2. Access via support by the Commission, national 
governments and members of the Convention 
The most obvious way in which the issue of participation could have made 
it to the Convention‘s agenda is by being promoted by some of the 
members of the Convention as some of them represented institutions 
which had already been active in the agenda-setting process such as the 
Commission and the EESC.  
However, interviews provide strong evidence against the hypothesis that 
the Commission acted as a levy for civil society in the Convention as none 
of the interviewees acknowledged support from this institution and five of 
them actually mentioned that the Commission was not their main 
interlocutor in this discussion. In particular the discourse of the two 
Commission interviewees (13 and 14) presents great distances with that 
of civil society: 
―Luis Bouza García: Contributions asked the Convention that civil 
dialogue be included in the Treaty.  
Interviewee: Yes, but it wasn‘t. [...] What the [Social] Platform 
would like is a social dialogue in the civil society field. [...]This is 
not in the Treaty; this civil dialogue is not there. [...] What is there 
is a different thing; it is an article saying that there are consultation 
mechanisms, dialogue mechanisms, but not a civil dialogue in the 
sense of the social dialogue.‖ (interview 14 with a member of the 
Commission‘s secretariat) 
This distance was perceived as well by civil society organisations: ―I 
remember we had contacts but difficult contacts‖ (interview number 11 
with a representative of COFACE). This is confirmed by the Commission‘s 
staff working documents which devote almost no attention to the issue of 
participatory democracy (not a single reference to these words) and in 
general to the mechanisms of consultation of civil society apart from 
noting that the ―basic principles in the chapter on democratic life‖ 
correspond to the Commission‘s expectations (Secretariat General 
European Commission 2003). These documents point out that the citizens‘ 
initiative is an innovation introduced in the last meeting of the Convention 
and that it was generally welcomed by the members. However as one of 
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the main items in the Commission‘s agenda was to safeguard its 
monopoly of legislative initiative it may not be surprising that the ECI was 
not particularly welcome by the Commission (interviews 5 and 13). 
Although it seems to be far from the norm, it is very noticeable that 
without a question on this topic being raised 5 interviewees brought the 
example of Irish social NGOs influence via the Irish representative in the 
Convention. Although this was mainly related to aspects of equality in part 
III, it resonated with the question of civil society participation in that as it 
was mentioned in the discussion of the amendments in the previous 
chapter the Irish member Proinsias De Rossa made the only amendment 
suggesting that civil society organisations should be brought closer to the 
status of social partners: 
―Strengthen the commitment to dialogue and give civil society 
organisations similar respect to that guaranteed to the Social 
Partners in the treaty.‖ (Amendment to Art. 46 by Mr. Proinsias De 
Rossa). 
This would not be noticeable if it was not because it was seen as a 
strategy to upload Irish social dialogue model to the EU: 
―This idea comes from the Irish tradition where in their social 
dialogue they have a few NGOs inside and some people said ―this 
must also be important at the European level‖ (interview 31 with a 
representative of ETUC) 
In this sense a few national and European officials consider that there 
were a few attempts to introduce national interests as civil society 
demands. 
―This was a way of justifying some contents that were not really 
demanded by civil society. [...] It should be analysed how national 
interests were introduced as supposedly civil society interests.‖ 
(interview 34 with a representative of the Spanish government).  
This seems to suggest that lobbying through the capitals may have been 
an option for some organisations, although by definition this was limited 
to sectors where demands by civil society organisations and national 
governments coincided. This does not seem to have been the case for 
Spanish or French governments as interviews with two Spanish civil 
107 
 
servants (interviews 34 and 39)19 reveal scepticism on national civil 
society‘s ability to participate in European affairs.  
Finally, as it will appear, several members of the Convention were 
supportive of civil society demands (IRI 2004). However, in their accounts 
participatory democracy is frequently equated with the ECI (Borrell 
Fontelles et al. 2003; Lamassoure 2004; Méndez de Vigo 2005), and there 
are few references to civil dialogue, which suggests that they were not the 
first articulators of the demand.  
3. Involvement in formal hearings and contacts with 
Convention members 
In accordance with its Laeken mandate, the Convention articulated 
several ways of access for civil society, going from national Conventions 
to an online forum and hearings with civil society organisations, both 
regularly in the EESC and the working groups and a plenary session held 
on 24-25 June 2002 (del Río Villar 2004; Cammaerts 2006; Monaghan 
2007, for detailed analyses of these mechanisms).  
In the absence of support by the Commission, interviewees report 
involvement in hearings and direct contact with specific members of the 
Convention as the two more straightforward ways of access to the 
Convention. This together with the fact that a large and influential part of 
the Convention was composed of well-known European personnel such as 
MEPs compensated for the novelty of the Convention (Monaghan 2007). 
However the presence of elected politicians as an empowerment factor for 
civil society organisations seems to be divisive for interviewees, including 
members of the Convention themselves. Whereas some consider that the 
electoral mandate of the members of the Convention made them sensitive 
to civil society demands, others argue that it is precisely these personnel 
who are more distrustful of civil society organisations and participatory 
democracy as a possible competitor for legitimacy. Interviews with 
officials and MEPs seem to clarify this point: although the Convention did 
                                       
19
 An advisor to the Spanish government during the Convention (interview 34) and a member of the 
Secretariat of the Catalan Convention (interview 39). 
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not dispel distrust about civil society‘s legitimacy among MEPs, they 
perceived that this institutional setting would make it costly to ignore civil 
society demands. In this case, institutionalisation of consultation was 
much easier to accommodate to the Laeken frame than demands on 
substance. Additionally, there seems to have been an expectation that 
civil society would correspond by contributing to the ratification of the 
Treaty (see chapter 5). 
The evaluation of access mechanisms and influence factors adds to the 
impression that the Convention was rather usual business for the 
organisations (Monaghan 2007; Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007). It 
appears that the plenary hearing in June was a rather formal event which 
civil society organisations used to strongly frame their unity. That said, 
calling it a formal event does not diminish its importance (del Río Villar 
2004, 295) as it contributed to put civil society consultation on the 
Convention‘s agenda. In terms of influence the interviewees tend to 
consider the EESC hearings and the working groups as the most effective 
fora, as 16 interviewees mentioned them as one of the most frequent 
ways of access to the Convention. It is interesting that these mechanisms 
were used by both EU and national NGOs, but that neither the social 
partners nor regional organisations pointed this as an access mechanism, 
since these organisations had more institutionalised access as social 
partners or via the EESC. The importance of these mechanisms is 
confirmed by the fact that the 5 organisations reporting that these 
hearings were just a formality (IRI, ELO, ACN, Polish Office and PFCS) are 
clearly at the periphery of the process analysed in the two previous 
chapters. A similar thing can be said of the Forum website where civil 
society organisations submitted their contributions. It seems to have been 
clear to all the organisations that this was a formality that did not grant 
any influence (Cammaerts 2006, 241–242) and yet all the organisations 
invested resources in contributing to it. An interview with a member of the 
secretariat acknowledges the need of action and presence for civil society 
contribution to be considered:  
―Interviewee: […] it would be dishonest on my part to tell you that 
during drafting and re-drafting the articles, we were looking at the 
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Forum. But, hum, there were some probably more organised, I 
don‘t know, associations or NGOs, hum, which were much more 
active than just putting things on the, on the website.‖ (interview 
number 5). 
It seems that civil society organisations perceived that participation in 
these formal events such as the Forum website or the hearings was not a 
way of influence but rather a way to be perceived as relevant actors. This 
is important because it contributes to build alliances and reputation in 
terms of lasting involvement, expertise and trust with decision makers, 
which are the ways in which interviewees explain their success or lack of 
in the Convention (see table 8 below about the importance of alliances). 
11 organisations, 9 of which are citizen groups, report direct contacts with 
members of the Convention. These were motivated by the same dynamic 
of continued involvement and trust building rather than by the defence of 
a specific point or amendment. Access via direct contact with the 
members has been more frequent for the organisations in this study than 
when a broader sample of groups is considered (Monaghan 2007, 152–
158). The participation in formal events as a way to ensure other ways of 
access does not differ from a broader pattern of consultation processes 
(Quittkat and Kotzian 2011) which has been seen in chapter 2, where 
involvement in formal fora seems to be a way to build trust, obtain 
informal access and in general increase the organisations‘ visibility.  
The presence of civil society consultation in the hearings has been 
discussed previously. By contrast this topic was not really addressed at 
the hearings in the European Economic and Social Committee. Although 
the EESC claims to be the appropriate forum for civil dialogue and the 
institutional representative of civil society in the EU, the minutes of the 
hearings with civil society organisations during the Convention do not 
mention any discussion on civil dialogue and do not point any particular 
action exercised in this context to influence the Convention‘s agenda 
about it. Although the EESC has refused to disclose the list of 
organisations that attended these meetings interviews suggest that these 
hearings were attended by most of the EU organisations of this study 
without however making their main demand in this venue. 
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The EESC is the institution having advocated earlier for a turn to civil 
society and participatory democracy (Smismans 2003). Its documents 
always associate references to civil society to the role of the EESC in 
representing it at the EU level. An interview with an EESC official (number 
20) confirms that this institution intended to use these hearings as a way 
to frame its role as the most adequate venue for civil dialogue (see as well 
(Monaghan 2007, 72). In this sense a strong role of civil society in the 
EESC hearing would have probably provided this institution with increased 
ground to claim a role in civil society consultation. Since most civil society 
organisations rejected such role for the EESC because of fears that it 
would amount to little more than a ‗talking shop‘ (see chapter 2) they 
seem to have declined the possibility of using the Committee hearings as 
an access door on this topic to the Convention.  
4. Alliances and frame convergence 
It was already mentioned in chapter 2 that citizens‘ groups made a 
significant effort to frame their demands on consultation as a unanimous 
demand by civil society to the Convention. Interviewees consider that this 
strategy contributed to setting the Convention‘s agenda on the issue. 
When asked about the conditions for being influential in the Convention, 
organisations point to the importance of alliances, as suggested by table 8 
below. Networking and membership of coalitions appear as the more 
important factors of influence both in position papers and interviews, 
followed by expertise and reputation in EU matters. All these factors seem 
to contribute to increasing the attention that actors can receive.  
As it had already been suggested in chapter 2, demands about the 
institutionalisation of consultation are strongly articulated by members of 
the CSCG and the Social Platform. Table 9 below shows that 74% of 
references to the need of a legal base for civil society dialogue come from 
members of these organisations, with a very significant salience of the 
Social Platform. At the level of individual organisations, the Social 
Platform, CEDAG, COFACE, CONCORD and Eurodiaconia – Caritas stand 
out. The EFC stands out as the only organisations intensely making this 
point without being a member of this coalition.  
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Table 8 Organisations reporting the importance of alliances to 
achieve influence in the Convention 
Name 
Interview 03 - Soc. Pla. 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 
Interview 11 - COFACE 
Interview 15 -  ELO 
Interview 16 - ACN 
Interview 18 - CSCG 
Interview 19 - Poli. Off. 
Interview 21 - CONCORD 
Interview 23 - Forum of Civil Society 
Interview 23 - ECAS 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 
Interview 35 - Eurocities 
Table 9 Alliance membership of organisations demanding a legal 
base for consultation  
 
No 
coalitio
n CSCG Social Platform ERC 
Regional 
organisat
ions 
Number of 
references 
per 
organisatio
n 
EFC 
(8), 
PFCS 
(4), 
ECAS 
(2), 
LDH 
(3), 
UEAPM
E (1),  
SOCIAL 
PLATFOR
M (23), 
CONCOR
D (6), 
CSCG 
(4), ETUC 
(2), EEB 
(3) 
CEDAG (9), 
COFACE (7), 
EURODIACONI
A-CARITAS (5), 
CEV (1) 
ACN 
(1) 
CPRM (2) 
Number of 
references 18 38 22 1 2 
Percentage 
of total (81 
references) 22,2% 46,9% 27,1% 1,3% 2,5% 
The strong correspondence between demands and membership in a 
coalition confirms the importance of alliances in the agenda setting 
process for collective action. The quote below of CEV‘s position paper for 
the 2000 consultation process confirms the importance of the agenda 
setting process for exchanges of opinion contributing to the circulation of 
collective demands:  
―Like CEDAG and the European Foundation Centre we believe that 
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the NGO sector should be recognised as a social partner alongside 
employers and trade unions. […] We recommend that the 
Commission take an approach that builds upon the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and that it comes out in support of a Treaty Amendment.‖ 
(CEV Response to the discussion paper ‘European Commission and 
Non-Governmental Organisations: Building A Stronger Partnership‘, 
April 2000, p. 3) 
Analysing the broader context is useful as well to understand the 
importance of coalitions. From 1997 to 2002, the context of the 
discussions is similar, that is, a consultation based on a communication or 
discussion paper by the Commission. That said the tendency is to a 
significant increase in the number of contributions for each consultation. 
Whereas only 5 European organisations were involved in the 1997 
discussion (Social Platform, EFC, CEDAG, CEV and CMAF), the Commission 
received several dozens of contributions for the consultation on the White 
Paper on Governance. The table below shows the general increase in the 
number of contributions.  
Table 10 Number of civil society organisations contributing to each 
consultation process20 
 1997 2000 2001 2002 Convention 
Total 5 37 225 65 528 
The organisations promoting civil dialogue, whose contributions are the 
oldest ones, reacted to this tendency by trying to foster their cooperation. 
The clearest evidence is the creation of the Civil Society Contact Group 
(CSCG) ahead of the Convention. However interviews suggest that 
alliances were more important for frame convergence than for collective 
action on the wake of the Convention. Interviews tend to point out 
different roles for the coalitions discussed so far. They suggest that 
alliances did not substitute their members in voicing their demands in the 
Convention as 11 interviewees21 reported having established direct 
relations with members of the Convention independently of their 
coalitions.  
                                       
20 The Commission documents for its consultations, (Kværk 2007, 161) for the Convention. Obviously 
the Convention position papers are not only on participatory democracy.  
21 Social Platform, COFACE, ACN, IRI, ELO, CSCG, Polish Office, PFCS, ECAS, CEDAG and Eurocities 
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The CSCG was an important actor in framing the unity of civil society 
behind demands on consultation. On the other hand and contrary to the 
wishes of some Convention members wanting to ―simplify‖ the civil society 
spectrum, it was never recognised as the formal voice of civil society in 
the Convention (del Río Villar 2004, 287–288). This relates, among other 
things, to its shallowness as an alliance given the strong differences 
among its members. For instance, the organisation could not have been a 
strong voice in concrete proposals on civil dialogue due to the divergences 
among some of its members having different views on this topic such as 
the Social Platform, ETUC or the EEB. Although ETUC played a minor role 
in this organisation its own perception of such role is extremely telling: 
―We are not totally against this idea of having less distance between 
the citizen and Europe and his job [the colleague participating in the 
CSCG meetings] was to make sure that there were no proposals 
coming out that were totally counterproductive‖ (interview 31 with 
a representative of ETUC).  
The difficulty of the CSCG to act as a strong coalition is clearly 
acknowledged by a representative of the organisation: 
―It was difficult enough if you think at the time, it was four sectors. 
Now our members are European NGOs, who then have members 
and that, and that. Now, to reach common positions and to have a 
common mission statement, you need to get there. You are very 
likely to be entering into a Christmas tree, where a million things 
were put in and there is no line to perceive any more. It took a lot 
of effort to put together an arrangement that people could accept, 
you know, we are not going to have 10 development statements, 
we are going to have one.‖ (interview 18 with a representative of 
the CSCG) 
Internal divisions may explain as well that according to the CSCG 
interviewee the main role of the organisation was not advocating 
particular horizontal causes such as participatory democracy, although 
that was an important issue, but providing support for the key issues of 
each of its sectors. In this sense the interviewee was much keener to 
acknowledge CSCG support for the Social Platform‘s call for a horizontal 
anti-discrimination clause than for participatory democracy. 
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Interviews suggest that the Social Platform played a more direct role in 
brokering the coalition and in promoting its‘ members activism on this 
topic. They suggest as well that the Permanent Forum of Civil Society, 
which describes itself as ―a think tank‖ on European citizenship and 
brought together different European and national actors during the 
Convention, may have been important in creating the general 
participatory democracy frame as it brought together advocates of civil 
dialogue and those of more direct democratic tools. 
A question related to the role of alliances is that of staff turnover. As it 
was said in chapter 2, it is not infrequent that European civil society 
organisations see their personnel move to other positions related to the 
EU, although it did not visibly affect organisational framing. In this sense 
7 of the interviewees moved from their organisation during the thesis time 
frame, of which 6 belonged to European organisations. An interesting 
finding, although it is difficult to present precise data without endangering 
respondents‘ anonymity, is that turnover did not necessarily affect 
organisations‘ coalition roles as several of the changes occurred among 
organisations of civil society and more importantly, between organisations 
of the same alliance. In particular some interviewees held multiple 
positions across the organisations, which, far from hindering their coalition 
activity, may have promoted it. 
The functioning of these coalitions is examined in the next chapter. 
However the previous section and these findings suggest that coalitions 
were not decisive in terms of their weight in expressing demands, but 
rather because of their contribution to creating a strong frame and 
facilitating collective action. 
In contrast with the importance of formal and informal opportunities for 
exchange with Convention members and participation in coalitions, there 
are almost no references to recourse to outside lobbying. Although the 
discourse was adapted to the dominant frames in each moment, the 
structure and the style of the papers submitted to the Convention undergo 
little transformation. In general those remain short and direct; somehow 
contrary to the expectation that the papers would become more 
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argumentative and more contentious as the number of participants and 
the divergence among their positions increased, the papers remain 
affirmative and fail to address a larger public. For instance IRI organised 
the European Referendum Campaign with 100 member organisations 
across Europe but the interviewee (number 12) dismissed the importance 
of this approach and highlighted the importance of insider approaches 
targeting decision makers (Lamassoure 2004). 
5. The debate about participatory democracy in the Convention 
After having analysed the way in which organisations used the 
Convention‘s access opportunities to try to influence the Convention, this 
section analyses official documents‘ references to participatory democracy 
with particular reference to the role of civil society organisations in putting 
this topic on the agenda.  
Civil society organisations wanting to interact regularly with the 
Convention were divided in 8 sectors of different interests. These sectors 
organised 8 meetings chaired by members of the Praesidium that 
prepared the plenary session hearing of civil of June 2002. It is interesting 
that about half of the organisations included in this research (10) were 
designated to speak on their behalf in the plenary hearing by the 361 
organisations that participated in the working groups across all the 
sectors. Despite the high turnout in the preparatory meetings there is no 
reporting about quarrels for representation in the plenary hearing, and the 
Praesidium paper suggests that this was done by consensus:  
"The Chairman asked the attending organisations to inform him of 
the way in which they would be using their speaking time. Following 
brief consultations, the following arrangements were adopted" 
(Secretariat of the European Convention 2002b, 22). 
 
A member of the Convention secretariat confirmed his amazement at this 
fact: 
 ―And then amazingly, I think amazingly it worked! I mean, they 
managed to decide amongst themselves and I think it worked 
reasonably successfully.‖ (interview 6). 
Out of the 37 civil society organisations that took the floor in the plenary 
session 10 are among the organisations considered in this thesis. This 
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means that half of the most active organisations in the previous debates 
took the floor during the Convention. This suggests that the question of 
civil society participation was high among the issues that civil society 
organisations wanted to include in the Constitution, given the salience of 
organisations advocating for this topic in this large meeting. It appears 
that this issue was an important horizontal topic for organisations from 
different sectors as it was discussed in 5 of the 8 sectoral hearings. 
Among the organisations represented in the main hearing of civil society, 
27% had been actively involved in the previous discussions related to 
participatory democracy. This suggests as well that it was a relative 
minority of organisations with a good reputation who took the lead in 
advocacy for this topic.   
Before the plenary hearing the Convention‘s Secretariat prepared a digest 
of the position papers sent by civil society to the online forum which 
acknowledges the demand for a legal base for civil society consultation 
(Secretariat of the European Convention 2002a). This acknowledgement 
shows that this demand was shared by a noticeable number of civil 
society organisations as well as a positive attitude of the Praesidium 
towards this question, probably linked to the Laeken declaration concern 
with democracy. Although it has not been possible to identify an individual 
decision to include participatory democracy in the Treaty it was supported 
by members the Praesidium as 3 of them (Hänsch, Dehaene and Amato 
who will later be the contact person for the ERC campaign) devoted 
particular attention to this topic in their reports on the hearings 
(Monaghan 2007, 74). An interview with Mr Hänsch confirmed the fact 
that the Praesidium took up the issue immediately after the hearing 
(interview 37).  
This may explain that participatory democracy was put early in the 
Convention‘s agenda. The Secretariat presented a series of articles on the 
democratic life of the Union on April 2nd 2003 (Secretariat of the European 
Convention 2003), which included an article on participatory democracy 
(article 34). The Secretariat links this proposal to the ongoing debate on 
how to bring the EU closer to the citizens in a clear example of a 
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conscious agenda-setting effort to link problem identification and policy 
proposals:  
―The question of how to increase the democratic legitimacy and 
transparency of the institutions was an essential element of the 
Laeken Declaration. From the beginning of the Convention's 
proceedings, it was evident that citizens had high expectations as 
regards transparency in the Union's legislative process, and wanted 
the Union to be closer to its citizens, partly through dialogue between 
institutions and citizens on the Union's activities, through 
associations and civil society‖ (Secretariat of the European 
Convention 2003, 2).  
The justification for article 34 in particular insists that this provides a legal 
base for current practice (Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007), which 
suggests that preceding agenda setting work was relevant in this decision. 
―Draft Article 34 sets out the main elements of participatory 
democracy, and is intended to provide a framework and content for 
the dialogue which is largely already in place between the institutions 
and civil society‖ (Secretariat of the European Convention 2003, 2).  
This proposal by the Secretariat saw little change in the subsequent 
months. Since some amendments asked the article to be more concrete, 
the general recognition of dialogue was supplemented by a particular 
reference to ―broad consultations with concerned parties‖ in the revision 
of the article presented on May 26th 2003 (European Convention 2003:b). 
These changes were debated in a plenary session on June 5th2003, where, 
according to the summary by the Secretariat there were few comments 
except some calls for the recognition of the European citizens‘ initiative 
(European Convention 2003: c: 3) which was not yet in the proposal. This 
provides interesting information on the Convention‘s debate on the 
European Citizens‘ Initiative. On the one hand it was on the agenda of 
some members since early in the Convention (unnumbered amendment 
by Spanish socialists Borrell, Carnero and López Garrido). On the other 
hand it appears that this mechanism was not seriously considered until 
the late moments (Lamassoure 2004), suggesting the importance of civil 
society activism for tipping the balance of internal discussions.  
 
6. Internal debate: analysis of the amendments 
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The analysis of the amendments confirms that despite the Convention‘s 
acceptance of participatory democracy the topic attracted the attention of 
many Convention members who sent 61 amendments on the first draft. 
That said this is very far from a heated debate as it is a very small 
number in comparison with the thousands amendments received by the 
first 16 articles of the Constitution (1187 according to (Méndez de Vigo 
2005, 272). Figure 8 below summarises the subjects raised by the 
Convention members and suggests that the discussion on the 
participatory democracy article (art 34 in the first draft, art. 46 in the 
second draft and 47 in the text approved by the IGC) gathered less 
unanimity on its details than on the principle.  
Figure 8 Topics of amendments on participatory democracy22 
 
This is confirmed by the analysis of the content. Most of the amendments 
are reformulations of the wording of the article by the Secretariat, rather 
than radically different conceptions of participation. The only challenge to 
the concept of participatory democracy is linked to the fact that the first 
draft referred only to participatory democracy in the section on the 
democratic life of the EU without mentioning representative democracy. 
Thus 6 amendments pointed out the need of a distinct article on 
representative democracy, which was included in the following draft. The 
                                       
22 The red bars stress amendments diverging from the majority line. 
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rest of the amendments reflect the abovementioned strategies of different 
sections of civil society to obtain specific recognition. 
The first draft did not include a specific recognition of social partners, 
which caused a strong reaction for the creation of a differentiated forum, 
which would be done in the next draft. It is worth mentioning that the 
EESC itself and in particular the representatives of the social partners 
within it (Jacobs for UNICE and Gabaglio for ETUC) made calls to make a 
clear-cut distinction between civil and social dialogue. There was only one 
call to bring civil society organisations closer to social partners‘ status, 
made by an Irish member of the Convention (de Rossa). 
A number of Convention members argued that if civil society was to be 
recognised, regional and local authorities or their representative 
organisations should obtain distinct recognition too. There were 8 
amendments on this point, with particular insistence from the 
representatives of the British and Spanish government. 
 
The question of how consultation should be organised and in particular of 
who should be consulted attracted the attention of a number of members. 
7 amendments emphasise the need to consult organised civil society and 
to proceed to structured consultations. In this respect, it seems that the 
aim was to recognise institutionalised actors rather than to allow for the 
emergence of new forms of consultation different from those already 
known. The fact that the notion of civil dialogue was only used by the 
representatives of the EESC and by Dominique de Villepin (representative 
of the French Government) confirms the decay of this frame in favour of 
participatory democracy that the previous chapter has suggested. 
 
The most significant of these attempts to change the wording of the article 
are the amendments suggesting the deletion of ―representative 
associations‖ from the reference to civil society in the article. The 
inclusion of these words despite a majority of contrary amendments (7 
against and only one for) is additional evidence that this formulation is 
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intentional. It rather seems to confirm that the reference to 
representativeness is a concession to social partners‘ demands.  
 
Finally a number of amendments address the question of participation 
beyond organisations, that is, directly by citizens. This is quite informative 
about the ways in which ideas were formulated in the context of the 
Convention. As soon as the notion of participatory democracy was 
included in the draft, a number of Convention members submitted 
different and autonomous amendments on different forms of direct 
democracy, the most significant being different forms of citizens initiative 
and of citizens‘ referendum, as well as the right to receive information. In 
particular, the language of some amendments appears to be influenced by 
the language of organisations such as ACN and the Permanent Forum. 
These amendments are presented by individual members (Bonde, Einem, 
Voggenhube) or a small group of members (such as the Spanish socialists 
Borrell, Carnero and López Garrido), although, they had very little impact 
and did not foster further action. However on the last session of the 
Convention the successful lobbying by IRI discussed above gave rise to an 
amendment on the citizens‘ initiative that was proposed by Jürgen Meyer 
and signed by virtually all the members of the Convention. It appears thus 
that activism in gathering the support of relevant actors or a high number 
of members was decisive in the promotion of new ideas. 
7. Understanding the agenda setting process 
The White Paper on Governance and the Laeken declaration convening the 
European Convention are two politically salient initiatives decisively 
shaping the EU‘s discourse on the need to come closer to civil society to 
make the EU more legitimate (Monaghan 2007) which together with the 
fact that the Convention was mandated with a revision of the Treaties 
makes it a privileged occasion for the realisation of the demand to provide 
civil society organisations with a legal basis for action. That said the 
convergence of the agendas is not a sufficient condition to include a 
Treaty article on this topic. 
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The empirical data confirm the importance of the preceding consultations. 
A majority of interviewees from civil society acknowledge that the 
discussion on participation in the Convention was not new but was 
influenced by the policy dialogues between civil society organisations and 
the European Commission (see table 11 below). This is acknowledged as 
well by a number of officials and members of the Convention. In particular 
interviewees have confirmed the importance of each of the consultations 
between 1997 and 2002 in the agenda setting process, with a strong 
insistence on the 2001 White Paper on Governance and included the first 
Social Policy Forum (1996) and to a lesser extent the First Convention on 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (1999-2000). The interviews show the 
importance of the ―red card‖ mobilisation about the 1998 NGO funding 
crisis as an important moment for the emergence of a transversal identity 
for the sector which realised the fragility of its position and access 
mechanism (Ruzza 2004, 47).  
Table 11 Convention's discussion on participatory democracy was 
influenced by previous discussions 
Name References 
Interview 03 - Soc. Platform 1 
Interview 09 - Soc. Platform 1 
Interview 10 - EFC 3 
Interview 11 - COFACE 6 
Interview 17 - UNICE 3 
Interview 21 - CONCORD 1 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 1 
Interview 27 - CEDAG 1 
Interview 29 - Eurocommerce 1 
Interview 35 - Eurocities 1 
Interview 36 - EEB 1 
Secondly it is important to insist on the fact that this process is not linear, 
that is, it is not because participatory democracy had been discussed 
before the Convention that it was ready to be included in the Treaty. In 
understanding this process, it is useful to refer to Kingdon‘s classical 3 
streams of problem recognition, policy proposals and policy windows (or 
political opportunities) as distinct phases of the agenda setting (Kingdon 
2003, 86–89). It is important as well to understand that these streams 
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are not necessarily linear either, as it is suggested by the garbage can 
model.  
The change of venue operated by the Convention is an important moment 
in the convergence of these streams. It has been highlighted that EU 
institutions had already recognised very clearly the problem of democratic 
deficit, and a potential solution, stronger participation, right at the change 
of the millennium, in particular between the fall of the Santer Commission 
and the end of 2001 (Georgakakis 2004). This recognition was operated 
simultaneously by the Commission in the White Paper and the Council in 
the Laeken declaration. The EU institutions have thus a very prominent 
role in setting the general agenda. However, it has been shown that civil 
society organisations played a much more important role than it is 
generally acknowledged in elaborating concrete policy proposals on 
participation. The key aspect of these proposals is the formulation of civil 
society participation as citizens‘ participation and as a way to make the EU 
more democratic. These proposals operate as frames for proposals on how 
to practically operate the answer to the problem: a legal recognition of 
civil society‘s right to participate. 
That does not mean that these proposals were accepted beforehand. To 
the diverse interests in the institutional field, evidenced by the EESC 
attempt to raise its profile, and within civil society, with the social 
partners sceptical on dialogue, it is important to add that civil society‘s 
demands were difficult to introduce in ordinary policy making. In this 
context the best example is that of the inability of the Commission to 
include an article on civil dialogue during the Nice Intergovernmental 
Conference. Furthermore, even when issues of detail were at stake, such 
as in 2002, the Commission had a very narrow control of the options and 
decisions. In this sense the incertitude of the Convention was an 
important change in that the Commission no longer had such a close 
control. In this sense, the Convention bridged the streams, in that it 
offered a political opportunity to add civil society‘s demands to a concrete 
problem, the Laeken mandate.  
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Chapter 4 The emergence of an 
organisational field of participatory 
democracy 
The previous chapter has confirmed that the agenda setting process was 
important in the formulation of a policy proposal on how to articulate 
participation as an answer to democratic legitimacy concerns. In particular 
the Laeken declaration concern with democracy was an important 
opportunity window. However none of this guaranteed the inclusion of civil 
society consultation in the Treaty. The best confirmation is provided by 
the surprisingly low profile of the Commission in this debate, despite its 
role in raising the issue previously. It has thus appeared that coordinated 
action by civil society organisations aiming directly at Convention 
members was important for the achievement of civil society goals.  
Once the importance of collective action is highlighted, it is important to 
understand more precisely the motivations of organisations to take action. 
The central question is why organisations advocated for a series of 
principles which were already enforced in practice (Secretariat of the 
European Convention 2003, 2; Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007, 281)? As 
it was argued in the first chapter it is necessary to analyse the group 
dynamics in order to understand what organisations were trying to 
achieve by introducing this demand.  
In order to do so this chapter analyses in greater detail the exchanges 
between organisations on the particular issue of participatory democracy. 
These exchanges are not only important for understanding the role of 
coalitions in the Convention, but are decisive for understanding the flows 
of information and common actions for the promotion of participatory 
democracy during the Convention, and thus whether and how the 
participatory democracy frame was diffused. The analysis builds on 
triangulated data obtained from documents, interviews and questionnaires 
(see the questionnaire in annex 9 annex 10 for a detailed presentation of 
the evidence obtained from each kind of source). 
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1. Analysing the field of organisations active in the debate on civil 
society institutionalisation  
Figure 9 below represents the entire relations between the organisations 
considered in this work, both those active at the EU and at the national 
level. 
Figure 9 Network primary organisations23 
 
From the first approach the graph provides a number of relevant 
observations. Firstly the almost complete connection of the network, that 
is, that there is only sub-component consisting of regional organisations 
suggests that despite the big diversity of organisations in terms of level of 
action (EU, Spain, France) and focus (business groups, trade unions, 
social organisations, environmental ones, regional interests etc) the 
organisations involved in the discussion on participatory democracy were 
regularly in touch because of their interest for the same topic. The 
                                       
23 EU organisations represented in yellow, Spanish ones in red, French ones in blue 
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existence of this shared interest and a system of regular relations suggest 
that the exchanges between these organisations on the subject of civil 
society participation can be characterised as an organisational field in the 
sense that ―in the aggregate, [they] constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life [...]. The process of institutional definition or 
―structuration‖ consists of four parts: an extension of interaction of 
organizations in the field; the emergence of sharply defined 
interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of coalition; an 
increase in the information load with which organizations in the field must 
contend; and the development of a mutual awareness among 
participants‖ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65). This chapter analyses the 
emergence of such a field.  
The graph above confirms the existence of regular exchanges and mutual 
awareness between members of the field, and significantly that those 
were established despite the strong diversity of interests and goals. 
Section 2 below analyses the objectives and motivations of organisations 
in order to understand what was at stake in these exchanges.  
The graph reveals very significant differences, which suggest ―sharply 
defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of 
coalition‖ in terms of patterns of cooperation and competition which are 
analysed in detail in section 3. The most significant of those are 
highlighted now.  
The graph suggests the existence of a core of EU level organisations in the 
centre of the graph intensely communicating with each other and a 
periphery comprising national organisations and less directly involved EU 
organisations, essentially business and regional organisations. It is 
noticeable that the latter are either disconnected from the rest of the 
network (regional organisations or just connected by one or two 
organisations (business organisations). This suggests that they were at 
the margins of this organisational field, without necessarily being 
outsiders in the Convention. Organisations such as Spain‘s RCE and ONCE 
or France‘s Fonda-CARFECS are the few exceptions of national 
organisations at the core of the network. 
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The graph reveals as well that some central organisations played a key 
role in connecting the network‘s core and periphery. Observation suggests 
such roles for the PFCS, ETUC, EEB, CEDAG, IRI and Eurocities. This 
preliminary observation is very relevant because among these ―brokers‖ 
of communication between different actors in the field only CEDAG was at 
the core of the coalition formulating the demand on the institutionalisation 
of consultation. 
 
Section 4 deals with the flows of information and communication, and 
reflects on their significance for the extension of the frame on 
participatory democracy beyond its original promoters. The last section 
discusses the findings in relation to the literature on collective action in 
the EU.  
2. Civil dialogue institutionalisation: what was at stake 
So far it has appeared that the policy debates between 1997 and the 
Convention contributed to the emergence of an agenda of civil society 
participation strongly shaped by a small number of civil society 
organisations and the European Commission and challenged by social 
partners and to some extent by the EESC. It has appeared that citizens‘ 
organisations sought to obtain a legal recognition of their access to EU 
institutions. This demand by civil society does not seem exceptional in the 
context of EU and civil society relations as ―the degree of 
institutionalisation of interest groups in the EU political system is what 
makes it unique‖ (Greenwood 2011b, 206). However it has been 
highlighted that the objective was not the creation of access opportunities 
but rather their institutionalisation. As this relevant distinction is rarely 
highlighted, it is important to make sense of its significance. 
2.1. The strategy of citizens’ organisations 
The analysis of recognition demands reveals that those are strongly aimed 
at raising the profile of citizens‘ organisations and in particular of social 
NGOs. This is formulated by an interviewee from COFACE as a way to 
reverse the historical discrimination by institutions and social partners 
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against social NGOs and the Social Platform, CSCG and CONCORD 
interviewees coincide that institutionalisation is a benefit for weak players 
whose contribution to policymaking could be contested by more influential 
organisations. Furthermore, opponents of this mechanism such as 
Eurocommerce and ETUC interviewees confirm that social NGOs meant 
civil dialogue as a way to raise their profile. The Social Platform requests 
the recognition of the autonomy of civil society with the same formula 
used for social partners, as well as the usage of the notion of organised 
civil society rather than the finally accepted text of ―representative 
associations and civil society‖. In this sense some interviewees perceive 
institutionalisation as the emergence of an obligation to listen for 
European institutions. Below is an unusually strong claim as to the 
benefits expected from institutionalisation:  
―Since the beginning was the idea that by more meetings with the 
Parliament, by more meetings with the Commission, by more 
meetings with the Council, get us on an equal footing with the 
European institutions‖ (interview 3, with a representative of the 
Social Platform).  
It is interesting to find two distinct accounts on the emergence and 
consolidation of a structured field of civil society and interaction with the 
Commission. The first account (table 12 below) puts the focus on the 
Commission‘s activism in structuring the civil society field by encouraging 
and funding the creation of sectoral platforms (Sánchez-Salgado 2007a; 
Greenwood 2011b):  
―They [the Commission] hate talking to 50 organisations and they 
do provide funding to structure‖ interview 10 with a representative 
of EFC) 
Table 12 Interviewees acknowledging the Commission's activism 
Name References 
Interview 03 - Soc. Pla. 2 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 1 
Interview 10 - EFC 1 
Interview 11 - COFACE 2 
Interview 16 - ACN 2 
Interview 27 - CEDAG 1 
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The contribution of the institutionalisation of consultation to reducing civil 
society‘s disruption potential is probably as important as the motivation of 
simplifying the field. Although it is frequently argued that EU organisations 
have a very strong preference for insider registers (Mahoney 2007; Balme 
and Chabanet 2008), it is also true that these organisations remain able 
to use protest in some circumstances (Ruzza 2011). In this sense the 
abovementioned red card mobilisation may have been a further example 
of the benefits that EU institutions would derive from cooperating rather 
than colliding with organisations (Alhadeff and Wilson 2002). This is 
acknowledged by an interviewee from Eurocommerce. Despite this 
organisation‘s disagreement with a specific legal status for civil dialogue, 
and with the very notion of ―civil dialogue‖, the interviewee agrees that 
this mechanism has had several advantages in trade policy: 
―I cannot advertise the civil society dialogue enough, because often 
and we‘ve seen it in Seattle in 1999 at the WTO conference, you 
allow me maybe a play on words but in 1999 in Seattle what we 
have seen was, in French, ―la loi de la rue‖ [the law of the street]. 
Now civil society discussions and civil society dialogue take place in 
the ―Rue de la Loi‖ [Law Street, the main street of Brussels‘ 
European district]. 
LBG: [laugh] 
Interviewee: That‘s a big change to which civil society dialogue had 
contributed.‖ (interview 29 with a representative of Eurocommerce) 
 
This is related as well to a frequent expectation on institutionalisation by 
citizens‘ groups: securing access to all the institutions of the EU rather 
than only to the Commission. The organisations‘ claims point to two 
different problems. The first one is the Parliament‘s reluctance to 
recognise civil society organisations (EFC, Permanent Forum) and the 
great difficulty to lobby the Council if it is not done through the capitals. 
Secondly claims that practices vary enormously across Commission 
services are probably the most relevant element. This confirms that the 
expectations of most civil society organisations, at least those linked to 
the Social Platform would be to create a horizontal dialogue with 
Commissioners in addition to day to day consultations with Commission 
services.  
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The second account is the argument that civil society organisations took 
themselves the initiative of creating these platforms to push forward 
consultation with the Commission (Social Platform, COFACE, CONCORD 
and EFC interviews). This account is linked to criticisms of the way in 
which the Commission organises consultation. In this sense the Social 
Platform, the EFC and COFACE interviewees argued that the Commission 
has always been reluctant to institutionalise dialogue in order not to be 
tied to specific partners and to avoid weakening the social dialogue. 
However it is clear that both accounts are not necessarily contradictory. In 
this sense both sides were interested in structuring the field, as the 
Commission could expect some legitimacy returns and European citizens‘ 
platforms used this move to try to secure access to the Commission and 
to outmanoeuvre their competitors.  
―So we began to fix the Civil Society Contact Group, […] and we 
began to push people who said they were civil society but didn‘t 
have the credentials, so we said: ―I am so and so, I work for this 
organisation, I‘m part of this alliance, which is itself part of this 
alliance, and I‘m mandated to speak on behalf of these 
organisations‖. So the other guy would go on to say ―I am very 
important, I have been around Brussels for a hundred years‖. ―Who 
are you‖?‖ (Interview 21 with a representative of CONCORD). 
Compared to these accounts, the role of civil dialogue in bringing the EU 
closer to citizens appears both relatively weaker and much more 
contested by organisations in the field. The two interviewees from the 
Social Platform, together with those from COFACE and ETUC acknowledge 
that the Commission has turned towards civil society organisations in 
search for increased legitimacy. In the opposite position the interviewee 
from ETUC considers this as a wrong strategy as he fears that civil 
dialogue may weaken an already fragile representative EU democracy. 
Furthermore, the EFC representative argued that legitimacy concerns 
were only attached to civil dialogue debates at the time of the Convention 
and that before this it was never the primary aim to be achieved (Kohler-
Koch and Finke 2007). In this sense EFC and CONCORD interviewees 
argued that expertise seeking is very much the Commission‘s primary 
concern.  It thus appears clearly that the main driver of the 
institutionalisation of civil dialogue on the side of civil society 
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organisations was the creation of a recognised and transversal access 
mechanism to EU institutions (del Río Villar 2004, 282–283). 
2.2. Differentiation strategies 
As it was said in chapters 2 and 3, virtually all organisations and not only 
citizens‘ groups were trying to be recognised as relevant partners of the 
EU. Until the Convention there is a shared demand on the need to 
structure consultations and all the organisations use available windows of 
opportunity to make it. This made very different sectors interested in the 
consultations preceding the Convention and to some extent foster 
cooperation between different organisations. However, as the stake of the 
Convention was a Treaty change and no longer raising the issue in the 
agenda, organisations followed very clearly differentiation strategies. Not 
only did they seek recognition for civil society in general but tried as well 
to secure access to institutions for them and the constituency that they 
represent. In addition to citizens‘ organisations at least 3 sectors (regional 
organisations, churches and the social partners) were following different 
paths in order to obtain specific recognition by the Convention. There 
were as well significant attempts at obtaining specific recognition by 
particular subsectors such as foundations, ―third sector‖ or groups 
experiencing poverty. 
Obviously this does not imply that the differentiation that took place 
finally, article 47 on ―associations and civil society‖, article 48 on ―social 
dialogue‖ and article 52 on dialogue with ―churches and philosophical 
organisations‖, and the role of the Committee of the Regions in checking 
subsidiarity, are the result of differentiation strategies on the part of these 
actors. There are obvious structural differences between the four sectors 
which are underlined by interviewees: social dialogue has existed at EU 
level for 20 years; local and regional authorities are not civil society and 
could hardly be involved in the same sort of mechanisms. That said, the 
uncertainty linked to the novelty of the Convention and the fact that the 
issue at stake was a Treaty change, may have made it plausible at some 
point to reconsider some of these existing practices. In this sense, 
interviewees from social NGOs (Social Platform, EFC, ACN and CEDAG) 
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admit that they would like civil dialogue be inspired in social dialogue or to 
participate themselves in social dialogue (del Río Villar 2004, 277), which 
is a taboo for social partners. The measure of activism of the latter to 
prevent this (see next subsection) suggests that at some point this may 
not have been a foolish possibility.  
Local and regional authorities associations established a strong alliance in 
order to obtain legal basis for their EU level cooperation. This should be 
clearly distinguished from partnerships with civil society (Sloat 2003), as 
the 2001 governance strategy entailed some risks of confusion as well as 
some recognition of the importance of the local level in any EU 
participatory model:  
―Eurocities as much as other organisations, organisations with 
which Eurocities collaborated, wanted that formal recognition of the 
local or regional authorities and their representatives at different 
levels as a different sector than civil society.‖ (Interview 35 with a 
representative of Eurocities).  
Churches, with the support of their social action NGOs, were seeking to 
obtain a specific recognition of their dialogue with EU institutions (Airiau 
2007; Leustean 2007). This seems to have been perceived as a sort of 
―internal treason‖ by social NGOs since church-related NGOs have been 
strongly involved in demands by Social NGOs (interview 18 with a 
representative of CSCG).   
Interestingly, there were attempts of subsectoral differentiation within 
citizens‘ interests‘ groups. The decay of civil dialogue in favour of the 
participatory democracy frame has been explained as a consequence of 
the politicisation of the agenda-setting process. However it appears that 
this frame was not equally interesting for all citizens‘ organisations. The 
fact that actors involved in consultations with DG trade and DG 
environment (CONCORD and EEB), where the standards of consultation 
are much more developed than in DG Social Affairs, did not make 
demands on civil dialogue during the Convention is related to concerns 
that the recognition of a horizontal standard applying to all DGs and EU 
institutions could downgrade the standards where they were already high 
(interviews with EEB, Eurocommerce and CONCORD representatives).   
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Furthermore EFC, ACN and CEDAG, in a nutshell organisations 
representing the ―third sector‖ or social economy, asked the Union to 
recognise the freedom of association (or foundation) on the Charter of 
rights which recalls the mid 90s discussion on the European association 
statute (Will and Kendall 2009) and its linkage with economic activity 
(interview 22 with a representative of the PFCS). On the other hand the 
Social Platform interviewee claims the specificity for social NGOs as they 
stand for the weakest groups of society, otherwise unheard: 
―And also because we come from a sector where we are coming 
from citizens‘ initiative and where it is hard to be heard. [...] You 
know, they [member organisations] have access to something that 
other people, no other expert have, but they are not recognised for 
that and they are not invited to meet‖. (Interview 3 with a 
representative of the Social Platform) 
The differentiation strategy of social partners is particularly interesting 
because it does not build on citizens‘ organisations one but is rather a 
reaction against it. 
2.3. The emergence of contestation 
A relevant dimension of the process of agenda setting is the emergence, 
albeit slow and fragmented, of some opposition to the institutionalisation 
of civil society consultation. It was highlighted that in the agenda-setting 
process the most significant opposition came from the social partners. 
This is matched by their activism against civil dialogue and for a distinct 
recognition. 
It is interesting that the interviewee of ETUC reduces the demand to 
include civil society consultation in the text to ―a few NGOs who are not so 
happy about the social dialogue article in the Treaty and they wanted to 
have a counterweight‖ (interview 31). In relation to this, social partners 
were trying to secure a different recognition than civil society 
consultation, as they already had in the social dialogue scheme. The 
positions of UNICE and ETUC coincide that their role should be 
distinguished:  
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―The draft constitutional Treaty contains an article 34 which sets 
out the general principle of participatory democracy. A clause to the 
effect that ‗[...] The EU promotes and support social dialogue 
between the Social Partners (Management and Labour), respecting 
their autonomy‘ should be added.‖ (Gabaglio, Jacobs, and Cravinho 
2003)  
The frame of this demand goes beyond a particularistic claim as the point 
is that the role of social partners is particularly important because they 
are able to participate in policy making as ―co-regulators‖ and that their 
representativeness allows them to take decisions for their constituents. 
However ETUC perceived a much stronger threat from social NGOs than 
UNICE did in that its role as the EU‘s main social counterpart could be 
challenged if other non-business organisations acquired a stronger role. 
―NGOs would like to come into social dialogue, but business and we, 
we have experience what happens in the factories, in the offices, 
and the NGOs are not really inside this business. So we cooperate 
wherever necessary, let‘s say on green jobs, or climate change, 
where they have a lot of experience, on human rights, fundamental 
rights because there as well they have a lot of experience, but it is 
already very difficult to get to an agreement with business, and the 
more people there are in this dialogue, the more difficult it is.‖ 
(Interview 31 with a representative of ETUC) 
As it has been suggested by the framing of the amendment quoted above, 
the social partners did not try to object to such a powerful framing as 
participatory democracy. As it was said in chapter 2, they were more 
active in influencing the details of the discussion on participatory 
democracy, in particular on the question of representativeness. On this 
point they could exploit the internal differences of citizens‘ organisations 
on issues of accreditation, representativeness and European status (Ruzza 
2004, 46). Although obviously these issues were necessarily marginal in 
such a broad setting as the Convention, interviews suggest that the 
wording of the article in relation to ―representative associations‖ may not 
be the result of a bad translation (interview number 4 with Alain 
Lamassoure) or of clumsy wording (Greenwood 2007b, 336) but linked to 
the demands of some civil society actors. In this sense, the interviewee 
from UNICE claims influence in the wording of the article: 
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―Well, we strongly emphasized that we wanted the words 
representative associations, OK? […] It is us who called for a real 
emphasis on representativeness. It was not really a problem 
because everyone was pretty much on the same line‖ (Interview 17 
with a representative of UNICE) 
This is coherent as well with the strong position of UNICE for 
representativeness during the previous consultations, where it even 
suggested its‘ own internal setting as an example of how European 
representativeness should be measured (Michel 2007). UNICE tried to use 
its position within the EESC in order to promote its view on 
representativeness in civil dialogue. Although unsuccessful, this may have 
contributed to the abovementioned rejection by citizens‘ groups of any 
role for the EESC in civil dialogue. 
3. Collective action: coalitions and interorganisational structures 
These qualitative findings on the role of alliances as facilitators of 
collective action and frame convergence of chapter 3 can be explored 
further by a quantitative analysis of two dimensions of the network. The 
first one is individual actor centralities, that is, the place of each actor in 
the network in terms of its number of ties to the rest. The second 
dimension is a study of individual actors‘ structural similarities, that is, the 
roles played by different actors seemed to have played and the 
hierarchical composition of the network. These analyses have been 
respectively carried out with the Visone and Ucinet software packages.  
Closeness and betweenness have been used as the main measures of 
individual actor centrality. Both measures point out how central an actor is 
in terms of contacts with the rest of the network, although closeness 
measures how close an actor is to the rest and betweenness calculates 
how many paths between pairs of actors come across one actor. That is, 
closeness measures the direct contact between one actor and the rest 
whereas betweenness measures the ability to broker contact between 
actors. Table 13 below summarises the findings for the 10 most central 
actors in each measure. See annex number 5 for the complete 
measurements. This is illustrated in the graph below (figure 10) 
representing actors which are close in the same areas of the graph, and 
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scaling nodes according to their centrality from the centre to the periphery 
of the graph. 
Table 13 Centrality measures 
Organisation closeness  Organisation betweenness 
PFCS 0.56 PFCS 0.20 
CSCG 0.52 ETUC 0.15 
Social Platform 0.51 IRI Europe 0.14 
ETUC 0.50 Social Platform 0.12 
RCE ES 0.49 CSCG 0.11 
CONCORD 0.47 CEDAG 0.09 
CEDAG 0.45 RCE ES 0.08 
COFACE 0.44 Eurocities 0.09 
IRI Europe 0.43 CCOO 0.07 
CCOO 0.43 EEB 0.05 
The analysis shows some relevant differences between both centrality 
measures. Some of these divergences are telling about the structure of 
the network and alliances. Analysis of closeness centrality shows that 
despite finding that the PFCS and the CSCG had a minor role in the frame 
setting process; they had an important role in linking other organisations, 
since they were the organisations having more ties to other actors. 
Surprisingly ETUC appears as a central actor of the network despite its 
rather distant attitude towards participatory democracy and civil society 
involvement. The results appear particularly surprising when betweenness 
is considered as not only ETUC and the PFCS score higher than the CSCG 
or the Social Platform, but so does IRI Europe, which was not only far 
from the core organisations advocating consultation but had not 
participated in the collective agenda-setting process.  
Given that the betweenness centrality measure increases for nodes 
connecting actors that would otherwise be isolated, the most plausible 
explanation is that the PFCS, IRI and ETUC had more ties to the more 
isolated organisations, that is, national ones, than the other actors. Figure 
13 in next chapter confirms that the PFCS, ETUC and IRI are the preferred 
partners of national organisations which confirms the abovementioned 
hypothesis that these organisations‘ betweenness centrality indicated a 
brokering role with national organisations. 
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Figure 10 Primary organisations betweenness centralization24 
 
The strong presence at the centre of figure 10 above of citizens‘ 
organisations framing civil society consultation as participatory democracy 
suggests a clear core periphery division. This was analysed by studying 
individual actor structural similarities with the Ucinet core / periphery tool 
that groups together organisations having stronger ties. The result is a 
clear bipartite division putting COFACE, CEDAG, CSCG, RCE, the Social 
Platform, PFCS, ETUC and CONCORD at the core25. The density of these 
organisations‘ contacts is very high as almost 60% of all the possible 
relations among them are achieved. These organisations have weak ties 
to the rest of the network, and the contacts among the rest of 
organizations are almost negligible. 
                                       
24
 Organisations’ position indicates centrality, node size indicates degree 
25 The software output in the form of a spatial representation is too large to reproduce it here.  
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Table 14 Core-periphery density matrix 
 Core Periphery 
Core 0.597 0.116 
Periphery 0.069  0.028 
The core or the network is thus constituted by advocates of civil society 
consultation (see table 9 in the previous chapter). This provides a very 
strong confirmation that these organisations constitute a coalition 
exchanging information and acting together on this topic. The presence of 
a Spanish organisation like RCE in this group may be surprising and is 
discussed in further detail in the following chapter, although it seems that 
this organisation could behave as a European actor thanks to its expertise. 
The most noticeable aspect is the strong role of the PFCS and ETUC in the 
coalition despite their distant attitude to civil dialogue and more indirectly 
the presence of the CSCG, since the qualitative data suggested that the 
organisation‘s role was undermined by internal differences. 
As this core – periphery division was expected a structural equivalence 
analysis of European organisations has been carried out to understand 
more precisely the similarities and differences in the roles of the actors. 
The dendrogram below (figure 11) clusters together actors with similar 
patterns of relations to other actors, rather than those networking 
intensely among themselves as in the previous analysis. This means that 
the ties towards other actors of organisations grouped together tend to be 
very similar. This figure suggests that organisations of the same size and 
type and those sharing similar visions of participatory democracy have a 
similar pattern of relations. In this sense organisations advocating a 
stronger dimension for individual citizens‘ participation and direct 
democracy are grouped together (except the PFCS), whereas social 
partners and regional organisations have similar patterns of relations. The 
rest of the organisations are regrouped according to their relevance in the 
coalition, as it seems that alliance organisations (PFCS, CSCG and the 
Social Platform) have greater similarities among them in terms of their 
patterns of relations than with their own members. This suggests that the 
members of the CSCG and its members, in particular CONCORD and the 
Social Platform, as well as several members of the Social Platform and 
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EEB tended to network intensely with the same organisations, which 
means that European organisations tended to network more intensely with 
organisations with which they had hierarchical relations. 
Figure 11 EU organisations correlation clustering 
So far, the measures focused on mere contacts and exchanges of points 
of view between organisations. When the dimension of collective action of 
organisations carrying out common actions is considered, a division 
appears between organisations acting as information or opinion relays 
(see next section) and organisations acting together towards the 
Convention. 
Figure 12 below is very telling, as it shows a central group of EU 
organisations interacting among themselves beyond exchanges of points 
of view. It confirms the importance of the Social Platform, in the sense 
that the most intense flows happen between this organisation and its 
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members, whereas other coalitions such as the CSCG and the PFCS 
acquire a minor role. It shows as well that only a few organisations such 
as ETUC, IRI and CEDAG established common actions with national 
organisations.  
A second relevant dimension of the graph is that it confirms that 
organisations with similar perceptions of participatory democracy were 
acting together. In this sense it appears that the Social Platform led the 
common action on civil dialogue whereas organisations promoting direct 
democracy such as ACN, PFCS, IRI or ATTAC were acting together as well.  
The finding of a coincidence between common positions towards 
participatory democracy and collective action is relevant because it 
confirms that the convergence of views on participatory democracy was 
accompanied by common action. This suggests both that views 
convergence was itself a manifestation of collective action and that 
promoting participation was one of the key elements behind organisations‘ 
collective action.  
This analysis thus confirms the interviewees‘ claims about the importance 
of coalitions. The importance in the network of organisations such as the 
CSCG and the PFCS that did not appear to have had much individual 
influence suggests that the importance of coalitions did not lay in the 
designation of an organisation to act on behalf of the members. Coalitions 
were important for the circulation of information and bridging national 
organisations, such as the PFCS and ETUC did, and for favouring common 
action by the members of the coalition, as the CSCG but especially the 
Social Platform. In this sense, the network data confirm that these two 
organisations and their members were frequently communicating and 
acting together. The role of coalitions seems to have been providing 
information, access opportunities and coordination for their members. If 
the agenda setting process contributed to building a common demand 
among a substantive number of organisations, their expression of this 
demand almost unanimously to the Convention was favoured by the 
existence of these coalitions. 
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Figure 12 Common action network26 
4. European coalitions and communication 
This section addresses two questions. Although it should now be clear that 
the civil society field is characterised by a very strong exchange of 
information among its participants, it is useful to know if there were 
different patterns of communication between organisations. Secondly, it 
discusses which role alliances played in the diffusion of the frame beyond 
specialised publics.  
 
 
                                       
26 The position in the graph represents degree and node area represents’ closeness centrality 
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4.1. Leadership and communication 
The results about the important role played by ETUC, the PFCS and to a 
minor extent the CSCG are surprising considering their relatively modest 
role in the coalition demanding the institutionalisation of civil dialogue. 
The importance of this role could be better tested by carrying out a 
prestige measurement. This measurement is not limited to the number of 
contacts of each actor but analyses the direction of the ties, that is, 
whether organisations are more often starting the contacts or rather 
receiving them. The most prestigious actors are those which receive more 
ties, they are sought by the others, whereas those sending more ties are 
more active in establishing contacts and diffusing information. This 
introduces a very relevant distinction between actors showing a very 
strong activism towards other actors and those being considered relevant 
and thus targeted by the other members of the network. 
This is done here by comparing the number of indegrees and outdegrees, 
that is, the number of contacts received and sent by each organisation. 
Table 15 below summarises the findings for the 10 actors receiving and 
sending more ties. See annex number 6 for the complete measurements. 
Table 15 In and out degrees 
id indegree (std) id outdegree (std) 
ETUC 0.26 PFCS 0.26 
Social Platform 0.22 CEDAG 0.24 
CSCG 0.2 CONCORD 0.2 
PFCS 0.18 CSCG 0.2 
CEDAG 0.16 RCE ES 0.2 
COFACE 0.16 Social Platform 0.2 
CARITAS UE 0.14 CCOO 0.14 
ECAS 0.12 ETUC 0.14 
Social forum 0.12 IRI Europe 0.12 
CCOO 0.1 ATTAC Spain 0.1 
These results nuance the centrality measures as they reorder the pre-
eminence of the actors of the network. In this sense, the indegree column 
in table 15 above shows that the actors which advocated civil society 
consultation such as the Social platform, COFACE, Caritas, are among 
those more often sought as partners. This tends to confirm the 
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importance of the Social Platform and the CSCG as the focal point of the 
coalition, and provide further evidence for the surprising role of ETUC.  
There are as well relevant differences between actors‘ receiving and 
sending more ties. In the case of actors like the PFCS and CEDAG it seems 
that their role in the network was more that of an activist in brokering 
contacts and sending information than that of a leader. In this sense their 
salient role in sending contacts (outdegree column above) is not matched 
by the number of times that they were sought as partners (indegree 
column). Furthermore a very active organisation such as the small 
Spanish RCE (outdegree column) had very few of their contacts 
reciprocated (it is not among the 10 most contacted organisations in the 
indegree column). These results mean that despite the activism of some 
organisations most of the members of the network tended to target 
mainly a few well-known actors and coalitions, in particular those 
advocating civil dialogue. This explains as well the surprising role of ETUC. 
Even if it was not really supportive of civil dialogue, its mere importance 
in EU civil society and its presence in the CSCG make it a focal actor for 
any organisation active on the field of civil society dialogue. Evidence of 
ETUC‘s ability to be active in different publics and bridge institutional and 
contestatory discourses is well exemplified by the following quote from the 
General Secretary‘s intervention in the European Social Forum: 
I would like first to thank the Mayor of Paris for his support in 
arranging this tremendous Trade Union Forum, as the opening event 
for the European Social Forum in Paris this week. As a left-over of the 
‘68 generation, I remember the old slogan: ‗sous le pavé, la plage‘. 
[...] We need more of this kind of thinking, which brings public 
administration, at whatever level, closer to our citizens. [...] The 
principles agreed by the Convention go very much in the direction 
pointed-to by the European trade union Movement.  It did not go all 
the way to meet our objectives.  We have particular concerns about 
the need for new tools for economic governance and we would have 
liked more majority voting on social policy. But as trade union 
negotiators, we know a workable deal when we see one. We judge 
that it would be a disaster if the principles that have been agreed were 
now brought back into question. They do not consecrate competition, 
but rather introduce the social market economy. They provide a legal 
base for positive action on our public services. Those are features that 
distinguish Europe from the model that some, like the International 
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Monetary Fund, would wish to impose on us.‖ (John Monks‘ address to 
the European Trade Union Forum, Paris, 11 november 2003) 
 
4.2. Alliances and frame diffusion 
The analysis of communication flows extends the strong core periphery 
division to the communication between organisations. It thus appears that 
the leaders of the network, the most prestigious actors that had 
advocated more strongly for the recognition of civil dialogue, were not 
very active in establishing relations with other actors. On the other hand, 
centrality analysis and prestige measures have somehow unexpectedly 
highlighted the activism of actors relatively distant from this core such as 
IRI, PFCS or ETUC. This has been explained by the stronger 
communication efforts and the stronger links between these organisations 
and national groups, which gave them the most significant role in bridging 
different parts of network. The implication is that the organisations 
communicating more actively (those attempting more contacts, outdegree 
column) were not those that had more actively contributed to create the 
participatory democracy frame.  
 
The coalition of core organisations was thus influential at bringing the 
topic to the Convention, but does not seem to have tried to extend the 
frame beyond this venue. This resonates with Mahoney‘s findings that, 
unlike the USA, the main rationale behind coalitions at EU level is not to 
anticipate public opinion pressures to political elites (Mahoney 2007, 368; 
Hula 1999, 49) but to efficiently pool resources at the EU level, since the 
EU‘s weak democratic structure hinders the ability of civil society to 
articulate a strong political pressure (Mahoney 2007, 377). This is a 
significant difference with the expectations of social movement literature 
on frame circulation. The lack of activism of its promoters beyond 
specialised circles suggests that contrary to the typical expectations of 
social movement theory (Snow et al. 1986, 472; Muller 2008, 58–61) 
there were no conscious frame extension strategies.  
 
In this sense the only claims that one of the reasons for organising a 
coalition was to contribute to the diffusion of the Constitution in order to 
promote debate at grassroots level are referred to the CSCG and more 
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particularly to its act4europe campaign. As it was highlighted, this 
organisation was relatively active in networking (outdegree 0,2). 
 
Organisations promoting the ECI (IRI, PFCS) and alternative views of the 
EU (ATTAC, Social Forum) were relatively more active in communicating in 
comparison with their relatively weak role in the debate. The IRI and PFCS 
were weak at creating lasting links with other groups and ATTAC and the 
Social Forum were almost not involved in the Convention (Agrikoliansky 
2007). In this sense their involvement in debates seemed to be reduced 
to individual participation in a few events rather than a campaign with 
national organisations: 
 
―During the two referenda campaigns, in France and in Holland, 
hum, several people from our association went to participate in the 
debates in France, myself I went to Lille at least twice and once to 
Paris, and the debate was so feeble…‖ (Interview 22, with a 
member of the PFCS). 
 
5. A field of specialised debate on participatory democracy 
Section 2 has shown that the organisations involved in the debates on 
participatory democracy before and during the Convention did not simply 
send their opinions to the EU institutions, but established competition and 
cooperation relations with them and with other organisations. This means 
that these consultations contributed to create a field of specialists on civil 
society consultation populated by organisations promoting different points 
of view.  
It has appeared that the Convention was sensitive to civil society 
organisations‘ demands to include the principle of consultation in the 
Treaty, as a result of the expression of a common demand and the need 
to comply with the Laeken mandate on the democratisation of the EU (del 
Río Villar 2004, 322). The strategy of civil society organisations implied 
using the participation opportunities provided by the Convention for 
formal and informal contacts rather than delegating advocacy on this topic 
to the Commission. Organisations consider that the main reason 
explaining their success was their involvement and reputation and 
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especially the fact that organisations produced a unanimous demand on 
the topic. 
Although the characterisation of the coalition promoting participatory 
democracy is not the primary aim of this work it is important to 
conceptualise it in order to try to produce generalisable conclusions. In 
some aspects the creation along a few years of a common frame of ideas 
on participatory democracy shared by a constituency of civil society 
organisations and the institutions resonates with the advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), which has been 
successfully adapted in the EU context (Sabatier 1998; Ruzza 2007; Engel 
2007; Dreger 2008).  
 
However there are different aspects where the case presented so far 
differs from the model. Firstly the changes that have been found in the 
organisations‘ discourses are difficult to attribute to a learning exercise 
between different organisations and seem to be directly related to an 
instrumental framing aimed at better fitting the expectations of other 
partners and EU institutions. In this sense the fact that the enlargement 
of the frame to include other mechanisms of participatory democracy such 
as the ECI was operated by actors outside the main coalition such as IRI 
suggests that the coalition failed to integrate these sorts of concomitant 
demands. In the case of an advocacy coalition it could be expected that 
these sorts of demands would have easily been integrated as policy or 
secondary beliefs by the coalition (Sabatier 1998, 103–104).  
 
Secondly and probably more substantially, there is no evidence that civil 
society and institutional actors come together under a common coalition 
for advancing the demand. Although Saurugger attributes a relevant role 
to the Commission Secretariat General in this achievement (Saurugger 
2010, 480), the evidence gathered here (interviews 13 and 14 with 
officials of the Commission‘s secretariat general and internal staff working 
documents) is that this institution was not particularly active in promoting 
civil society consultation during the Convention.  
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It has rather been found that the actors were interested in the progress of 
the advocacy for different reasons. In this sense it is clear that the 
Commission was interested in framing its exchanges with civil society 
organisations as a form of participatory democracy and that it was this 
institution that introduced this issue in the agenda (European Commission 
2000; European Commission 2001), which organisations only assumed 
after 2001. Network analysis has confirmed the existence of 4 different 
coalitions: the social partners, regional organisations the promoters of 
civil society consultation and those of direct participation. In no moment 
all the actors in the discussion, and even the members of a coalition, were 
pursuing exactly the same goals. For instance within the citizens‘ interests 
coalition each actor sought the recognition of its own role besides common 
advocacy. Furthermore it is difficult to see a movement advocacy coalition 
(Ruzza 2004) in that the participants are very diverse, with a combination 
of actors more or less prone to contestation and with a very weak 
connection to broader social movements as a coalition, despite the 
obvious linkages of some of its members.  
This suggests that rather than concentrating on the importance of a 
network coordinating all the relevant actors it is better to identify a field 
as a stable and recognizable set of relations where actors deploy 
autonomous and competing strategies (Bourdieu 1981; Bourdieu 1984; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Stone Sweet, Fligstein, and Sandholtz 2001). 
The agenda setting process that culminated in the Convention was a 
process where some of the most salient actors of each of the civil society 
areas came to discuss together and with the EU institutions the rules that 
should apply generally to the relations with non-state actors. The actors 
become aware of each other‘s strategies to obtain or block each others‘ 
ways of access. As it has been shown, the field is structured by the 
frequent presence of actors particularly active in the topic and the 
development of coalitions and oppositions between them. Institutional 
theory posits that organisations active in the same field experience 
institutional isomorphism in the form of the emergence of an 
organisational ideal type (DiMaggio 1991), common frames and similar 
forms of collective action (Scott 2008, 185–190). Although this has not 
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yet been the case for organisations active on participatory democracy, 
after all participants in this field are rooted in a specifically differentiated 
EU field, the stake of the field was the definition of common norms on 
organisations‘ access to EU institutions. The fact that the Convention was 
an open door to Treaty change made it a decisive venue in this 
organisational field, although the uncertainty over the fate of the 
Constitution, the changing objectives of the institutions about participation 
and the need to develop the secondary norms emanating from the Treaty 
imply that the field is still today immerged in a structuration process 
(Greenwood 2011a; de Castro Asarta 2011; Bouza Garcia 2012).  
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Chapter 5 A failing meeting point: patterns of 
relations between European and national 
organisations in the Convention 
One of the central questions raised by this thesis is whether the 
Convention contributed to making national civil society interested in 
participatory democracy in the EU, which could then contribute to raising 
awareness in the European public space (see following chapter). Analysing 
the participation of national civil society organisations in the Convention 
and their relations with the promoters of participatory democracy is thus a 
necessary step. 
Furthermore, it is an important contribution to the study of the role of civil 
society in the Convention, which has been so far almost neglected under 
qualifications that the Convention was ―Brussels talking to Brussels‖ 
(Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005, 43) and highlighting ―business as usual‖ 
in the predominance of European over national organisations (Shaw, 
Hoffman, and Bausili 2003; Lombardo 2007; Monaghan 2007). On the 
basis of these findings and in general of literature on the relations 
between the EU and civil society (Ruzza 2007; Sánchez-Salgado 2007a; 
Greenwood 2011b, 66) the participation of civil society in the Convention 
can be expected to have been quite hierarchical in that national 
organisations tend not to have some of the specific European resources 
necessary for influence in this sort of process (Will et al. 2005, 23; 
Sánchez-Salgado 2007b), such as offices in Brussels, knowledge and a 
lack of involvement in the previous venues and trust of European political 
personnel which has a preference for specifically European organisations. 
This quote of a Spanish organisation shows that national actors are aware 
of these access barriers: 
―They [EU institutions] only address 5 issues, and they always call 
upon the same people and that‘s all. And you must see what they 
subsidise. What do they subsidise? The European Movement, the 
[European Women‘s] Lobby is subsidised for women affairs, and 
what else? Because it was a real fight for organisations other than 
the Lobby to get in because it‘s open, but you have to meet such 
requirements that no one is able to. First of all you have to be 
149 
 
formally constituted in Brussels, and then all the rest...‖ (interview 
24 with a representative of RCE). 
This resource imbalance could make national organisations‘ participation 
ineffective in comparison with those of European organisations, and as a 
result it can be anticipated that the main strategy of successful national 
organisations may have been to rely on their European umbrella 
organisation rather than direct access. 
This chapter analyses whether the Convention was a meeting point for 
national and European civil society and thus possibly favoured contact 
between specialised and general publics. In order to do so it analyses 
firstly which Spanish and French civil society organisations participated in 
the Convention and how they did it. Secondly it analyses their evaluation 
of the Convention, that is, to what extent they consider that it was useful 
and their participation relevant. Thirdly it analyses their contacts with 
European organisations and finally it discusses which dynamics in terms of 
collective action influenced that national organisations could play a role in 
the Convention.  
1. Ways of access of national organisations to the Convention  
The Brussels based Polish NGO office was the only national organisation 
strongly involved in the consultations preceding the Convention (see 
annex number 2). This contrasts with the interest of national actors on 
the Convention on the future of Europe, which amounted to 59,06% of the 
contributions to the online Forum, which is a slight increase from 51,8% 
of the contributions to the first Convention (Kværk 2007, 161). This 
means that the change of venue and stake, which implied a possible 
Treaty change in contrast with the more subtle stakes of the previous 
consultations, and probably the higher political salience of the debate 
which aimed to take the EU to a new constitutional step (Habermas 2001) 
made the Convention an attractive event for national organisations. The 
following quote, if somehow overstated, exemplifies the way in which civil 
society participation was associated to a deepening of European 
integration at the time of the Convention: ―The flags of Federalism, 
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Constitution and governance were raised in the first instance by 
organisations representing civil society‖ (del Río Villar 2004, 280). 
Although the Convention had multiple access venues the Forum has been 
described as being ―little more than a website‖ (Monaghan 2007, 77), and 
it has already been said that the Praesidium and the Secretariat did not 
actually consider these contributions in the drafting (interview 5), despite 
the digests produced by the Secretariat (Secretariat of the European 
Convention 2002a). In this sense, national civil society organisations‘ 
obvious interest for the Convention does not directly imply a strong 
involvement in the Convention. It is thus important to analyse the 
presence of national organisations in the other more relevant fora that 
have been identified as the ways of influence for civil society in the 
Convention. In this sense the Forum was actually more than a website as 
it was a filter for organisations‘ participation in the working groups which 
prepared the plenary hearing (del Río Villar 2004, 299). 
The evidence is that among the participants in the plenary session 
hearing only 5 organisations were not European organisations: the 
Robert Schuman Foundation, the Network of Women Citizens of 
Europe (Red de Ciudadanas Europeas), Institute for Economic 
Analysis and Informatics, Hungary – ECOSTAT, Polish NGO Office in 
Brussels and the Association of Women of Southern Europe (AFEM), 
all of which except the Hungarian organisation have a distinct 
European flavour. It thus seems that the Convention reproduced the 
EU institutions preference to consult European organisations:  
 
―I think that there was a statement by Dehaene to separate input at 
the European level and input at the national level. And as a result 
of that I think that he got input from the organisations in Brussels, 
but they didn‘t bring their national members into the process. ‖ 
(interview 23 with a representative of ECAS)  
 
This seems to endorse criticisms on the hearing of civil society 
organisations of 24-25 June 2002 as yet another occasion of 
―Brussels talking to Brussels‖ (Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005). 
Furthermore, one of the ways in which the Convention intended to 
obtain input from the national field, the organisation of national 
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debates by members of the Convention and governments, seems to 
have worked very irregularly (Monaghan 2007, 74–75). This is 
admitted by Jean Luc Dehaene, the vicepresident of the Convention 
in charge of civil society relations.  
―Throughout the Convention we encouraged member states and 
national civil society structures to organize a debate at the national 
level also and there are a number of countries that did, France and 
Spain among others, but most of them didn‘t and as a result the 
dialogue with civil society had no impact on those working on the 
field.‖ (interview 1 with Mr. Jean-Luc Dehaene). 
 
An analysis of the governments‘ reports on the national debate in 
Spain and France diminishes even Dehaene‘s cautious approach, 
since in both countries the dialogue seems to have focused on 
strongly institutionalised organisations prone to be interested by the 
EU, such as Universities, salient think tanks and foundations (León, 
Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004, 69), with a very weak involvement 
of third sector actors (Will et al. 2005). When these cases are 
considered the most salient exception is the Catalan Convention 
(León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004, 68), which met formally for 
11 months at the same time of the Convention and consulted widely 
the different sectors of Catalan civil society (Convención Catalana 
2003, 46–54), although having been presented to the Convention‘s 
Praesidium after the end of the Convention‘s hearing phase in 
February 2003 when the diplomatic stakes were high (Lamassoure 
2004; Méndez de Vigo 2005), it may have arrived too late to be able 
to provide input to the Convention‘s debate.  
 
Whereas the immediate conclusion would be that despite their 
interest evidenced by their strong involvement in the Forum national 
civil society organisations were not really present in the Convention, 
there is evidence suggesting that national organisations were not as 
marginal as the literature and these data suggest. In this sense, the 
working groups which prepared the plenary hearing show quite a 
different picture. Although it is not possible to obtain a full picture 
since the official documents do not disclose the list of organisations 
having participated in these meetings (Secretariat of the European 
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Convention 2002b), the list of participants in the contact group on 
citizens‘ and institutions, obtained from an interviewee, shows a 
significant presence of national organisations, among which a large 
number of the Spanish and French organisations that were 
interviewed (see annexes 3 and 4). Although less salient than the 
June hearing, these formal fora constituted one of the ways of 
access most appreciated by European organisations, including those 
that did not participate in the plenary session hearing. Additionally 
some organisations could access the Convention via some of the 
other formal mechanisms such as the EESC or the Youth 
Convention. This makes it worth exploring the ways in which 
Spanish and French organisations used this mechanism to approach 
the Convention.  
The Spanish organisations directly represented in the working group were 
the RCE, ONCE-CEPES, FCCE, the CJE, and ACSUR. All these organisations 
report having participated previously in consultations on a particular EU 
policy. These organisations claim expertise in an EU field and the ability to 
mobilise elite contacts, in particular Spanish members of the Convention, 
which could compensate for the lack of specific European resources in 
comparison to European organisations. In this sense, the relation with 
Spanish members of the Convention is quoted by several of these 
interviewees. The role of Íñigo Méndez de Vigo (MEP) is particularly 
prominent: 
―I remember... what‘s his name? Íñigo, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, in 
many meetings, he supported us in many meetings on disability 
[...] Well Íñigo helped us a lot, [...] and truly the man took our 
issues very seriously, especially on disability, and defended them 
tooth and nail, hum? I mean it, and very well defended by the 
way.‖ (interview 25 with a representative of ONCE-CEPES). 
Other members of the Convention such as Carlos Carnero (interview 30) 
claimed to have had strong relations with Spanish organisations. It is 
worth insisting on the role of Méndez de Vigo as he was a representative 
of the European Parliament rather than the Spanish one, which suggests 
that organisations working with him (RCE, ONCE-CEPES, FCCE and CCOO) 
were rather well informed about EU politics. The ability to contact 
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European political personnel emerges strongly in the interview quoted 
above, as the interviewee considers that the relation with different 
Spanish MEPs not related to the Convention was important for the 
promotion of participatory democracy.  
The expected recourse to their EU-level umbrella groups does thus not 
appear as the primary way of access. Among Spanish organisations this 
was the way of access of CCOO, Adicae and Caritas which followed the 
Convention via ETUC, BEUC and Caritas Europe respectively. It is 
noticeable that those are much larger organisations than those 
participating directly (except ONCE-CEPES). Additionally as it was said 
above the secretariat of the Catalan Convention was formally received by 
the Praesidium as part of the different efforts to foster national 
conventions. 
Additionally, considering the organisations which appear not directly or 
indirectly involved in the Convention, ATTAC Spain, the Fundación Luis 
Vives, Demopunk and Ecologistas en Acción, provides interesting accounts 
about the relations between positions on European matters and 
participation. Although all these actors had contacts with EU level 
organisations (ATTAC Europe, EFC, IRI and EEB respectively) the evidence 
suggests that this was not aimed at participation but rather at obtaining 
information. Furthermore, not all these organisations shared the positions 
of their EU counterparts, in particular for EEB and Ecologistas en Acción.  
All things considered the picture of Spanish civil society involvement is 
more complex than suggested by (León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004, 
75): ―The groups that have been involved in the Convention debate are 
mostly groups that belong to a wider European network.‖ 
The picture among French organisations is fairly similar as all the 
organisations except the Union du Grand Commerce du Centre-Ville and 
the MIC reported having followed the Convention in different ways going 
from liaising with their EU level umbrella organisations for large 
organisations such as CGT and MEDEF, sending written contribution and 
amendments (Fondation Copernic) to direct participation in the hearings 
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for the Fondation Robert Schuman, Maison de l‘Europe, LDH, AFEM and 
ATTAC. 
Regarding the ways of access and of action in the Convention, this too 
appears similar to Spanish organisations as previous involvement in EU 
affairs and reputation was an important factor. A slight difference is that 
French organisations pay more importance to the 1st Convention on 
Fundamental rights than to consultations with the Commission as a 
relevant precedent for the Convention. As for Spanish organisations, the 
ability to mobilise elite contacts is an important factor, although in this 
case organisations do not explicitly refer to the members of the 
Convention but to different particularly strategic connections in the EU 
such as the EESC for CGT or the Commission for the Union du Grand 
Commerce du Centre-Ville. This seems to belong to rather well established 
organisations (CGT, MEDEF and FCCV as ―social partners‖) whereas AFEM 
and Fondation Robert Schuman report such contacts for special events 
such as conferences, seminars etc. In this sense the ability to liaise with 
political personnel seems to be slightly less relevant than for Spanish 
organisations.   
The tendency of some organisations to be directly involved in comparison 
to those delegating to the EU umbrella group appears to be very strongly 
related to the type of sector and the degree of internal consultation. 
Similarly organisations not having members to consult such as the 
Fondation Robert Schuman or the Maison de l‘Europe claim a stronger role 
in the Convention. 
The picture of civil society involvement in the working groups which 
prepared the plenary hearing of civil society suggests that the role of 
these actors in the Convention was not as limited as it is suggested by 
accounts that access to the Convention was reserved to European 
organisations (Shaw, Hoffman, and Bausili 2003; León, Mateo Díaz, and 
Meseguer 2004; Milton and Keller-Noëllet 2005). Attention is now turned 
to the way in which this non-negligible presence in the Convention was 
perceived by the different kinds of actors and which sorts of relations were 
established between them. 
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2. Evaluation of national organisations’ role in the Convention 
When EU level organisations are asked about their perception of the role 
of national organisations, it appears that those are quite cleaved. On the 
one hand 4 interviewees from organisations seeking to empower citizens 
(ACN, ECAS, PFCS and CEDAG) expressed grief over a small and 
insufficient participation by national organisations. This evaluation from 
EU level groups was rather expectable not only on the grounds of previous 
analyses on the insufficient role of national groups but also because their 
own role is built on the difficulty of national organisations to take part in 
European affairs because of the lack of specific resources by national 
organisations. In this sense the interviewee from ELO perceives that the 
participation of national organisations suffers from a lack of real 
understanding of the EU:  
―You also have organisations which were not based in Brussels 
representing different issues […] and there is a clear need for civil 
society from the, from, from the professional people at national 
level, a specific demand. [...] They want to be actors of their own 
right, even if they don‘t clearly understand because it is a bit too 
sophisticated‖ (interview 15, ELO) 
 
This quote does not only suggest that European organisations saw 
national organisations as relatively unable to participate, but also shows a 
measure of distrust that these groups might acquire a higher profile.  
On the other hand, some of the groups at the core of the ―civil dialogue 
coalition‖ (Social Platform, COFACE, CSCG and CONCORD) saw national 
groups, and particularly their own members, influencing concrete 
decisions in the Convention, although acknowledging that this is a rare 
phenomenon. The role of Irish organisations‘ lobbying through national 
government was in particular mentioned by 5 interviewees: 
―The most painful is to get a few people from a key NGOs from a 
few countries who would pick this issue up and say ‗I will use this 
information to lobby my national government, to sort of push the 
local actors to be involved‘. You know, somebody in Ireland from a 
particular NGO: ‗I understand the national level, I understand the 
European level, it interests me, give me the information and I will 
arrange meetings with the Irish minister or push the Irish Taoiseach 
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to talk about this issue.‘ ‖ (interview 9 with a representative of the 
Social Platform).  
Table 16 below shows that overall national organisations are considered 
able and willing to participate in EU affairs, although it does not 
necessarily reflect actual participation in the Convention. It appears that 
most EU organisations point out both national organisations‘ interest and 
inability to participate, in general the argument being that national 
organisations would like to participate more but that it is still difficult for 
them, although clearly positive references outnumber sceptical ones. The 
enthusiasm of Spanish organisations with this topic is noticeable. 
Table 16 References to the interest of national actors to 
participate in the EU 
Number of references 
EU level 
orgs 
Spanish 
orgs 
French 
orgs 
National public and orgs not interested or 
able to participate in the EU 21 0 21 
National publics and orgs wish to participate 
in EU 46 31 24 
The analysis of the role of national organisations in the Convention shows 
that these actors were not marginalised by the fact of being national 
organisations. Several Spanish organisations (ACSUR, Catalan 
Convention, CJE, RCE, FCCE and CCOO) consider that the Convention was 
a modest but real participation opportunity for civil society and most of 
them are satisfied with the Convention, in particular with the recognition 
of participatory democracy and civil society (see chapter 6). The quote 
below captures this shared understanding:  
―It‘s true that it was not as much as we would have liked it be, civil 
society‘s involvement was unequal in different territories, but I 
think it was an opportunity to start up a new dynamic and even 
though this breach has not been as large as we expected, it‘s now 
open and when we have met in later occasions we realise that this 
was a moment of change. Things changed, not so much as we 
would have liked, but today it is clear that member states, which 
have always been the engines of European integration, know that in 
certain areas they can no longer do and decide alone and on their 
own.‖ (interview 38 with a representative of the FCCE). 
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Furthermore, almost all the Spanish organisations shared the enthusiasm 
sparked by the first months of the debate on the future of Europe. 
Interviewees said that the Convention was perceived by civil society as a 
―Porto Alegre like moment‖27 (interview 34 with an advisor of the Spanish 
government) or ―Europe‘s Estates-General‖ (interview 44 with a member 
of the Consejo de la Juventud), in that the moment and the method 
allowed for a complete rethinking of the EU project. This goes together 
with frequent federal arguments on the possibilities to turn the EU into a 
political system resting on citizens‘ wishes which clearly resonate with the 
Laeken declaration and with the expectations that the Constitution would 
mean a new step in European citizens‘ ownership of European integration 
(Habermas 2001). In this sense, Spanish organisations involved in the 
Convention seemed to take the Constitutional discourse seriously (Piana 
2004). On the other hand interviews with two Spanish civil servants (34 
and 39) and organisations campaigning for the rejection of the 
constitution are sceptical about the possibility of building a more 
democratic EU on the grounds of civil society participation.  
On the other hand French organisations did not perceive themselves as 
relevant actors. Qualitative analysis of the position papers and interviews 
suggests that French civil society organisations perceived themselves as 
relatively marginal actors in comparison to the attitude of their Spanish 
peers. Despite the clear presence of some French organisations in the 
hearings (Maison de l‘Europe, LDH, Fondation Copernic, Fondation Robert 
Schuman) interviewees do not claim a particularly relevant role and rather 
saw themselves as privileged observers. Although they were fully aware of 
the content of the Constitution and the Convention debates, French 
organisations concentrated in influencing national debates rather than EU 
level ones, as it was explicitly formulated by the LDH interviewee: 
―Some people criticised us as being less present in the second 
Convention. Because what we saw immediately was that we had to 
do field work and to convey to people what was inside of the 
Treaty.‖ (interview 48 with a representative of LDH) 
                                       
27
 In relation to the Brazilian city that held the first meetings of the alter-globalisation World Social 
Forum.  
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This quote resonates strongly with Dehaene‘s one at the beginning of this 
chapter saying that organisations intervening in the Convention were not 
in touch with their members. It tends to suggest that there was a trade 
off between involvement or at least strong and potentially influential 
involvement in the Convention and the contact with grassroots members 
of the organisations and citizens. 
 
This reflects a more general feeling that: ―in the NGO community, there is 
much ambivalence about whether to participate in policy making or to 
take on the role of a ‗critical conscience‘, possibly threatening protest and 
using other social movement tactics‖ (Ruzza 2007, 65). In this sense it 
seems implicit in several interviews that organisations perceived a strong 
involvement in the Convention as a way of making it more legitimate, 
which most French organisations would abstain from doing considering 
that they did not appreciate real participation opportunities.  
This perception by French organisations is clearly linked to an overall 
negative evaluation of the Convention (see table 17 below). Organisations 
point out that there were no real issues for civil society (MEDEF) and that 
the content of EU policies, and in particular economic policies (Part III) 
was not discussed at all (LDH, Maison de l‘Europe, Fondation Copernic and 
AFEM for social policies) despite the role of civil society in the creation of a 
Social Europe working group (Will et al. 2005; del Río Villar 2004, 330; 
337–338). Furthermore, most of the French organisations did not 
appreciate any significant constitutional dimension of the process implying 
a qualitative transformation of the EU into a more citizen-centred polity. 
In particular organisations like ATTAC, the Fondation Copernic, the LDH 
and the Maison de l‘Europe consider that the Convention did not 
sufficiently represent the demands of European citizens for more 
democracy, being too dominated by heads of state. The only overtly 
positive readings of the Convention process come from the LDH and the 
Fondation Schuman by acknowledging that it did address the debate on 
the EU‘s democratic deficit. 
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Table 17 Evaluation of the Convention by French organisations 
 
No change 
of 
economic 
policies 
insufficient 
social policies 
Domination by 
member 
states 
Convention 
addressed 
the 
democracy 
issue 
AFEM X X   
CGT X X   
LDH X   X 
MEDEF   X  
Mouvement 
pour 
l‘initiative 
citoyenne  
 X  
Fondation 
Copernic X 
X X  
Fondation 
Robert 
Schuman  
  X 
 
3. Relations between European and national organisations 
Beyond the ability to influence the Convention, it is important to analyse 
whether and how the Convention contributed to establish relations 
between national and European organisations which could in turn 
contribute to the generalisation of the participatory democracy frame.  
In this sense, a number of interviewees acknowledge that Brussels-based 
organisations and national ones are quite distant and have weak ties. The 
finding of a distance between European organisations and their national 
members is a stable assessment of these relations (Armstrong 2002; 
Sudbery 2003; Mahoney 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010b) although (Friedrich 
and Rodekamp 2011) have concluded that EU associations are now more 
proactive in working to bridge this distance. In the light of the 
Convention‘s discourse on the use of civil society as way to bring the EU 
closer to citizens it may seem paradoxical that EU umbrella organisations 
refer more strongly to this distance whereas a weak majority of national 
organisations tend to point out that they have strong relations with 
European organisations. However, this resonates with organisations‘ 
justificatory rationales, in that the lack of interest of members justifies the 
need of a strong role for EU organisations. On the other hand some 
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national organisations tend to point out their links with European 
organisations as a way to justify their Europeaness and thus their right to 
be involved and heard in EU policy-making.  
Table 18 Relations between European and national organisations 
 
European 
organisations 
Spanish 
organisations  
French 
organisations 
Distance 
between EU and 
national orgs 9 4 3 
Strong links EU 
and national 
orgs 0 6 4 
Figure (9) in the previous chapter shows that the network is only crowded 
in its the centre where EU organisations are located and its‘ periphery, 
composed mainly of non-citizens‘ interest groups and national 
organisations. When the density of ties linking European organisations and 
the entire network (table 19 below) are compared, this distinction is 
relevant in that the density of the full network is significantly lower than 
the density of the network containing only EU level organisations (0,19), 
which may be considered relatively high (Knoke and Yang 2008, 87). This 
confirms strongly that EU level organisations tended to network much 
more intensely among themselves than with national organisations, and 
that the contacts between national organisations were not as intense as 
those between EU level ones. 
Table 19 Network density 
 Density No. of Ties                                                          Avg Degree
Full network 0.0631        161 3.1569 
EU level network 0.1905 144 5.1429 
The figure below (13) represents the networking of national actors, that 
is, the relations between them and between national and European 
organisations. For the sake of clarity relations among EU level 
organisations have been omitted. Spanish organisations are represented 
in red, French organisations in blue, EU level organisations in yellow. The 
size of the square represents organisations‘ degree (see annexes for the 
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centrality and prestige measures).  This is analysed herein for Spanish 
and French organisations. 
Figure 13 Networking national organisations28 
When the relations with EU institutions and organisations are considered it 
appears that being active primarily at the national level did not make 
Spanish groups outsiders in the Convention. Not only did they have direct 
access to the Convention but some of them networked quite strongly with 
EU groups and at the national level.  
The choice of European partners by Spanish organisations is strongly 
cleaved as three organisations (RCE, ONCE-CEPES and Caritas) were in 
touch with the leader of the European coalition promoting the recognition 
of civil society consultation, the Social Platform, whereas ATTAC, CCOO, 
                                       
28 Node size represents degree and the layout represents closeness centrality.  
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CJE, FCCE and ACSUR were rather in touch with the PFCS, IRI Europe or 
ETUC which promoted other forms of participation. In terms of 
involvement in the EU network, it is most noticeable that ONCE-CEPES 
and RCE have a pattern of relations comparable to European organisations 
as they only networked with European organisations. Given that these 
organisations have no tie to other national groups, except their mutual 
relation, the fact that they are among the most central actors indicates 
their strong encroachment within the alliance advocating civil society 
consultation, as it was suggested in the previous chapter.  
Figure 13 above confirms that French organisations were rather inactive in 
establishing partnership with other organisations. These data show that 
FONDA-CAFECS presents a pattern of relations broadly comparable to 
Spain‘s ONCE-CEPES or RCE, in that they tended to network only with EU 
organisations having been influential in the creation of the participatory 
democracy frame, although not with the core actor. The most central 
actor among French organisations is the LDH-CCDF which shows more 
balanced relations than FONDA-CAFECS. The case of CGT is interesting 
since its activism is not related to direct influence in the Convention as 
they did not participate directly but to its aftermath. All the other French 
actors show much lower centralities and tend to be connected only to one 
or two actors. This is undoubtedly linked to a lower degree of response to 
the networking questionnaire. 
The graph above suggests that the contacts between national and EU 
organisations are weak and that those are relatively diffuse, as no EU 
actor seems to have had a particularly central role. In this sense it is also 
noticeable that the European actors which were more targeted by national 
organisations are not at the core of the EU coalition promoting civil 
dialogue. It rather seems that the PFCS, ETUC and IRI Europe have the 
higher indegrees as well as higher closeness centrality (represented by 
centrality in the graph)29. The European Social Forum, which irrelevant for 
European organisations, emerges as a relevant contact for both Spanish 
                                       
29
 Betweenness measures are not used in this analysis as they are artificially increased for some actors 
by the effect of not including ties between EU level organisations.  
163 
 
and French groups. This suggests its importance as a venue for national 
organisations seeking alternatives to representation via Brussels umbrella 
groups. Most of the interviewees from the French and Spanish 
organisations that took part in this forum did not highlight it as an 
important forum. This may be related to the fact that participation in the 
Social Forum was not managed by interviewees who participated in the 
Convention, but this very possibility would tend to confirm that this venue 
was rather oriented towards the coordination of contestation to the Treaty 
(Feron 2006; Agrikoliansky 2007; Della Porta 2007) than to articulating 
an interaction with the Convention.  
A very relevant effect of national organisations‘ involvement is that it 
introduced a new set of actors in the field of participation, unleashing a 
degree of competition between European organisations and the 
newcomers, as it was suggested above by the quote of an interviewee 
from ELO. Interviews suggest that Spanish organisations perceived 
themselves as fully qualified and influential actors. In this sense some of 
them tended to network with Brussels organisations and at the same time 
to see them as potential competitors for attention and resources, in that 
EU umbrella groups are entrenched in the EU system and may sometimes 
block the access to other groups. In particular, some groups point out that 
funding by EU institutions influences the positions of the groups receiving 
these subsidies. The fact that this view is much more diffuse among 
French organisations seems to be related to their lower profile: they did 
not perceive competition in the sense that they did not really seek to 
achieve influence. 
Table 20 Competition for attention and resources 
Name References 
Catalan convention paper 1 
Interview 24 - RCE 3 
Interview 42 - EAPN 1 
Interview 25 - CEPES 1 
Interview 8 - ATTAC 1 
Ecologistas en acción paper 1  
LDH paper 3 
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The following quote is the probably the strongest expression of this 
distrust between national and European organisations: 
 
―If I join a platform they are never going to ask for my opinion! […] 
I think that these umbrella organisations are the best way to be 
inefficient. That‘s why we created the RCE. In opposition to these 
umbrella organisations, which are inefficient, they are not 
participatory democracy. […] When we launched the organisation 
the Lobby took it terribly bad, although after that they have 
realised that we have quoted them, when we think it‘s worth, and 
otherwise let them use their own website, and their huge subsidy! 
Because these people are really well paid and they have 90 staff 
don‘t they? […] I mean, participatory democracy should start by all 
these NGOs which have nothing to do with participatory 
democracy.‖ (interview 24 with a representative of RCE) 
 
4. Inclusiveness and exclusiveness in the Convention 
This chapter has shown that the cleavage between European and national 
organisations in terms of access to the Convention was not as decisive as 
it has been suggested so far by the literature (Shaw, Hoffman, and Bausili 
2003; León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004; Milton and Keller-Noëllet 
2005; Monaghan 2007; Lombardo 2007; Cook 2008). Whereas European 
organisations were the actors involved more strongly, the Convention was 
relatively open to national organisations. In this sense even organisations 
which consider themselves rather deprived of European resources such as 
Spain‘s RCE could be heard in the plenary session and network with other 
European organisations. In this sense the Convention seems to have 
significantly reduced the cost of participation in EU affairs for national 
organisations.  
The EU‘s preference for European organisations notwithstanding it seems 
that it is not organisations‘ primary action level per se which explains their 
degree of involvement in the Convention. This chapter suggests that 
rather than a distinction between European insiders and national outsiders 
(W. Grant 2000, 20–35), attitudes towards European integration and the 
Convention as well as differences in ways of action are a more important 
factor. In this sense an organisation like ATTAC is considered unable to 
influence EU decision making, not because of its lack of interest or a 
national rooting but because of its approach to EU debates: 
165 
 
―What do you want of this constitution? ‗Well, we want to change 
how it works.‘ Well, to engage in this process you need to say more 
than that. You‘ve got to say ‗We suggest that you put an article that 
addresses this and that. We suggest a clause that could have this 
effect‘. They found it very difficult to engage at that level, and 
because they didn‘t do that they went back to the French and the 
Dutch and they said ―this is useless‖. I‘m not too critical of it 
because I think it is very difficult to have the organisation needed 
to engage in a constructive dialogue‖ (interview 9, Social Platform) 
Further evidence about the importance of attitudes towards European 
integration is provided by the differences between Spanish and French 
organisations. Although differences in their ways of access are very small, 
it appears that their evaluation of these access opportunities is very 
different, with Spanish organisations being generally satisfied with their 
role, whereas French organisations tended to see no real participation 
opportunities. Furthermore it appears as well that the organisations that 
played a more direct role in the Convention had strong EU resources, 
embeddedness in EU participatory structures or had less intense internal 
control by members. A quote from an interview with a representative of 
the LDH has suggested that French organisations perceived a trade off 
between strong involvement in the Convention and their ability to be in 
touch with their members. This is discussed thoroughly in the next 
chapter, but it seems that the attitude towards participation in the EU is 
linked to the political opportunity structure that organisations have at 
European level compared to national scenarios and to their attitude to the 
question of democracy in the EU (Liebert 2011, 109–111). 
The analysis of national organisations‘ participation suggests very strongly 
that organisations‘ challenging the Convention‘s agenda and the 
Constitution or more broadly European integration did not participate in 
the Convention, although they played an important role in mobilising the 
public against it during national referenda (Agrikoliansky 2007; Dufour 
2010; Seidendorf 2010). It thus appears that the organisations that did 
not participate in the Convention (ATTAC Spain and France, Fundación 
Luis Vives, Demopunk, Fondation Copernic, Mouvement pour l‘Initiative 
Citoyenne and Ecologistas en Acción) took part, except the rather passive 
Fundación Luis Vives, in campaigns and movements against the 
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ratification of the Treaty. The participation of ATTAC in the hearings does 
not disqualify but rather confirm this approach, in that this organisation‘s 
interviewee did not agree with ATTAC‘s attitude and rather tended to see 
himself as a member of a larger European network. 
The question is thus what is the causal relation between non-participation 
and rejection of the Constitution? An important expectation of the logic 
sustained by the White Paper on Governance and its aftermaths such as 
plan D (European Commission 2005) is that participation entails support, 
since often rejection of European policies is equated with a lack of 
knowledge (Bee 2010, 97). However, the attitude of the abovementioned 
organisations is clearly instrumental in that it is the rejection of the 
constitutional project which discouraged them from participating and 
eventually legitimating it indirectly. This appears in the interview with 
ATTAC Spain suggesting that many members of the organisations were 
unhappy that EU affairs were focusing too much the attention of the 
organisation and especially in the Fondation Copernic which sent 
amendments to the Convention precisely to prove that there were no real 
participation opportunities and that participation was perceived as a 
device for legitimating the Convention. 
―At the beginning they [those supporting the Treaty] tried to tell us 
―after all you could have had your say‖ and so on. But we had taken 
a precaution: we had sent in a lot of amendments. Obviously on 
key questions. Such as excluding public services from competition 
rules, things like that. [Laughing] And obviously none of them was 
adopted.‖ (interview 49 with a representative of Fondation 
Copernic) 
The chapter has shown as well that the Convention did not actually 
constitute a meeting point for national and EU level networks, which in 
some cases tended to see each other as competitors for attention and 
resources. It appears that a majority of national organisations had their 
own channels of access to the Convention and did not depend on 
European organisations to introduce them. In this sense it seems that the 
decision to participate and the ways of access were autonomously taken 
by national civil society organisations. 
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It has been found that organisations at the core of the demand for civil 
society‘s participation tend to acknowledge the participation of their 
members, whereas most of the national organisations tended to be in 
touch with organisations outside the coalition promoting civil dialogue. 
This adds to the finding that the European organisations that 
communicated most actively were not those most involved in the 
Convention‘s discussions on participation (chapter 4, section 4). It thus 
can be expected that the Convention did not contribute to convey the 
frame on participatory democracy, at least as it was elaborated by EU 
groups. The circulation of this frame and its appropriation by national civil 
society organisations is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Civil society and frame circulation 
at national level 
 
This chapter will analyse whether and how civil society organisations 
contributed to ―download‖ the participatory democracy frame from the 
Convention to the general public debates in Spain and France. (Monaghan 
2007) refers to three mechanisms by which organised civil society links 
the EU with citizens, participation, representation and communication. If 
the question is adapted to the fragmented European public sphere, frame 
circulation can be operationalised as the main linkage mechanism between 
specialised and general publics. 
 
However the previous chapter has highlighted that contacts between 
national and European organisations were limited and dominated by 
organisations that did not share the frame on participatory democracy. In 
this sense it can be expected that the lack of contacts meant little 
information diffusion and common action, significantly reducing the 
opportunities for frame circulation. 
 
It can thus be expected that if civil society contributed to download 
information on participatory democracy to the general publics this must 
have been the result of European organisations‘ activism at national level 
or autonomous involvement by national organisations. 
 
In order to explore this, the chapter analyses firstly the involvement of 
European organisations in national debates and their contribution to 
awareness-rising in relation to participatory democracy. Then the next two 
following will analyse to what extent Spanish and French organisations 
where interested in participatory democracy and whether their position on 
this topic coincided with that of European organisations. Chapter 7 will 
analyse the role of these organisations in the general debates. 
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1. European organisations and frame diffusion at national level 
Frame circulation is not only an important variable of this study, but 
according to European civil society interviewees it was one of the 
objectives that the Convention sought when it included article 47 in the 
Constitution. Some interviewees (see table 21 below) thus acknowledge 
that civil society‘s achievements were linked to a political calculation 
expecting these organisations to act as proxies for European publics and 
contribute to diffuse and support the Convention‘s work: 
―They were happy to see that some expert groups were interested 
in their work because media did not get interested in this.‖ 
(interview 3 with a representative of the Social Platform). 
Table 21 References to civil society organisations as proxies for 
European publics. 
Name 
Interview 03 - Soc. Pla. 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 
Interview 10 - EFC 
Interview 12 - ACN 
Interview 18 - CSCG 
Interview 23 - ECAS 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 
Interview 36 - EEB 
In this sense some interviewees (EFC, IRI, Permanent Forum) explicitly 
say that one of the reasons why the Convention accepted article 47 was to 
make the Treaty more attractive to public opinion. The Convention would 
thus have seen civil society participation and participatory democracy as a 
way to address the ratification referenda. Whereas the opinions of the 
members of the Convention and officials that were interviewed do not 
coincide on whether it addressed public opinion in general, all these 
interviewees consider that article 47 was a way to respond to democratic 
deficit criticisms. On this question, the interviewees from CONCORD and 
EEB explicitly say that the Convention expected active involvement by civil 
society organisations in the ratification process in return for its influence 
in the process.  
170 
 
―[Speaking about large transnational NGOs such as OXFAM]. And then 
we have the, you know, the CONCORDs and the Social Platforms, […] 
The Convention was where their credibility was smashed. It was 
smashed because they could not deliver, they made a lot of noise by 
saying: ―Our members are not happy, our members would want this‖, 
and they got a lot of what they asked for. And then when the 
politicians would come and say: ―And now your members will be happy 
and they will be supportive‖ ―Oh! There‘s no way we can contact 
them‖. So anti poverty networks said no, CONCORD said, ―well, no‖, 
Women‘s Lobby said ―no, we can‘t do it‖ (interview 21 with a 
representative of CONCORD) 
 ―Andrew Duff, Andrew Duff30, from the UK, we had invited him and 
two others, at the annual assembly of the EEB. He was really angry 
with us. Because he felt that all the NGOs, all civil society 
organisations should actively campaign for it [the Constitution]. And 
we told him, ―look, our role here is to inform everybody and it‘s at the 
national level where they have to make up their minds, because 
there‘s so many reasons for people in a country to make up their mind 
that we don‘t know about and that only national organisations can 
respond to‖, of course. It‘s really up to them. And we are divided, we 
have groups that are saying ―it doesn‘t go far enough‖, and some 
groups like our Swedish member, they look at environment, 
development and nature, they don‘t look at the social agenda and at 
the other international agendas. But for Ecologistas en Accion [Spain], 
the fact that this Treaty would bring a European army closer is a very 
important reason for them to say ―no, no‖. […] And how can we tell 
them not to take that into account?‖ (interview 36 with a 
representative of EEB). 
The quotes suggest that this strategy was not endorsed by the 
organisations. The interviewee from CSCG was particularly critical of it 
and said that he never tried to give the impression that the organisations 
would diffuse the text, which raises new doubts about the impact of 
CSCG‘s act4Europe campaign. 
―Being a promoter of the EU as such, that‘s not our role. It‘s not our 
responsibility, maybe we should have looked to social justice. Did 
this Convention make any effort to make the life of the people in 
the EU any better? […] I think that for environmental NGOs, 
whether there was a Convention, I mean, a constitution or not a 
constitution, did it actually matter?‖ (interview 18 with a 
representative of CSCG). 
Furthermore these quotes suggest that the main reason for the 
organisation‘s rejection to contribute to diffuse information and eventually 
                                       
30 British Liberal-Democrat MEP, member of the Convention, well known by his federal positions.  
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promote the Constitution is their weak relations with their members. In 
this sense 4 civil society interviewees endorsed the EEB‘s statement that 
associating EU level groups does not grant consensus from national 
members (Ruzza 2011, 461). Officials and members of the Convention 
share this impression with a critical note:  
―But we must be realistic and therefore rather low profile in the way 
we define relations with civil society, because we may give the 
impression that we associate all citizens, and that's a utopia that we 
will never achieve.‖ (interview 1 with Jean-Luc Dehaene) 
 
―This illustrates one of the large gaps of European civil society 
which is the insufficient link that they establish with their members 
at the national level, in particular on what I call horizontal 
questions. After all what was in the Treaty? What we will do with 
the European project and what direction and what path it will take. 
So it was purely an horizontal civil dialogue, that is, outside the 
traditional scope of civil society organisations from a sector point of 
view, it was about social questions, not about the environment, 
there was no trade, no development, no matter what, or culture, on 
which, I would say, European structures can rarely take a step 
without consulting their members. However for national 
organisations, because there is also a part of responsibility of 
national organisations, you know, these issues, ‗the meaning of the 
European project, we‘re paid to sell I mean, to lobby on issues of 
family, culture, education and so on, but we're not paid to discuss 
the meaning of the European project, we leave that to our 
European structures.‘ " (Interview 20 with an official of the EESC). 
The difficulty to deal with horizontal institutional subjects is widely 
acknowledged by European civil society organisations. In this sense quite 
a large number of interviewees point out civil society organisations‘ 
difficulties in getting involved beyond their own field of competence into 
what interviewee from the EESC quoted above calls horizontal debates 
and in particular political or ideological issues. The following quote is 
representative of an approach shared by very diverse organisations (see 
table 22 below). 
 
―We prefer to think of ourselves like constructive activists not 
engaging on discussions on the big concepts like socialism or 
liberalism. We prefer to think like this, this and this is useful for our 
members.‖ (interview 3 with a representative of the Social 
Platform) 
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Table 22 Interviewees mentioning the difficulty of EU 
organisations to engage in political debates. 
Name References 
Interview 03 - Social Platform 2 
Interview 09 – Social Platform 1 
Interview 11 - COFACE 2 
Interview 12 - IRI 1 
Interview 15 - ELO 1 
Interview 18 - CSCG 3 
Interview 19 - Poli. Off. 1 
Interview 21 - CONCORD 3 
Interview 26 - PFCS 1 
Interview 29 - Eurocommerce 3 
Interview 35 - Eurocities 2 
Interview 36 - EEB 5 
 
The only exception to this is the PFCS which wished to contribute a more 
horizontal approach. This may have been one of the decisive factors why 
many CSO felt that they were not concerned by the national ratification 
debates. 
 
This suggests that organisations played a modest role in national debates, 
which is confirmed when the question is asked to interviewees. 
Interviewees from European organisations did not pretend to be able to 
generate wide public debates and acknowledge that they are not citizens‘ 
main information source. In this sense most interviewees tried to 
participate in national debates (for instance the interviewee from EEB 
participated in the 2003 Social Forum in Paris and PFCS and CEDAG in 
French debates) but most of the times rather on a personal capacity and 
in very small events. 
Furthermore and more importantly, interviews reveal as well that 
organisations played a minor role in the diffusion of the debate towards 
national organisations because they found it extremely difficult to make 
their own members interested. In this sense some interviewees confirm 
the opinion of the EESC official quoted above by saying that their national 
members were expecting a debate about the substance of EU policies, 
whereas the Convention focused almost exclusively on institutional and 
procedural matters (see table 23 below). (Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 
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2007, 280) has argued that this is one of the reasons for the 
disconnection between European and national organisations. Additionally 
interviewees tended to say that the Convention chose to focus on these 
topics, which were not the result of the Laeken mandate. This perception 
that the Convention tended to ignore most of the substance demands of 
civil society may partly explain why members of civil society organisations 
considered the Convention an issue of indirect concern for them despite 
its high political profile. 
Table 23 National organisations expected a debate on concrete 
issues 
Name References 
Interview 09 - Soc. Pla. 1 
Interview 10 - EFC 1 
Interview 19 - Poli. Off. 2 
Interview 21 - CONCORD 1 
Interview 29 - Eurocommerce 1 
Interview 36 - EEB 1 
 
This applies in particular to participatory democracy, in that this topic is 
considered too distant and abstract to make national organisations 
interested (see table 24 below).  
Table 24 Grassroots members and organisations not interested in 
participatory democracy 
Name References 
Interview 10 - EFC 1 
Interview 17 - UNICE 1 
Interview 19 - Poli. Off. 2 
Interview 22 - Forum of Civil Society 1 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 4 
Interview 27 - CEDAG 2 
Interview 31 - ETUC 1 
Interview 35 - Eurocities 2 
Interview 36 - EEB 2 
 
The only interviewees who argued that members of their networks very 
much appreciated these new instruments and were ready to use them are 
the first interviewee from the Social Platform (number 3), COFACE and 
ACN. It remains that ¾ of the interviewees did not perceive any interest 
for the issue among their national members. It is however noticeable that 
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the organisations outlining the disinterest of their members were not 
those at the core of the coalition. In this sense Monaghan points out the 
interest that the members of the Social Platform expressed for this topic 
in a seminar in 2005 (Monaghan 2007, 130, footnote 21). This suggests 
that the members of the organisations at the core of the civil dialogue 
demand were more sensible to this frame.  
This result requires reinterpreting the finding that European organisations 
tend to see national organisations as potential actors in the EU field (see 
table 16 in chapter 5). A breakdown of the references in that table 
provides two explanations. As far as European organisations are 
concerned most of the references to the role of national organisations in 
the EU are included in position papers, in particular those sent to the 
Convention, which suggests that the aim was to avoid the exclusion of 
national organisations. Regarding the references in interviews, it is 
interesting that the references to participation by national organisations 
and publics is not exclusive of a lack of interest by their own members 
since they most often refer to the ability of national organisations to 
participate in debates on the EU. Credit goes most often to organisations 
which rejected the Treaty. The following quotes are representative of 
these remarks:  
 
―I think it was disappointing but… I think they [ATTAC] played a 
role, a really useful role, as they kind of urged a responsible 
process, they tried really to hold people to account.‖ (interview 9 
with a representative of the Social Platform). 
 
―I‘ve been, I‘ve been myself at the social plat… the social forum. 
You know this big thing that was started in Porto Alegre and is now 
everywhere in the world? I was in Paris, there was once one in Paris 
and it was huge! It was [emphasis] huuuge really, I was impressed 
about the size. […] Many environmental organisations have been 
outside… a bit outside of this debate. Apart from Spain where the 
most active and largest member organisation was part of the anti-
EU platform, Ecologistas en Acción.‖ (interview 36 with a 
representative of the EEB) 
 
However, when it comes to evaluating the national referenda, it appears 
that European organisations do not appreciate a significant European 
dimension in these debates, in spite of the judgement that they provided 
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an opportunity for civil society participation. In this sense it appears that 
almost all the interviewees considered that national debates were 
dominated by national politics or in one way or another disconnected from 
the Convention (see table 25 below), although 3 interviewees saw the 
French debate as a significant exception and considered that the French 
public became substantially interested in the text. 
Table 25 National debates dominated by national politics 
Name References 
Interview 03 – Social Platform 1 
Interview 09 - Social Platform 2 
Interview 12 - IRI 1 
Interview 19 - Poli. Off. 1 
Interview 22 - Forum of Civil Society 1 
Interview 23 - ECAS 1 
Interview 26 - Forum of Civil Society 1 
Interview 27 - CEDAG 1 
Interview 29 - Eurocommerce 1 
Interview 31 - ETUC 1 
Interview 35 - Eurocities 1 
Interview 36 - EEB 3 
Several interviewees explain that a lot of the disconnection has to do with 
lack of involvement by national publics. The most relevant comments are 
that one of the reasons of the failure, or at least of civil society 
organisations difficulty to follow these debates was due to member states 
disinterest in associating them and more generally in promoting debates 
on the EU. Some interviewees in a sense expected a replication of the 
Convention at the national level. Although this was done in Spain and 
France, it has been mentioned that civil society involvement was generally 
weak (chapter 5).  
Interviews with European organisations have offered an additional 
perspective on diffusion somehow confirmed by Spanish organisations 
(see chapter 7). Three interviewees (Social Platform, ACN, Polish Office) 
considered that consultation of civil society is stronger in the EU than in 
most national systems. In this sense 3 more interviewees (Polish Office, 
CONCORD and CEDAG) argued that article 47 should have interested 
national organisations as it may contribute to diffuse practices of 
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consultation and citizens‘ initiatives in countries where they do not exist. 
Nevertheless these interviewees did not see the realisation of their 
expectation as they, except for CONCORD, tend to consider that national 
organisations were not interested in participatory democracy (see table 24 
above).  
2. National organisations and the participatory democracy frame 
This section will discuss the positions of national organisations in relation 
to the participatory democracy frame. As the two graphs below 
demonstrate, it appears very clearly that Spanish organisations engaged 
strongly with this frame, whereas most French organisations ignored it. 
Figure 14 References to dimensions of participation, number of 
national organisations  
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Figure 15 References to dimensions of participation, number of 
words by national organisations 
 
 
2.1. Spanish organisations: strong involvement with participatory 
democracy in the EU, but no European debate 
Figures 14 and 15 above suggest that virtually all the Spanish 
organisations were interested in subjects of participation and democracy. 
In this sense almost all the interviews and papers consider the Convention 
process as an opportunity for citizens empowerment, because of the 
importance of the democracy frame in the Laeken declaration and the 
Convention and because the text would be ratified via popular votes in 
several member states (see the ―CSO consultation empowers citizens‖ 
bars in the figures above). Additionally, up to 6 organisations argue that 
they contributed to putting the issue of civil society participation on the 
Convention‘s agenda: 
―So we went to all the formal events on these topics. We went 
everywhere we thought we had to. That‘s the plain truth. We 
weren‘t sure if it would be useful or not, but we had to defend our 
points of view and proposals. We were more advanced than we 
thought, and we got a bit more or something more than what was 
already in place.‖ (interview 25 with a representative of ONCE-
CEPES).  
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In this sense it seems now less surprising that Spanish organisations 
shared unanimously the idea that national organisations are interested 
and able to participate in European affairs (see table 16 in chapter 5). 
This section shows that most of the Spanish organisations were not only 
in favour of more participatory democracy in the EU but shared to a large 
extent the European organisations‘ frame putting civil society consultation 
at its centre.  
Figures above (14 and 15) show the main similarities with the European 
frame. Spanish organisations share the central reference to participation 
by organisations as a way to empower citizens and the need to recognise 
civil society and to structure more clearly the consultation of civil society 
in order to secure civil society‘s access to EU institutions. Although the 
notion of civil dialogue is only explicitly used by ONCE – CEPES, the 
organisation with the strongest EU network, up to 6 organisations call for 
the recognition of civil society and 4 of them even recall the demand for a 
European association statute that was a key issue for EU level 
organisations in the late nineties. The following quote from ACSUR‘s 
position paper suggests how close the frame of most Spanish 
organisations was to the European one: 
―Organised civil society‘s participation is indispensable to ensure the 
success of the European Union. The mechanisms needed for 
consultation, coordination and political dialogue and a stronger co-
management of community policies must be set up. Every man and 
woman must be able to make proposals and to be listened to in all 
the areas of the Union‘s competence. For this the necessary 
consultative committees must be articulated. The European Union 
must ensure the availability of means for the creation and 
consolidation of European civil society networks, recognising civil 
society as a permanent partner. The statute of European 
association must be incorporated into the new treaty.‖ (ACSUR las 
Segovias, 4) 
Similarities with the European frame extend to the justificatory rationales 
provided by Spanish organisations. The argument is that civil society 
contributes to raise awareness on the EU among citizens, in particular via 
the European Citizens‘ Initiative (table 26 below). It is noticeable that this 
refers to a justification that declined on the wake of the Convention in 
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favour of notions of citizens‘ participation and empowerment (see chapter 
2). This suggests that frame diffusion is not a mere reproduction of the 
discourse of European organisations but adapted to the national context. 
Table 26 Participation as a way to promote awareness on the EU 
Name 
Reference
s 
Paper ACSUR las Segovias  1 
Interview 25 - CEPES 3 
Interview 32 -ADICAE 2 
Interview 38 - FCCE 1 
Paper Grupo de contacto de la sociedad civil española  1 
However there are some differences in the demands that tend to suggest 
that Spanish organisations did not simply replicate the demands of 
European organisations. The most significant difference is that Spanish 
organisations make a very strong claim for recognition, but only CEPES 
makes an explicit call for this recognition and for the inclusion of 
participatory democracy in the new Treaty. Additionally there are some 
nuances in relation with the EU level frame. In this sense their discourse 
associates participatory democracy in the EU with more opportunities for 
ordinary citizens and national organisations to access the EU agenda. This 
suggests that Spanish organisations extended and transformed the frame 
(Snow et al. 1986, 472–476) for their own purpose and based on their 
own experience.  
 ―So the European Union was being built by patching existing 
structures, from Brussels downwards, and we citizens had nothing 
to say, so really, our feeling was that the Convention was not about 
enlargement or Treaty simplification but about democracy, and that 
us in the bottom wanted to start understanding what European 
integration was all about.‖ (interview 44 with a member of the 
CJE). 
These claims for a bigger role for civil society, and in particular for 
national organisations, are related to a strong dissatisfaction with existing 
consultation mechanisms (see table 27 below). 
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Table 27 Existing consultation is not participatory democracy 
Name References 
CJE position paper 1 
Interview 24 - RCE 3 
Interview 32 - ADICAE 2 
Interview 41 - CCOO 2 
Interview 42 summary - EAPN 3 
Ecologistas en acción paper 1 
The first criticism is that these dialogues are not participatory democracy 
but rather managerial processes because of the weak role that civil 
society plays in them and the distance with ordinary citizens. 
This famous debate about governance in Europe, you know. ―Yeah, 
we grant you access, we let everyone speak and say what they like, 
but you need one million signatures‖. I mean, I think it‘s more of a 
formality along famous governance, which I think is rather a 
managerial conception of power rather than a matter of real 
democracy. We pretend to meet you to consult you but in fact 
we‘ve already taken the real decision, haven‘t we? (interview 32 
with a member of ADICAE). 
The second criticism goes to the big role played by lobbies which is 
perceived in a strong contrast with to the weakness of citizens‘ interests.  
Consequently Spanish organisations insist more than their European 
counter parts that participation cannot be a mere formality but must imply 
real decision making influence: 
―We want to get organised, but we want to get organised to 
participate and be real stakeholders in the debate, we want to 
contribute to policy-design. Why? It‘s not a matter of putting 
ourselves in the centre stage, no, no, it‘s because we consider that 
what we represent must be incorporated into the concepts of the 
European constitution. […] Citizens‘ participation is the important 
thing. What for? To be influential!‖ (Interview 40 with a 
representative of Caritas Spain). 
It is clear that Spanish organisations were promoting a more robust 
approach than European organisations. 
―We thought that what was approved was really minimalistic. 
Because we already have the citizens‘ initiative in Spain, and we 
Spaniards saw that as something basic. And then structured 
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dialogue with civil society... yes, but at which level? We wanted the 
whole cake, obviously.‖ (Interview 44 with a representative of CJE). 
In this sense it seems that they were rather inspired by binding national 
models such as citizens‘ initiative referenda:  
―we suggest, for instance, that European scale referenda be 
established for topics of particular importance and salience. [...] Of 
course the result of these referenda should be binding for European 
institutions. We suggest as well the regulation of popular legislative 
initiatives.‖ (Convención Catalana 2003, 28) 
It appears that despite their strong endorsement of the demands on 
participatory democracy, national organisations somehow remain as a sort 
of ―utopian outsiders‖, which (Ruzza 2011) sees as one of the functions of 
social movements in the EU. 
 
These organisations‘ interest in participatory democracy contrasts strongly 
with perceptions that politicians were disinterested or even distrusted this 
issue (ONCE-CEPES and FCCE). In this sense the main resistance was not 
perceived from the social partners or business groups but from national 
governments and political parties. 
This suggests that networking is not decisive for discourse convergence. 
In this sense Spanish organisations formulated very similar demands on 
participatory democracy to those of the core coalition on civil dialogue 
despite their weak relations. This suggests that Spanish organisations 
adopted the EU frame on their own rather than as a response to contacts 
with EU level organisations. This tends to confirm the interpretation of the 
emergence of an organisational field of participation. In this sense, 
organisations seeking to play a role as European actors, such as Spanish 
ones perceiving themselves as fully qualified actors (see previous 
chapter), were pushed to integrate this common frame as an entry 
requirement, whereas organisations such as French ones tended to ignore 
it.  
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2.2. Distance towards the EU participatory democracy frame 
among French organisations 
In contrast with the strong resonance of the participatory democracy 
frame among Spanish organisations, French civil society organisations 
were almost not involved with it (see figures 14 and 15 above). This 
contrasts with the sobering opinions about democracy in the EU that they 
share with Spanish organisations and the role that these organisations 
attribute to the EU‘s democratic deficit in the negative outcome of the 
referendum in France. It seems that French organisations were as 
demanding about democracy as their Spanish peers but that they did not 
really expect that the Convention to change the situation. 
Those organisations generally favourable to the EU like LDH and Maison 
de l‘Europe pointed out that the Commission is not sufficiently supportive 
of organisations pleading for more democracy in the EU. 
―They ask us our opinion but they don‘t take it into account. It 
would be better not to consult NGOs and associations then! Every 5 
minutes they ask us to tell them what‘s the right way to 
communicate with citizens and so on, but they don‘t take it into 
account.‖ (interview 50 with a representative of the Maison de 
l‘Europe) 
The fact that French organisations were not involved in this frame creation 
process is all the more significant because it is not due to ignorance or 
isolation. Up to five interviews reveal that French organisations did not 
share this framework or did not try to diffuse it at national level despite 
their awareness that a debate on participatory democracy had been going 
on for some time in the EU.  
―Yes, there was a real process of unanimity construction of civil 
society around this topic, because the NGO platform, the Social 
Platform which was created at this time is somehow the result of 
this debate‖ (Interview 48 with a representative of the LDH). 
The only positive references about the article on participatory democracy 
regard the ECI, although most of the organisations specifically interested 
in democracy in the EU do not expect it to empower the citizens. 
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It appears that up to 5 organisations were not satisfied with the 
democratic changes introduced by the Constitution (table 5). This 
obviously does not mean that they did not see any progress, but it means 
that the EU was still perceived as insufficiently democratic, in contrast 
with the constitutional moment perceived by Spanish organisations.  
―There are several reasons to say NO despite a democratic 
evolution which is evident, but how insufficient.‖ (ATTAC‘s second 
paper submitted to the Forum, 15/06/2003).  
Table 28: French organisations pointing out insufficient progress 
in democracy 
Organisations Number of 
references 
Nodes - reasons 
Fondation Robert 
Schuman  
1 transparency and technocracy 
CGT  3 generally undemocratic, national 
parliaments too weak, policy drift 
from voters‘ preferences 
LDH 4 Weak representativeness of Council, 
softness of participatory democracy 
mechanisms, lack of public opinion 
Fondation Copernic 2 Impossible for civil society to 
influence the EU, policy drift from 
voters preferences 
Maison de l‘Europe 1 Commission does not listen to civil 
society 
Several reasons can be suggested to explain this. The most obvious is 
that interviews suggest that participatory democracy is somehow alien to 
French political culture. Distrust of civil society participation is particularly 
striking when heard from Alain Lamassoure, who according to his own 
account (Lamassoure 2004) played a decisive role in the inclusion of a 
Treaty article on participatory democracy:  
―NGOs are problem on which we will have to have a true reflection 
and a real debate at the EU level [...]. They were born 
spontaneously, they fulfil an extremely important role, but they 
have become so numerous, and they are so important in the media 
that questions of democratic character have to be asked, because 
these NGOs are not representative. [...] nobody knows exactly who 
controls them, who funds them, what they express, we cannot 
measure their impact in the population [...] And so the NGOs do not 
want democratic procedures to be used quickly. They prefer fuzzy 
procedures in which, having easier access to media, they impress 
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leaders and policymakers, rather than have problems addressed 
directly by all citizens by secret ballot after a truly large democratic 
debate.‖ (interview number 4 with Mr Lamassoure).  
The reference to the pressure that NGOs put on leaders through the 
media rather than via votes and numbers of members is clearly linked to a 
formal conception of democracy which seems difficult to reconcile with a 
participatory approach relying on pluralism in the public sphere. 
Furthermore some organisations consider that building a European 
democracy is difficult because it poses fundamental problems about 
sovereignty and challenges established political cultures.  
―They tell you that you can [participate] but if you have no real 
venue for debate... and then who decides? Who decides? That‘s 
very important because we did not want a nationalistic comeback, 
but we have to put the ―who decides‖ question at the centre of the 
project. Is it experts, is it popular sovereignty?‖ (Interview 49 with 
a representative of the Copernic Foundation) 
That said although this conception was more strongly voiced by French 
interviewees, it could hardly be explained by issues of political culture, as 
participatory culture is very weak in Spain as well (Vázquez García 2010, 
199). In this sense there is no significant difference with Spanish 
organisations in references to representative democracy and the need to 
reform the institutional system. That said the issue of democracy and 
legitimacy problems in the EU is more salient among general publics in 
France (Chopin 2008, 135–200) than in Spain. 
Instead it is suggested that this can rather be explained by the different 
ways in which Spanish and French civil society organisations related to the 
Convention and to the national debates. It was already said in chapter 5 
that French organisations had a rather passive attitude in the Convention, 
which now seems related to their perception that questions of democracy 
were not really addressed. In this sense it is interesting to note that some 
French organisations rejected the process because it was not a real 
constitutional process elaborated by mandated citizens‘ representatives. 
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―[Proponents of European integration] say there‘s not enough 
political Europe! Okay, but how you do it? How you do it? The only 
thing they can do is give more power, a little more power, to things 
which are simply not political bodies. The European central bank, 
another bit of stuff ... You know, I'm ready for a real European 
political power. On matters of EU competence, with a reinforced 
subsidiarity, but I am for a European political power. But how do we 
go from the current state to a real European political power? Well, 
either by force or we ask people if they agree! Otherwise it won‘t 
work!‖ (interview number 49 with a representative of the Copernic 
Foundation) 
Table 16 above (chapter 5, section 2) suggested that French organisations 
were much more sceptical than Spanish ones about civil society‘s 
willingness to be involved in European politics. In this sense French 
interviews reveal a conception of democracy strongly identified with 
national choices and in particular by the importance of the social 
dimension of public policies. 
―An enlarged and open Europe, based on the democratic expression 
of every people‘s economic and social choices‖ (CGT 2005) 
Liebert makes a similar finding in her survey about national organisations 
position on the constitution: "nearly all CSOs that share national ideas of 
democracy also contested the TCE" (Liebert 2011, 109). Consequently 
organisations identified with the left cannot share a frame about more 
democracy in the EU as long as the they see that the EU promotes liberal 
policies threatening elements of the social dimension (i.e. public services 
and labour law) supported by their members and the French voters. In 
this sense the perception of the EU‘s liberal preferences are thus framed 
as an antidemocratic tendency: 
―At this time some people said "this Europe does not meet the 
aspirations of the people", which is true, which is still true. 
Especially on the social dimension, we can‘t say that the social 
dimension, even in the Constitutional Treaty and in the new treaty 
the social dimension has not really changed since.‖ (interview 47 
with a representative of the CGT) 
This perception is related as well to the strong involvement of these 
organisations in the national debates and awareness raising that is 
discussed in the following section. 
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3. Analysing the content of the debates 
Some analyses of the French referendum have confirmed suggestions that 
referenda and in particular on topics such as the EU produce second order 
effects where citizens do not really reply to the question addressed (Smith 
2009, 127–132). In France the referendum was used to express internal 
dissatisfactions against the unpopular Chirac government, which wished to 
use supposedly popular European affairs to improve its popularity 
(Sauger, Brouard, and Grossman 2007). The circulation of a copy of the 
Treaty to every household in France was one of the efforts to improve the 
salience of this text. This seems to support findings that the main 
motivation for national political elites to call referenda was to improve 
their position in the national field rather than to deepen the legitimacy of 
the EU via debate (Mateo Gonzalez 2008; Crum and Hollander 2011). 
Furthermore internal socio-political cleavages were decisive in the final 
result of the vote (Lehingue 2007).  
 
The Spanish referendum was dominated as well by electors‘ party 
sympathies and strongly elite driven (León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 
2004; Closa Montero 2004; Font Fábregas and Rodríguez Ortiz 2007, 116; 
122–123), and unlike in France the campaign seemed to have little effect 
in the result of the vote (Font Fábregas and Rodríguez Ortiz 2007, 105; 
Lehingue 2007, 139).  
 
However, the recent comparative paper by Glencross and Trechsel (2011) 
rejoins some qualitative studies pointing out that frames and perceptions 
of European integration mattered in the final result (Maatsch 2007; 
Dufour 2010; Seidendorf 2010). In order to be able to understand 
whether civil society contributed to the construction of the frames and 
cues used by citizens in deciding their vote (Font Fábregas and Rodríguez 
Ortiz 2007) it is important to analyse how Spanish and French 
organisations perceived the content of this debate.  
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3.1. Perception of the Spanish national debate 
 
The results of the Spanish referendum on the Constitution (77% in favour 
of the Constitution with an abstention rate over 50%) suggest that EU 
topics in Spain are fairly consensual but do not mobilise public opinion or 
electors (Closa Montero 2004, 322; 326). However, Spanish publics were 
not particularly misinformed about the Treaty, as opinion polls show that 
Spaniards were well above the European average in terms of awareness of 
the European Convention (León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004, 71). 
The weak participation is generally deplored by the organisations studied 
in this thesis and a majority of them consider that the referendum on the 
Constitution was not really on EU issues.  
 
A majority of organisations share the idea that the EU‘s democratic deficit 
is linked to a lack of information and understanding of the EU by its 
citizens. Consequently they ask the EU to be more active in 
communicating Europe and consider that they can contribute to this task if 
the EU was to grant them a more salient role (see previous section). 
 
Figure 16 Number of organisations referring to the EU´s 
disconnection with the public 
 
The organisations or at least the members of the organisations managing 
European affairs here are not part of the general publics‘ but elite 
organisations aiming at directly influence EU and Spanish politics. 
Nevertheless, or precisely because of this, these organisations are 
sensitive to the lack of a European public space and public opinion. In 
particular some of them argue that this is negative for the interests that 
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they represent, in that public opinion cannot control the activity of the EU 
and this grants elites increased autonomy. 
It is thus paradoxical that when asked about the reasons for this lack of 
interest organisations tend to reproduce the Spanish political elites 
consensus that EU topics are the domain of specialists, too technical and 
too distant from citizens concerns (Closa Montero 2004, 328). In this 
sense these organisations‘ favourable attitude towards EU political 
integration does not challenge the Spanish traditionally consensual 
approach to EU integration (Closa Montero 2004; León, Mateo Díaz, and 
Meseguer 2004). Their approach thus seems consist to in complementing 
the traditional elite consensus by a general public‘s consensus via far 
reaching information campaigns (see next chapter). As an example 
ACSUR argues that ―you cannot share what you do not understand‖ 
(ACSUR las Segovias, 2). None of these organisations associate the high 
abstention rate to the lack of real debate caused by consensual 
approaches. 
Table 29 EU affairs are technical and complicated 
Name References 
ACSUR las Segovias paper 1 
Interview 38 - FCCE 3 
Interview 39 - Convención catalana 2 
Interview 44 - CJE 2 
Manifiesto grupo contacto sociedad civil española paper 1 
 
3.2. A Europeanised debate in France 
In contrast with Spain, most of the French organisations consider that the 
debate, despite obvious national political influences, focused on the EU. 
That said most of the organisations agree that, despite the ―exegesis 
strategy‖ of focusing on details of the Treaty that was developed by 
several no campaigners (see next chapter), the debates focused on the EU 
in general rather than on concrete aspects of the Treaty. This implies that 
citizens used the referendum on the Constitution to express concerns 
about different European issues such as enlargement, values and 
economic policies (Maatsch 2007; Seidendorf 2010). This is in agreement 
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with Glencross and Tresschel‘s (2011) comparative and quantitative 
analysis finding that voters‘ attitudes towards the EU are a stronger 
predictor of their ballot than their position on internal politics. 
French organisations‘ position papers and interviews reveal a strong 
disconnection between the debate in the Convention and the national one 
in that the Convention and the Constitution tried to foster innovations 
(CFSP, voting system adapted to enlargement, more democracy, 
fundamental rights) whereas the general public debate focused on the 
past of the EU and its current functioning. Ironically interviewees consider 
that the only aspect on the future of the EU that was addressed in this 
debate was the accession of Turkey to the EU (Goulard 2004; Maatsch 
2007; Tekin 2008). 
The question of democratic deficit, which was relatively important though 
far from decisive (Chopin 2008), contributed to frame the EU as generally 
distant from ordinary citizens and their preferences. This may have 
contributed to focusing the debate on the constitution‘s Part III31 and in 
general EU economic policies, by pointing out that those were absolutely 
out of people‘s control. The first point to be mentioned is that several 
organisations consider that Part III should have not been included in the 
text. 
―We wrote somewhere that the formulation [of article 3 on EU 
objectives] was rather positive. But once you dug into the 
Constitution‘s third part, you only found free and undistorted 
competition. It was very narrow and to be applied to public services 
and overruled anything else, all the values in a sense.‖ (interview 
47 with a representative of CGT). 
The fact that part III had not really been debated by the Convention 
caused organisations to be even more critical of the Convention and the 
constitution (see previous chapter). Secondly, organisations point out that 
the debate on the TCE was totally influenced by the adoption of the 
Bolkenstein directive on services liberalisation and the Commission‘s 
                                       
31 Part III included most the community acquis and provided the general orientation and decision 
making procedures for EU policies. Both domains have a strong economic content as a result of the 
EU’s functionalist and teleological approach.  
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liberal attitude. In this sense, it was easy to argue that the TCE and the 
EU in general were contributing to erode social rights in France (CGT, 
Fondation Copernic, ATTAC). 
So the debate started in November, and it was not about the Treaty 
but about the impact of the services directive in France. It was like 
―we have to stop the services directive so we have to say no‖. 
(Interview 28 with a representative of MEDEF). 
This confirms that EU topics are not so distant for national publics, since a 
topic which was under discussion in Brussels was used to portray the 
policies of the EU as liberal and to suggest that this was the model that 
the TCE was promoting. 
―In France Europe is not a minor social subject, you know that? It is 
even... I don‘t know if you remember that, but there was the 
debate on the Bolkenstein directive, and that was really a major 
questioning... It was a way to introduce competition between 
workers and service-providers.‖ (interview 47 with a representative 
of CGT). 
In a sense, the arguments of the promoters of the ―yes‖ somehow 
reinforced these arguments, since they insisted that Part III was mostly 
currently enforced acquis (Fondation Schuman, Maison de l‘Europe, LDH). 
This somehow reinforced the critical focus of the opponents of the Treaty 
on the EU policies since those, the promoters of the yes somehow implied, 
would not be changed by the Constitution.  
―So the tragedy, and I insist, the tragedy was to collate this third 
part, which raised stakes and reduced support for the project. We 
had lots of questions and there was as usual a problem of 
communication. […] For instance, the [EU institutions] Paris office 
sent us a leaflet without any reference to Part III. Why? We don‘t 
know, they may have thought ―it‘s too complicated, citizens won‘t 
understand anything‖. So finally citizens said ―what‘s this whole 
mess about? Why are there different versions?‖ So when they 
received the text it was of course impossible to read when you don‘t 
have 10 years of university training, which I don‘t myself have.‖ 
(interview 50 with a representative of Maison de l‘Europe) 
Otherwise, the fact that the Treaty included Part II on fundamental rights 
was generally perceived as a positive point, although the CGT and the 
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LDH tended to say that it had been watered down and was subject to the 
EU‘s liberal policies. 
On a detail note, it is interesting to point out that the only organisation 
which refers to one of the elements of the Convention‘s justificatory 
frames, the need to simplify the EU‘s basic law to make it more readable 
and understandable by citizens, was the business organisation MEDEF.  
4. Discussion: civil society and the relations between different 
publics 
This chapter has suggested that European civil society organisations did 
not significantly contribute to the diffusion of the participatory democracy 
frame to member organisations or the general publics. They were not 
significantly involved in the national debates either by participating 
directly or by promoting the Constitution towards their own members. 
This is linked to the two main factors. The first one is that the Convention 
was not an exception to the well documented distance between European 
umbrella organisations and their members (Warleigh 2001; Sudbery 
2003; Mahoney 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010b). In this sense, and as 
Monaghan (2007) has pointed out in relation to the notion of 
representation by civil society in the Convention, European organisations 
could not fully act for their members and made it clear that their positions 
on the text would not necessarily be shared by their members. 
Furthermore it seems that in relation to participatory democracy the 
―downward facing‖ communication was even weaker than it is suggested 
by Monaghan, since members seemed to be simply not interested in this 
topic.  
Secondly, in addition to the difficulty of communicating with and 
anticipating their members‘ positions, organisations could not compensate 
for this by participating directly in the general publics debates on the 
constitution. This seems to be in line with previous research pointing out 
the parsimony of these organisations in relation to public opinion, which is 
often attributed to a lack of resources or to preferences for insider 
collective action registers (Balme and Chabanet 2008). This chapter‘s 
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findings suggest that in the case of the ratification debates the main 
reason for their non involvement has to do with their relative difficulty to 
address horizontal issues, and in particular of their rejection to engage in 
political and ideological debates. Although interviewees often claim that 
civil society organisations are not political parties, the distinction between 
the state and civil society does not necessarily configure it as a 
depoliticised field (J. Cohen and Arato 1992; Vázquez García 2010). The 
debate on the politicisation of the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009; 
Papadopoulos and Magnette 2010; De Wilde 2011) points that 
politicisation is often the result of activism among others of civil society, 
such as nationally based organisations, of which the Convention was an 
example (see chapter 7). The emergence of a more politicised European 
public sphere would put off European organisations.  
Finally, European civil society organisations tend to adhere to the idea 
that the national debate was strongly disconnected from the debate in the 
EU and substantially influenced by national politics. In this sense they did 
not believe that there was a substantial national debate, which implies 
that they did not perceive any significant role for civil society in putting 
these debates in a European frame. This contradicts strongly with recent 
studies which see civil society activism as an important factor in the 
framing of European debates (Dufour 2010; Seidendorf 2010). It shows a 
very great difference with the appreciation of French organisations. 
In this sense the chapter has shown as well two very different perceptions 
of the debates by national organisations. Spanish organisations shared the 
EU‘s frame about the contribution of civil society to the democratisation of 
the EU, but did not appreciate any significant European dimension in the 
national debate. On the other hand French organisations were very distant 
from the Constitution‘s discourse on democracy since they did not 
appreciate real opportunities for citizens‘ participation in particular in 
matters related to the EU‘s economic model, although they perceived a 
real ownership of European issues by citizens‘ in the national debate. 
This suggests that Spanish and French organisations had very different 
roles in the public sphere. Spanish organisations behaved as European 
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specialised publics but did not see a real diffusion of the Constitution, 
whereas French organisations took their distances with the Convention but 
saw a strong empowerment of national publics. In this sense it is essential 
to ask how these perceptions related to their own roles during the 
debates, with particular attention to the question of their activism and 
contacts with general publics. This is done in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Civil society and the framing of the 
debate. Opportunities for entrepreneurs 
It is common to suggest a positive correlation between associative density 
or individual participation in voluntary organisations and a stronger 
citizens‘ socio-political participation (Balme and Chabanet 2008, 69; 
Vázquez García 2010), although the causal link of this relation is 
discussed (Van Der Meer and Van Ingen 2009). However the structure of 
the public space and the financial dependence on the EU institutions 
(Sánchez-Salgado 2007a) do not guarantee that the participation of 
European civil society organisations automatically leads to a stronger 
participation by citizens (Sudbery 2003; Mahoney 2008a; Kohler-Koch 
2010b). This chapter explores the role of civil society organisations in the 
ratification debates in Spain and France (February and May 2005) and 
analyses whether national organisations, in principle closer to the citizens, 
contributed to making the public aware of the debate on participatory 
democracy in the EU. 
This is precisely the focus of this chapter, that is, whether and how 
organisations contributed to diffuse the frame about participatory 
democracy in the national debate. It is important to consider that this 
does not only mean diffusing and communicating the European frame but 
to analyse its adaptation to the national context and the way in which 
organisations promoted citizens‘ participation in the national debate. In 
this sense it is important to recall here Monaghan‘s analysis of the three 
roles civil society can play in promoting participation, representation and 
communication (Monaghan 2007).  
1. The role of Spanish and French civil society in national debates 
on the European Constitution 
Although relatively little is known about the role of civil society in framing 
these national debates, the role of Spanish and French civil society 
appears to be strongly differentiated. Whereas it has been pointed out 
that French civil society was important in mobilising public opinion against 
the Treaty (Dufour 2010; Seidendorf 2010), Spanish organisations are 
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generally credited with a modest role in this debate (León, Mateo Díaz, 
and Meseguer 2004). A traditional explanation for Spanish organisations‘ 
weak involvement with European affairs is a general weakness (Vázquez 
García 2010) which makes it impossible to devote resources to European 
affairs (Will et al. 2005, 23; Sánchez-Salgado 2007b). However it is not 
clear to what extent this differs with the French case, where French anti-
globalisation organisations seem to have played a critical role (Feron 
2006; Agrikoliansky 2007; Dufour 2010). In this sense it is worth pointing 
out that referenda are exceptional mobilisation opportunities. It is thus 
important to focus on more specific factors to explain the way in which 
civil society seized or did not seize opportunities of mobilisation in the 
wake of the referendum and whether Spanish organisations‘ role was as 
modest as it is generally thought of. 
 
The political opportunity structure does not seem to be a fundamental 
difference between the two countries. Both countries‘ referenda have been 
considered as a way for national governments to use European affairs to 
reinforce themselves (Mateo Gonzalez 2008, 134–137; Sauger, Brouard, 
and Grossman 2007). A priori the political landscape was very similar as 
the main parties leaned towards the yes side and the no side being 
supported by minoritarian organisations although it must be borne in mind 
that the French Socialist Party had a large dissenting current. The biggest 
difference can be found in the domestic political cycle, to the extent that 
in 2005 Spain had a newly elected government after years of strong 
critical mobilisation of civil society during the last Aznar government (Font 
Fábregas and Rodríguez Ortiz 2007; Mateo Gonzalez 2008) while in 
France President Chirac was re-elected in 2002 in bizarre political 
circumstances32 and had an unpopular government (Sauger, Brouard, and 
Grossman 2007). 
Moreover, although when the decision to call for a referendum was taken 
there were no significant differences in public opinion towards the EU 
between both countries, some differences in the political culture may have 
                                       
32
 Reelected with 82% of the votes against the extreme right Front National candidate Jean-Marie le 
Pen.  
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had an influence. In this sense it is clear that French political culture can 
be characterised by a more sustained distrust towards European 
integration (rejection of the EDC in the 50s, Gaullism and the empty chair 
crisis in the 60s, almost rejection of the Maastricht treaty in the 90s) than 
the Spanish one. A strong sensitivity towards the EU‘s democratic deficit 
among French public opinion is a notable feature of this issue (Chopin 
2008, 136).  
One of the effects of the extended usage of quantitative methodologies is 
that most of the available studies on Spanish and French debates about 
the European Constitution tend to pay little attention to the mechanisms 
by which these organisations act as mediators between the EU and the 
general public (Anduiza 2005; Lehingue 2007; Sauger, Brouard, and 
Grossman 2007; Mateo Gonzalez 2008). However Font Fábregas and 
Rodríguez Ortiz (2007) and Glencross and Trechsel (2011) have 
suggested that social and political actors‘ mobilisation should be analysed 
to understand evidences that attitudes towards the EU and the text were 
more decisive than national politics in the result of the vote. In this sense 
authors analysing national actors‘ mobilisation from a qualitative 
perspective (Maatsch 2007; Closa Montero 2008b; Seidendorf 2010; 
Dufour 2010) tend to point out to the importance of mobilisation in the 
construction of European frames in these referenda. The following sections 
try to explain why French civil society contributed strongly to challenge 
the political elites‘ consensus on the EU (Agrikoliansky 2007; Seidendorf 
2010; Dufour 2010) whereas Spanish organisations tended to share and 
reproduce it.  
2. Civil society organisations’ communication in the context of the 
national debates 
 
Since in the previous chapter it has appeared that European organisations 
had a very modest role in the national debates, this section will focus on 
the activism of national organisations.  
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2.1. Attempts to raise awareness: Spain 
Almost all the Spanish organisations declared that they had in a way or 
another engaged in campaigns on the constitution. The table below (30) 
shows that all of them organised public oriented events in the form of 
seminars or conferences as well as press and internet campaigns.  
Table 30 Actions of Spanish organisations during the ratification 
debates33 
Name Assemb
lies, 
fora 
and 
debates 
with 
other 
groups 
Demons
trations 
and 
contenti
ous 
action 
Intern
al 
deliber
ation 
Int
er
ne
t  
Press 
campa
ign - 
manife
stos 
Se
min
ars 
 
Sig
nat
ure  
ADICAE   X   X  
ATTAC X X  X  X  
Caritas 
Spain 
    X   
CCOO X  X     
CJE X  X X X X  
Conv. Cat.   X X  X  
FCCE   X  X X  
ONCE-
CEPES 
     X x 
RCE    X  X  
Ecologista
s en 
Acción 
 X    X  
This contrasts strongly with the difficulty of EU organisations to use 
outside lobbying (Monaghan 2007, 254; Mahoney 2008a). 
Notwithstanding Spanish organisations characterisation as specialised 
publics (see chapter 6), they are much more prone to engage the general 
publics‘ through contacts with the press, political parties and the ability to 
mobilise their members than European groups. In this sense they do not 
necessarily see a contradiction between their specialism and their possible 
impact on the public sphere: 
                                       
33 Organisations not declaring any type of action are not included 
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―It now looks as if parity democracy had been invented by 
Zapatero! Empty-talk socialists have never understood the 
importance of ―gender quality‖34. Look, it‘s not an issue of having 
more women, it is about the policy changes when a woman is in 
charge, right? So are we elitist? Well good, but we‘re there every 
day and if being there every day providing information is elitism...‖ 
(interview 24 with a representative of RCE) 
Interestingly, the same organisations that considered that the EU is still 
very much the domain of specialists (see table 29 in chapter 6) put a big 
emphasis on the need for civil society to contribute to a ―pedagogy‖ on 
European affairs and in particular on citizens‘ participation rights (see 
table 31 below). In this sense, it appears that Spanish civil society 
organisations engaged in a sort of vertical Europeanisation campaign. The 
following two quotes illustrate the way in which organisations tried to 
convey the message that the EU was no longer the domain of member 
states and specialists but that citizens ought to have a role: 
―Well, [laughing] the truth is that this campaign was a little risky. 
As we wanted to mobilize young people we hired a consultant to 
create a funny campaign. The center of the campaign was a can of 
energy drink called ―Referendum Plus‖. So the idea was that of an 
apathetic young person, ‗I couldn‘t care less, but when I drink 
―Referendum Plus‖ I want to participate, to vote, to change the 
society where I live and I want to be a participative citizen‘. And it 
was a very successful campaign, we got it on TV, we had 900 
young people handing out cans of drink, with a pamphlet on the 
Constitution across many Spanish cities. And the truth is it was a 
very interesting initiative, because it was from the point of view of 
young people, let's laugh at this too‖ (interview 44 with a 
representative of CJE) 
―Here we also saw the need to involve local administrations, in 
particular to launch a pedagogy at the local level explaining that 
Europe is not only money, no need to give it up either, but it is also 
a space to exchange ideas, to exchange people exchange mobility, 
see what they do, you copy what others do. I believe that this is 
important for people to see that Europe has an added value, not 
only in how many Euros.‖ (interview 38 with a representative of the 
FCCE) 
These two quotes provide a strong suggestion that the aim of several of 
the Spanish organisations was to convey a message similar to that of the 
                                       
34
 RCE uses the concept of gender quality to describe the qualitative changes in policy making when 
women get to positions of political responsibility.  
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Convention, that is, that the Constitution and the referendum were 
opportunities for citizens‘ participation in European affairs. These quotes 
suggest that for the organisations in table 31below participation was an 
end in itself, that is, communication should put emphasis on the 
importance of citizens‘ participation. This resonates very strongly with the 
Commission‘s Plan D rhetoric (European Commission 2005; Monaghan 
2007; Bee 2010).   
Table 31 Information and advocacy as political roles 
Name References 
Ecologistas en acción papers 2 
Interview 24 - RCE 8 
Interview 38 - FCCE 5 
Interview 39 - Catalan Convention 2 
Interview 44 - CJE 6 
Spanish Civil Society Contact Group Manifesto paper 2 
A possible answer to the contradiction between the technicality of 
European affairs and the will to inform citizens to promote their 
participation is provided by organisations who say that their public 
activities focused on issues of rights and interests of their constituency.  
―We focused on Europeans‘ fundamental rights, I think that the 
vote had to be on two issues. One was the inclusion of the 
fundamental rights of the Europeans. We had two days here at the 
association where we explained what the European Constitution 
was and what it had in relation to the rights of consumers. And the 
second was about their [consumers‘] participation. From two 
perspectives, the role of consumer groups in organised civil society 
and in more general terms of participation in decision making.‖ 
(interview 32 with a representative of ADICAE) 
Among more salient actions for the general public, organisations preferred 
press campaigns and internet networking, although probably this tool was 
not as influential in Spain in 2004-2005 as it may be today. Three rather 
left-oriented organisations participated in the European social forum and 
large assemblies, whereas demonstrations (even atypical and contentious 
ones) were used by organisations campaigning for the no. Finally a very 
large organisation such as ONCE engaged in a signature collection 
campaign during the Convention debate, although indirectly related to the 
constitution as it focused on specific rights questions.  
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However this did not seem to have had any significant influence on the 
content of the debates or in the result of the referendum as interviewees 
somehow contrast the intensity of their interest and involvement with 
their modest influence on public opinion. The opinion below on the modest 
role of Spanish organisations is shared by 4 interviewees, whereas only 
Ecologistas en Acción claimed to have influenced the result. 
―Look, there is a tradition here to say that civil society in general is 
well aware of European issues. I do not know. Hum... but on the 
day of the referendum in Catalonia I think participation was below 
the Spanish average. Why did this happen? A lack of interest? I do 
not know. A lack of knowledge?‖ (interview 39 with a representative 
of the Catalan Convention) 
In this sense it seems that Spanish organisations engaged in diffusion of 
the text, but that this was mainly done internally through discussion with 
their own members and little contact with the political debate. These sort 
of vertical campaigns are one model of how civil society could contribute 
to the emergence of a European public sphere. A possible alternative 
would be a contribution to the politicisation of the EU which is discussed in 
the following section. 
2.2. Civil society contribution to Europeanising debates in France 
Next to their influential involvement in the yes and no debate (Dufour 
2010) which is discussed in the next section, French civil society 
organisations played an important role in forms of activity that are 
political but not necessarily aimed at influencing the result of the vote, but 
rather to raise issues on the EU in the public space.  
Table 32 below suggests that alike their Spanish peers, French 
organisations engaged in what they call ―public instruction‖, that is, 
activities aimed at improving the citizens‘ knowledge on the Treaty. 
Virtually all the organisations organised public oriented events such as 
seminars and press campaigns. It is remarkable that given the high 
saliency that several interviewees attributed to internet in the negative 
result, very few French organisations declared having used this as a way 
of campaigning.  
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Table 32 Actions of national organisations during the ratification 
debates35 
Name Assemb
lies, 
fora 
and 
debates 
with 
other 
groups 
Demons
trations 
and 
contenti
ous 
action 
Intern
al 
deliber
ation 
Inter
net  
Press 
campai
gn - 
manifes
tos 
Semi
nars 
 
MEDEF      X 
Fondation 
Robert 
Schuman 
X 
 
 
 
X X 
CGT X  X   X 
LDH X  X   X 
Fondation 
Copernic 
X 
 
 
 
X X 
ATTAC X      
Maison de 
l'Europe 
X 
 
 
 
 X 
Mouveme
nt 
Initiative 
Citoyenne 
 
 
 
 
X  
French civil society organisations were involved, to different extents, in 
raising the interest of French citizens for the Treaty. A key difference 
between the French and the Spanish referenda, apart from the result, is 
the larger participation and the focus of the debate on EU affairs in 
France. Organisations insist on the role which they played in this 
achievement. In this sense the fact that the Treaty was read by ordinary 
citizens emerges as a key topic in interviews (Fondation Copernic, 
Fondation Robert Schuman, LDH, ATTAC). It is worth recalling the 
interviewees‘ amazement at this:  
―[...] I remember those meetings where I myself was amazed 
because people came with their Treaties. [...] And they had 
highlighted them in red and green!‖ (interview 49 with a 
representative of Fondation Copernic) 
                                       
35 Organisations not declaring any type of action are not included 
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"Something absolutely fantastic, unbelievable, happened. [pause]. 
People started talking about the treaties.‖ (interview 48 with a 
representative of LDH) 
 ―[...] the Treaty was actually read [...] and was given conflicting 
interpretations since the early days‖ (interview 45 with a 
representative of Fondation Robert Schuman) 
For the organisations that called for a no vote this was a decisive and 
absolutely unexpected achievement that can only be explained by the role 
played by civil society organisations (Dufour 2010). The Fondation 
Copernic is the organisation making this claim more clearly, arguing that 
the biggest strength of the promoters of the no vote is their epistemic 
superiority and their ability to dismantle their opponents‘ arguments by 
doing the exegesis of the text, which was acknowledged by some of the 
promoters of the yes.  
―I am convinced that it was possible to win, that the yes side could 
win on the condition of explaining very precisely to the public what 
was actually in the treaty. But the yes side was not able to do that 
because it was not sufficiently mobilised. Because most people had 
worked insufficiently on the text and they could not explain it.‖ 
(Interview 45 with a representative of the Fondation Robert 
Schuman) 
Although this vision probably exaggerates the importance of the 
discussion on the text, some of the other organisations point out that the 
debate was very much focused on the details of the text and that this 
process of detailed discussion was clearly going on during the debate. 
The fundamental difference with Spanish organisations is the stronger 
participation of French organisations in assemblies, fora and debates with 
other groups. To some extent this is the result of French anti-globalisation 
activism which contributed strongly to the European Social Forum held in 
Paris in 2003 (Feron 2006; Della Porta 2007; Agrikoliansky 2007). 
However, the most relevant aspect is that French organisations had a 
higher tendency to have recourse to debate than to internal deliberation 
or seminar style communication (see table 32 above). In this sense 
French organisations seem to have focused more strongly on the 
promotion of the discussion of the text than in the promotion of 
203 
 
participation. In this sense public instruction is not a form of pedagogy as 
for Spanish organisations but rather a way of doing politics in the sense 
that there was a relevant degree of confrontation among organisations 
with different visions of Europe and the purposes of participation. In this 
sense the political role of civil society is not only the diffusion of 
information as the Spanish organisations seemed to do but contributing to 
frame the national debate on the EU.  
―At the Foundation we discussed the question, and we decided to 
take a stand on this debate on the grounds that it was a political 
and not just a partisan debate. That is to say that our corporate 
purpose, as an organisation of public interest, is to promote 
discussion. We considered that advocating, assisting and producing 
arguments for a positive vote were among our missions. [...] We 
decided not to simply inform but to discuss, and we assumed that 
we had to [emphasizing] convince because the yes vote was not, 
that it was not a foregone conclusion. It's easy to say today but I 
can assure you that‘s what we thought then.‖ (interview 45 with a 
representative of the Fondation Schuman) 
Interviewees and documents are very explicit that there was a degree of 
competition among organisations for imposing the terms of the debate. 
Although it is not this thesis‘ aim to assess the eventual influence in the 
electoral process and result, it confirms Dufour‘s findings (2010) in that 
some of these organisations had an important role in setting the frames of 
the debate well before the election. In this sense the Fondation Copernic 
claims to be the first one in following and analysing the Convention and 
constitution systematically. A similar thing was done by the Fondation 
Robert Schuman, although the interviewee considered it a failure because 
of their inability to address politics or to consider seriously the possibility 
that the Treaty would be rejected. The importance of ATTAC and the 
Fondation Copernic in setting the terms of the debate and influencing 
other organisations is acknowledged by several other organisations like 
the Fondation Robert Schuman, Maison de l‘Europe and the CGT, as well 
as strongly claimed by the Fondation Copernic interviewee and more 
reluctantly by ATTAC‘s.  
―Regardless of content, something where, beyond all the reasons 
we have discussed, where supporters of the yes were beaten is that 
very soon, it was the supporters of the no who imposed the terms 
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of the debate. And the supporters of the yes were constantly in the 
need of responding, they were on a defensive stance.‖ (Interview 
45 with a representative of the Fondation Schuman) 
It thus seems that French organisations contributed to elaborate a frame 
at the national level where the debate about the EU acquired a clearer 
political dimension than the political parties‘. Whereas large political 
parties agreed on the need to ratify the Constitution to simplify decision 
making in an enlarged EU and to allow it acquire a more coherent foreign 
policy, civil society contributed to re-politicise the debate by focusing on 
socio-economic issues and on the political model of the EU (see chapter 6 
on the content of the debate). Their promotion of debates on these issues 
that political parties and promoters of the yes had avoided had certainly 
an effect on the final vote (Dufour 2010). 
3. Civil society as a promoter of citizens participation  
It has been suggested that Spanish and French organisations had a 
different approach to their role in communicating about the Constitution in 
that Spanish organisations focused on the diffusion of the idea that the 
Constitution was an opportunity for stronger citizens‘ participation 
whereas French organisations focused on a stronger citizens‘ appropriation 
of the EU and the text by debating it. This is related to differences in each 
country‘s organisations stance in politics and their differing abilities to 
foster and frame citizens‘ participation, including their own members 
which are analysed in this section. 
3.1. Spain: civil society apolitical stance 
The weakness and thin participatory structure of most organisations 
(Vázquez García 2010) together with the low saliency and consensual 
nature of EU affairs in the Spanish public space (Closa Montero 1999; 
Closa Montero 2004; Ruiz Jimenez and Egea de Haro 2011) probably 
inhibited organisations from playing a more salient role in the debate 
(León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004; Will et al. 2005). 
205 
 
To start with the weaknesses, the two civil servants interviewed 
(interviews 34 and 39) challenge civil society organisations‘ internal 
deliberation and argue that in general decisions related to the EU are 
made by a small number of experienced members of the staff. Whereas 
this may obviously be related to civil servants distance from civil society 
and to a measure of distrust towards participatory democracy, this is 
strongly confirmed by the acknowledgement by 6 interviewees that their 
organisations‘ interest on participation in the EU is very much the result of 
their own individual internal activism for the organisation to consider EU 
affairs. Chapter 5 suggested a sort of trade off between involvement in 
the Convention and in the national debate. In this sense the difficulty or 
lack of will to make members participate in EU-related decisions fostered 
a preference by organisations to be active in the Convention. Since most 
Spanish organisations were satisfied with the result of the Convention and 
the ratification of the Constitution seemed granted, they had few 
incentives to mobilise their own members on this point. 
Secondly, it appears that Spanish organisations were not able to address 
the national debate from a political perspective. It is clear that most of the 
organisations that tried to do a campaign on the Constitution avoided any 
possible politicisation. In this sense it is noticeable that few of the 
organisations favourable to the Treaty did actually call for a favourable 
vote (CCOO and RCE), although a positive approach is clear in several 
campaigns, for instance in the case of the CJE. This is particularly clear in 
the case of Catalan organisations, which were quite active but careful to 
avoid politics, since the political debate on the ratification of the text was 
particularly sensitive in the Catalan party-system. It is noticeable that the 
FCCE which regrouped about 200 Catalan civil society organisations 
claimed that it gathered unanimity among members who may then have 
adopted different positions in the referendum. This is quite illustrative of a 
general tendency of Spanish civil society whose actions sought to 
communicate and provide information rather than to take sides. In such 
an approach coming together in broad platforms and activities is a way to 
replace the deepness of collaboration by breadth. This may explain the 
much higher tendency of Spanish organisations to network with each 
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other than it was the case of French organisations (see figure 13 in 
chapter 5). Additionally reports by five organisations of their strong 
dependence on national or EU institutions approval and support for 
conducting public campaigns can contribute to explain this rather neutral 
approach. In this sense the almost comical superficiality of the above 
mentioned ―Referendum Plus‖ energy drink campaign by the CJE can only 
be explained by this organisation‘s dependence on public funds. This 
favoured that their campaign could benefit from significant resources (900 
leaflets distributors) but had a very shallow political message.  
It could be argued as several interviewees did that it is necessary to adopt 
a Gramscian distinction between civil and political society (J. Cohen and 
Arato 1992) and that it cannot be expected that civil society organisations 
behave like political parties in taking sharp ―yes‖ and ―no‖ stances. In this 
sense, a few moves towards a ―simplification‖ of EU issues via a political 
rather than a neutral approach to the text can be reported. In this sense 
they prove that the non partisan nature of civil society organisations does 
not necessarily mean being neutral to political values and sensitivities. In 
the Spanish context the most noticeable approach of this kind was the 
Spanish civil society contact group regrouping among others ACSUR, CJE, 
and CCOO which produced a manifesto articulating a progressive view of 
the EU. Despite being a broad addendum of their main concerns (gender 
issues, labour and fiscal law convergence, participatory democracy, public 
services) the manifesto is quite far from being consensual and argues for 
the need of a stronger politicisation of the EU. That said this coalition 
seems to have been quite irrelevant in the debate since it was only 
pointed out by one of the four interviewees, although it shows that 
organisations with similar positions tended to cooperate intensely. The 
analysis of the network confirms this by indicating that ACSUR, CJE and 
CCOO had a unique pattern of relations between each other (a clique). 
A second form of political activism by civil society organisations was the 
attempt to download the new participatory democracy frame to the 
Spanish context in particular regarding civil dialogue at the national level 
(Catalan Convention, the Contact Group of Spanish civil society, Caritas 
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and EAPN) confirming the hopes of some European organisations about 
the extension of the European model of structured dialogue with civil 
society to the national context (see chapter 6 section 1). Although this 
approach may not be very relevant in terms of dissemination of debates 
about the EU in the public space, it may have contributed to structuring 
better the relationship between the authorities and Spanish civil society 
through the reform of institutionalised dialogue taking place in the 
National Council of social action NGOs. Although no mention to a causal 
relationship between the two events was made, some interviewees note 
that the debate on the European Constitution contributed to a better 
coordination of civil society organisations in Spain (EAPN Spain, Caritas). 
Finally, the most relevant example of the politicization of civil society 
activism was the emergence of a coalition for the "no". This coalition, far 
from massive, was articulated by Ecologists in Action, the more active 
actor among the organisations not involved in the Convention. The 
arguments of the coalition - which considered that the Constitution turned 
the EU into a military superpower willing to apply the American doctrine 
on "preemptive strikes" - and the membership of various anti-war 
organisations suggests that this coalition built on the social movement 
against the Iraq war in 2002-2003, in the same way that the French no 
coalition had links to protests in the late 90s (Dufour 2010, p.432). The 
other important member of this coalition despite not having played a role 
as strong as in France was ATTAC which contributed to organise 
demonstrations and protest activities (table 30) and spread the movement 
through contacts with other organisations (figure 13, chapter 5). The 
arguments of ATTAC and Ecologistas an Acción suggest a strong 
replication of the French no campaign, both because of the content and 
the similarity with the ―exegesis strategy‖. The explanation for this 
mobilization draws on a typical logic of social movements in that the 
unanimity of major social and political forces left a void space that could 
be filled by relatively weak organisations. The organisations themselves 
acknowledge that their movement must be understood in the broader 
context of movements for an alternative globalization. 
 
208 
 
Although the movement did not turn the tide against the Treaty, the 
referendum contributed to organisation of critical movements about the 
EU in Spain. This is a minor victory claimed by the organisers of this now 
campaign: 
 
―The percentage of negative votes for the treaty evolved from 5% 
at the beginning of the campaign to 17% at the end. We consider 
that the campaigns of criticism of the current European Union in 
which Ecologists in Action has been active are decisive for this 
increase in percentage of negative votes‖ (Ecologistas en Acción 
2005). 
 
3.2. France: alternative ways of politics 
The contrast between Spain and France is particularly strong when it 
comes to the ability of civil society organisations to foster their members‘ 
participation, both in internal debates and in the public sphere. 
It is very important to point out that for some organisations there is a 
clear evolution towards scepticism on the Treaty which is the result of 
internal debate and participation in different fora of debate, in particular 
the Paris Social Forum. The CGT is not the only case of an organisation 
which had an internal debate on the Constitution (LDH and MEDEF had 
internal discussions about whether taking sides), but is certainly the most 
significant one. The interviewee pointed out that the organisation has 
traditionally been extremely reluctant towards European integration. 
Although positions have evolved slightly, this has left a rather anti-EU 
attitude in its members. The debate on the EU constitution was seized by 
the direction of the CGT as an opportunity to be involved in EU affairs and 
change this culture. Whereas the direction would have liked to follow the 
process without formally demanding a yes or no vote, the internal debate 
showed that grassroots members were strongly opposed to the Treaty and 
forced the organisation to launch a campaign against it. This suggests 
quite a strong distance between organisations and members on EU topics. 
This may be a substantive distance, or rather reflect the difficulty to relate 
organisations‘ activity in the EU with their grassroots members.  
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Table 33: Distance between organisations' EU activities and 
grassroots members 
Orgs. and data Number of 
references 
Nodes - reasons 
MEDEF 1 Difficult to get 
members interested 
by EU matters 
CGT – (intw 48 
and position 
papers) 
1 Difficult to get 
members interested 
by EU matters 
LDH 3 Brussels 
organisations are 
distant, dependent 
on EU funding and 
fragile 
Fondation 
Copernic 
1 Difficult to get Trade 
Union members 
interested by EU 
matters 
Additionally organisations point out to the lack of resources (Union du 
Grand Commerce de Centre-Ville, LDH) and of citizens‘ interest for EU 
topics as other key difficulties to address EU affairs (Fondation Copernic, 
CGT and Maison de l‘Europe). 
In this sense French organisations consider it natural to play a role during 
the national debate, which they tend to link to the way in which they 
conceive themselves. In this sense, some organisations consider their 
mission to bring citizens closer to the EU (Fondation Robert Schuman and 
Maison de l‘Europe), others consider that the topic does necessarily 
influence their own domain of activity (AFEM, LDH, CGT and MEDEF) 
whereas others consider that it is via national debate that they can 
contribute to shaping the EU (ATTAC, Fondation Copernic). This will have 
a major influence on the role they will play in the debate. In this sense 
organisations who consider their role to get citizens interested in the EU 
will launch a campaign for the yes, those who see the EU as an important 
question for their own primary role will try to stay away from the debate 
whereas the last ones will call for the ―No‖ in order for citizens to be 
heard. In this sense it is clear that although not all the organisations took 
yes /no position, civil society organisations decisively contributed to the 
politicisation of the debate via different ways of doing politics like exerting 
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influence on other organisations, by contributing to construct arguments 
and in particular by raising awareness on the EU. 
It is clear that organisations‘ decision to be involved in the debate is 
clearly linked to their own self-conception. In this sense the two business 
organisations who define themselves as interest representatives did not 
take part in any campaign during the referendum, although the MEDEF 
contributed to raising awareness by providing regular information to 
companies on the Treaty. The organisations whose field of activity is 
affected by EU integration tried to avoid partisan campaigns and in 
particular calling for a vote in the referendum, but they contributed to 
raising awareness in particular by mobilising their own organisations. As it 
was said above, these decisions were not always easy, since internal 
pressures existed for organisations to take sides. The organisations that 
took sides for or against have EU integration as one of their main 
concerns be it because they promote it as a cause or because they are in 
favour of a different course for European integration and globalisation. 
Table 34: Civil society in the YES / NO debate 
Name References Coverage 
Fondation 
Copernic 
11 Civil society can participate in politics, call 
citizens to vote (NO), Influence on other 
organisations, construction of a no coalition 
Fondation 
Robert 
Schuman 
6 Civil society can participate in political choices, 
call citizens to vote (YES), 
LDH 1 Internal debates contributed to contestation 
CGT 2 construction of a no coalition, taking sides, call 
citizens to vote (NO), 
MEDEF 3 No interest in politics 
CCCV 1 No interest in politics 
One of the ways in which organisations did contribute to the politicisation 
of the debate is by influencing different organisations. It is the Fondation 
Copernic which claims more clearly an influence on different 
organisations, and particularly on trade unions. Interestingly, this 
corresponds with the impression of the interviewee from the CGT, who 
considers that political parties and other organisations had a bigger 
influence on TU militants than the direction of the organisation. 
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Interestingly, the only organisation that seems comfortable with its links 
with political parties is the Fondation Copernic. Although French 
organisations had an important political role, they reject traditional 
politics, and tend to criticise NGOs being very close to political parties 
(Maison de l‘Europe and significantly CGT, traditionally linked to the 
French Communist Party). Another important finding is that there was 
very little official coordination between different civil society sectors, in 
particular those that usually consult each other (Trade Unions and 
Business Organisations). 
Data about the organisations collective action (see for instance figure 13 
in chapter 5) confirm that the 2003 Paris Social Forum was an important 
meeting point for activists and for debate between groups promoting 
alternative views on the EU (Akrigoliansky 2007).  
Table 35 Participation in new international networks 
Orgs. and data Number of references Nodes - reasons 
ATTAC 
 
2 Joint campaign with 
other European 
ATTACs, Participation 
in 2003 Paris social 
Forum 
CGT – (intw 48 and 
position papers) 
4 Contacts with national 
organisations, new 
international networks, 
Participation in 2003 
Paris social Forum 
LDH 2 Contacts with national 
organisations, 
Participation in 2003 
Paris social Forum 
Fondation Copernic 3 Member of ERC, new 
European networks , 
Participation in 2003 
Paris social Forum 
MIC 1 Member of ERC 
Although far from being massive, some interviewees noticed that the 
European Convention confirmed the emergence of new actors in the EU 
civil society field, in that it was becoming more competitive because of the 
participation of new actors (Maison de l‘Europe, LDH):  
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―Just then comes a time, with the charter of fundamental rights, a 
time when we will be in these networks and at the same time other 
civil society organisations will come into the background so to 
speak. Including national organisations.‖ (Interview 48 with a 
representative of the LDH) 
The main forms of such activism consisted in being in touch with European 
coalitions such as the European Referendum Campaign (ERC) launched by 
IRI Europe or the Social Fora and to liaise directly with European peers 
like other trade Unions or other relevant alternative European groups like 
ATTAC. That said, the Fondation Copernic and MIC tend to acknowledge 
the shallowness of the cooperation in the ERC.  
4. Civil society and frame diffusion at national level 
Chapter 6 showed that French organisations saw the national public space 
as the natural context of their action, whereas Spanish organisations were 
more strongly involved in EU venues and networks. In this chapter this 
chapter has shown that similar awareness raising campaigns by Spanish 
and civil society organisations had very different results. Spanish 
organisations acknowledge that they had very little influence on the 
general public whereas French organisations tend to claim a stronger 
effect in particular by successfully framing the Treaty within the EU 
economically liberal policies (Dufour 2010) although civil society 
involvement does not in itself explain the different focus of debate in both 
countries.  
Whereas unexpected in the aftermath to the Convention (Radaelli and 
Lucarelli 2004, 9), these results are to a large extent aligned with studies 
indicating the importance of considering activism (Hooghe and Marks 
2009), including civil society‘s (Agrikoliansky 2007; Seidendorf 2010; 
Dufour 2010), when seeking to explain public space dynamics in national 
debates on the European Union. It also confirms the importance of 
organisations, in the case of this chapter French ones in particular but not 
only, in the development of a political vision of the European Union 
challenging the national political elites‘ vision (Dufour 2010). In this 
sense, it seems especially important to consider the politicisation of the 
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political frames of reference to understand the emergence of European 
issues in the national context (Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
When it comes to influence, it appears that Spanish organisations tended 
to reproduce political elites‘ conception of the EU as a technical domain 
where citizens‘ had to acquire a bigger role by providing them sufficient 
information to share EU consensuses allowing them to participate. In this 
sense, Spanish organisations share an almost reverential fear of politics, 
which invited them to play a minor role in the campaign. On the other 
hand French organisations seemed much more eager to challenge political 
elites‘ consensus both by promoting debate on different topics and 
providing an alternative political framing for the referendum and by 
directly intervening in the political debate against or for the Constitution. 
This does not challenge previous findings on the weakness of Spanish civil 
society in the national debate in contrast with the strong participation by 
French organisations, although it clearly shows that these differences are 
not due to un-involvement (León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004; Will et 
al. 2005), but to the choice of the forms of participation in these debates.  
The Convention‘s potential for mediation between the EU and national civil 
society (Monaghan 2007) was hampered by the dichotomy between the 
ability to influence European decision making and difficulties of being in 
touch with members and supporters regarding their participation in 
European discussions. The fact that the strongest promotion of 
participation in debates on the EU was not achieved by Spanish 
organisations which shared most strongly the EU‘s participatory 
democracy frame but rather by distant French organisations is another 
form of disconnection between the Convention and national debates. 
Whereas Spanish organisations focused on the significance of the 
constitutional moment for citizens and civil society‘s role, French 
organisations focused their attention on the opportunity to discuss the EU 
as such, including its economic ―acquis‖. 
This finding is very significant as it does not challenge the utility of civil 
society participation for the emergence of a public sphere. In this sense 
the disconnection between participatory democracy and the referenda 
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confirms the significance of the missing gap between specialised and 
general publics (Eriksen 2007). Yet, this chapter suggests that civil society  
organisations were vectors of citizens‘ participation and in this sense 
contributed both to the diffusion of political frames for debating the EU 
among general publics and to the diffusion of the importance of citizens‘ 
involvement. In this sense it appears that a frame on citizens‘ 
participation emerged at the national level, although not necessarily as a 
result of the diffusion of the EU frame but rather the autonomous 
extension and re-appropriation of this frame by national organisations. 
However this would have probably not happened without the importance 
of this question in the Convention, which is to a large extent due to 
European organisations. It thus seems that frame circulation can happen 
without a direct contact in a similar way in which the promoters of the ECI 
could benefit from the Convention‘s reframing of civil society consultation 
as participatory democracy (see chapter 3). In this sense the circulation of 
the idea of the importance of participation among different European 
publics seems to be related to the existence of venues allowing the 
expression of these publics, rather than to very close contacts between 
different publics. 
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Chapter 8: Civil society and the European 
public sphere 
This chapter summarises the thesis findings in order to address the 
questions raised in chapter 1 and to elaborate on the question of how 
different European publics communicate.  
1. Replicability and generalisation 
The findings of the thesis have to be handled carefully when it comes to 
generalising them because of the way in which the sample of observation 
was created. In this sense a researcher choosing a random sample or 
studying all the contributions of civil society organisations (for instance via 
quantitative text analysis techniques) would likely find a much weaker 
focus on issues of participation regulation and delimitation.  
 
In this sense the thesis cannot conclude that its findings are extensive to 
all civil society organisations. However, it can soundly assess the practices 
of those organisations that were more strongly involved in the debates 
and can thus come to a general conclusion about what the specialised 
actors that intervened on the debate on participatory democracy between 
1997 and 2003 were trying to achieve, and what was their impact on 
Spanish and French organisations and indirectly in these countries‘ 
ratification debates.  
 
Thus the main elements of the analysis can be generalised to contribute to 
a better understanding of the rationales behind civil society 
institutionalisation strategies, the dynamics and obstacles in the 
communication between civil society activism in different spaces of the 
public sphere and to the political effect of these dynamics. 
2. The institutionalisation of civil society consultation 
Overall, the findings of this thesis do not challenge two important 
considerations about the register of collective action of European civil 
society organisations. Firstly, they confirm these organisations‘ general 
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difficulty to communicate with and make members participate (Warleigh 
2001; Armstrong 2002; Sudbery 2003; Mahoney 2008a; Kohler-Koch 
2010a). Secondly it has found that regular involvement, reputation, 
participation in coalitions and trust with policy makers are the most 
relevant factors for influencing agenda setting (Quittkat and Kotzian 2011; 
Greenwood 2011b) and favour organisations using insider registers over 
those more prone to mobilise citizens (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Liebert 
2011). Despite confirming well known tendencies these findings are 
relevant because the Convention was a relatively unusual setting, as it 
was a new and salient venue. This, together with stronger competition 
resulting from pan-European civil society mobilisation (Kværk 2007), 
could have provided the conditions for a stronger recourse by civil society 
organisations to public opinion mobilisation (Della Porta 2007). The 
prevalence of insider registers as the most relevant influence strategy is 
an important parameter when assessing the activism of civil society 
organisations in the European public sphere.  
 
That said three findings that differ or add to the literature on EU civil 
society and the Convention have been made. Firstly, the thesis confirms 
the importance of venue change (Princen 2009) by pointing out the 
ductility of the frame used by organisations in terms of its adaptation to 
what they perceived could be more acceptable for institutions in each 
situation. This shows a remarkable degree of flexibility by organisations to 
adapt their demands and ways of advocacy to different settings. Secondly, 
civil society organisations were able to navigate between competitive 
pressures by different social institutional actors, such as those exerted by 
the social partners, the EESC and different services or DGs of the 
Commission, as political opportunity structures for achieving the 
institutionalisation of civil dialogue. The third relevant finding is that 
despite the stability of the collective action register, the Convention was 
not an exclusive field for European organisations (Shaw, Hoffman, and 
Bausili 2003; León, Mateo Díaz, and Meseguer 2004) but rather for 
organisations able to mobilise valuable resources at the EU level. 
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2.1. Agenda setting and European politics 
As expected by the first hypothesis raised in chapter 1 the analysis of the 
agenda setting process has found that the introduction of an article on 
participatory democracy in the European constitution is directly related to 
the activism of civil society in the consultations on civil dialogue ahead of 
the Convention.  
 
The strongest evidence of this connection is that the Convention satisfied 
the core demand of these organisations throughout this process: a legal 
recognition of civil society‘s role in the EU policy-making system. The 
connection between the Convention‘s recognition and the previous agenda 
setting is clear because of the continuity of the frame, civil society 
consultation as participatory democracy and of the key actors in that 
almost a third of the organisations that took the floor in the Convention‘s 
civil society plenary hearing had been strongly involved in the agenda 
setting process. 
 
This is relatively surprising as the hypothesis in relation to the changing 
venues was that this would favour the diversity of actors and of frames. It 
has however appeared that this was only true for the 2002 consultation, 
as the proximity of the minimal rules for consultation to the better 
regulation package favoured a stronger presence of business 
organisations and a degree of reframing of participation for output 
legitimacy (chapter 2). However, the remarkable aspect is that the core 
organisations and demands remain stable and that it is the way in which 
those are framed which vary. Furthermore, there is a general 
consolidation of the participatory democracy frame along the process. In 
this sense, the most strongly emerging frame is that of citizens‘ 
participation and participatory democracy. The frame clearly seeks to turn 
mechanisms of consultation from an emphasis on expertise and to some 
extent communication to the idea that those are opportunities for citizens‘ 
participation and part of a participatory democracy model. 
 
Most significantly, this is a collective frame in the sense that it is not 
merely the result of organisations‘ reaction to their perception of 
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institutions‘ expectation but rather an element of a collective action 
strategy. As it was expected, organisations advocating similar positions 
tended to form coalitions and act together. In this sense it has been found 
that there is a very strong correlation between discursive references to 
civil society participation as a form of participatory democracy and 
membership of the Social Platform and the CSCG. Furthermore, all the 
organisations at the core of the network of groups active on civil dialogue 
shared this emerging frame. It is thus quite clear that civil society 
organisations perceived that the Commission intended to use existing 
mechanisms in order to reinforce input legitimacy and that they turned 
this into an opportunity structure to obtain its recognition. This collided 
with the interests of other actors of the policy-making process. The 
evolution of the frame and the convergence of different organisations 
around it tend to suggest as well that the frame formation and 
convergence is strongly related to the formation of an organisational field 
of civil society participation. 
 
2.2. The political opportunity structure for civil dialogue 
institutionalisation 
The thesis has provided strong evidence that just like the institutional 
actors that promoted participatory democracy(Saurugger 2010), civil 
society organisations were doing this in order to promote their own 
collective, legal recognition of their right to be consulted, and sector or 
organisation specific goals in terms of recognition. Hence the new 
discourse of the EU on participatory democracy can be explained as a 
manifestation of the emergence of an organisational field of civil society 
participation, that is, a virtual space of exchange constituted by relevant 
actors, fora and formal and informal rules where the conditions for civil 
society consultation and participation are thereby discussed and decided. 
The constitution of such fields is always dependent on the existence of an 
issue. In this case it clearly is that of the creation of a horizontal rule 
about which organisations had to be consulted.  
 
As Ruzza suggests ―the crisis of legitimacy of the EU system of 
governance can be viewed as a political opportunity for movements‖  
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(Ruzza 2004, 41). In this sense civil society organisations have been able 
to use the institutional agenda and needs to legitimate their own 
demands. Some civil society demands that could be associated within a 
participatory democracy model were the definition of common, 
transparent and objective rules of access in contrast to the more or less 
ad hoc selection of partners that tends to occur in some DGs as well as 
the creation of a horizontal and higher profile consultation (Fazi and Smith 
2006; Kohler-Koch 2010b).  
 
The whole discussion about the definition of civil society, the 
characteristics of legitimate actors or issues of representativeness could 
legitimate the characteristics of some actors and exclude others. The 
organisations participating more actively in these consultations were thus 
defining the rules that were going to be applied to all the other sectors, 
but it is within this field‘s discussion, rather than in the specific sectors, 
that these common rules could be modified. This explains why 
organisations from distinct sectors participated actively in these 
discussions and that contrary to the expectations there were some clear 
resistances to this agenda.  
 
It is thus clear that the recognition of civil society participation, far from a 
commonly accepted democratic progress had the potential to create 
winners and losers. With this insight in mind it is less surprising that 
organisations promoting the institutionalisation of civil dialogue did not try 
to justify it simply in terms of efficiency such as the predictability of 
outcomes for organisations (Ruzza 2004, 45) but rather tried to articulate 
it as an irresistible cause (Greenwood 2007b, 344). According to Bourdieu 
any field is characterised by its habitus, that is, a set of interiorised social 
practices and dispositions that inform the range of possible actions by its 
participants (Bourdieu 1984, 133–136). In this sense it is clear that the 
constitution of the field had some visible effects on the ways of action of 
the organisations in terms of windows of opportunity, acceptable ways of 
advocacy and collective action. In the wake of the EU‘s legitimacy crisis, 
of the discourse of the Commission and of the Laeken declaration, it would 
have been impossible for organisations to oppose frontally any proposal 
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framed as a form of participatory democracy and to be taken seriously 
within this field any more. Instead these organisations used democratic 
arguments to weaken it by arguing that participatory democracy should 
not endanger the EU‘s fragile representative democracy. Similarly, they 
argued that for the sake of democratic accountability sound 
representativeness criteria should be associated to the article.  
 
In addition to the opposition of social partners, the promoters of civil 
dialogue had to face distinct attitudes from institutional actors such as the 
Parliament‘s scepticism on participatory democracy, the attempt by the 
EESC to use it to raise its own profile or the lack of support (if not the 
reluctance) of the Commission to support civil society demands during the 
Convention. And yet organisations experienced article 47 as a victory, 
which shows that the agenda was not totally set by European institutions 
and that organisations had a relevant margin of manoeuvre. The very 
presence of these fragmented interests could have acted as an 
opportunity structure, as organisations could to some extent engage in 
some ―venue shopping‖. Furthermore it may have increased the 
importance of organisation, coordination and activism as ways to avoid 
compliance with the institution‘s colliding expectations.  
 
However, it appears as well that ―playing by the rules of the game‖ (or 
abiding by the habitus of the field) by being providers of expertise, 
demands and legitimacy was the most efficient approach, and that 
recourse to protest, such as during the 1998 ―red card campaign‖ 
(Chapter 3), was a rare ―ultima ratio‖. As it was said above, the 
Convention did not produce a change in the ways of collective action of 
organisations as organisations did not employ outside lobbying (Mahoney 
2008a), let alone protest. On the contrary, it has been suggested that the 
main reaction of the oldest contributors to the debate to the increased 
number of participants (and thus of competition in the Convention) was to 
foster cooperation between them via the CSCG. 
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2.3. The rules of the civil society game: collective action before 
and during the Convention 
The evidence is that the main mechanism of influence for civil society 
organisations during the entire process was participation and involvement 
in successive debates and policy consultations on policy options. The 
Convention did not significantly change the organisations‘ strategy as they 
did not employ outside lobbying (Mahoney 2008a), let alone protest. The 
main ways of advocacy are basically exchanges with the institutions, via 
involvement in formal consultations with the institutions and other 
organisations including the submission of written contributions. Neither 
officials nor civil society organisations consider any of these particular 
access mechanisms as the key of success. Unsurprisingly the ability of 
these mechanisms to associate civil society to the Convention has been 
evaluated negatively by the literature on this matter (Monaghan 2007; 
Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007; Lombardo 2007). Yet it is precisely the 
weakness of each of the individual mechanisms which explains the 
importance of frequent involvement for the attainment of an insider 
status: other than by the salience of some interests, it is precisely 
because several of these access doors are open to anyone that the key 
factor lies in building the conditions for one‘s contribution to stand out.  
 
Perhaps the best evidence on the importance of this continued 
participation in the field is provided by the contribution by organisations 
that were not involved in the discussions ahead of the Convention such as 
IRI Europe and the Spanish organisations. To the account that the ECI 
was the result of a last minute fight by outsiders (Lamassoure 2004), the 
thesis has opposed evidence that the promoters of the ECI were not new 
to EU affairs since they had lobbied the EU on the issue since 1996 and 
had close working relations with members of the Convention since its 
early phases. This was much more relevant in including the ECI in the 
Treaty than the weak pan-European grassroots European Referendum 
campaign (IRI 2004). 
 
Similarly, national organisations were not outsiders because of their 
national rooting. In this sense they were relatively well represented in the 
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Convention, although it has been found that success in the case of the 
discussion on participatory democracy was not dependent on their ability 
to mobilise members but on their capacity to play by the rules of the 
Convention. In this sense there seems to be a clear relation between 
sharing the Convention‘s frame on participation and considering 
themselves as relevant actors, as evidenced by the different patterns 
between Spanish and French organisations.  
 
It is important to emphasise that it is not involvement in itself which 
makes a difference in terms of influence, but rather the role of each 
organisation in the emerging field of pan-European civil society. For 
instance, ELO or RCE had only a minor role despite their strong 
involvement and concern with the topic. It is those organisations able to 
mobilise specifically European resources and that can fulfil a relevant role 
in the field in each moment that can achieve more influence. The 
institutional system and agenda setting dynamics favoured an insider 
collective action regime (Balme and Chabanet 2008). This ―rule of the 
game‖ has an important effect on the functioning of the EU as a public 
sphere in that the ability to be in touch with, and mobilise, members is 
not as rewarded, if at all, as the ability to play a role useful for the 
institutions in different venues.  
 
3. Understanding the European public sphere as a space of groups  
The analysis reveals that the debates on participatory democracy were 
decisively dominated by elites until the Convention. Civil society appears 
as a relevant link with general publics in the aftermath of the Convention 
during national debates. However the mechanisms behind these contacts 
must be carefully analysed because the mediation was not produced by 
the same actors that elaborated the discourse. Although civil society 
organisations were not the only relevant actor in these debates 
(Saurugger 2010), the thesis has argued that the behaviour of the 
institutions and officials can also be understood by emphasising medium 
to long term collective action dynamics. This section uses the 
Convention‘s debate on participatory democracy to discuss the effect of 
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the predominance of these group dynamics in the EU‘s specialised publics 
for the European public sphere. 
 
The findings on the role of the organisations in the European public sphere 
have to be evaluated carefully because of their contradictory nature. As 
other studies (Sudbery 2003; Mahoney 2007; Kohler-Koch 2010b), it has 
been found that organisations did not need to mobilise their members to 
achieve influence and that they had little contact with them throughout 
the process (chapter 5). That said, in agreement with most of the 
previously mentioned research, it appears that this distance with their 
members and the public is the result of the EU‘s institutional setting 
rather than a substantial matter of lack of interest for European affairs.  
 
This seems to be in contradiction with the second finding that under some 
circumstances civil society organisations‘ activism can contribute to raise 
debates on the EU among European general publics. Most interestingly, it 
appears that this can take place even without a strong link with their 
grassroots: in some circumstances, typical of a public space dominated by 
groups, frames, ideas and debates can become independent of their 
authors and circulate among different publics. In this sense it has 
appeared that national civil society organisations circulated and adapted 
frames about participation and democracy in the EU even when they did 
not entirely share the discourse of EU institutions and civil society.  
 
In this sense the hypothesis that participatory democracy may not have 
been relevant for national organisations because of its linkage with the 
institutionalisation of access for European organisations is disproven to a 
large extent. Even those organisations that did not share the content of 
the frame (mostly French ones) were perfectly aware of its construction. 
Furthermore, in the national debate these organisations circulated, with 
different degrees of success, ideas about the need of citizens‘ and civil 
society involvement in the EU. More importantly, they framed national 
debates, in particular the French one, as opportunities to exercise 
participation.  
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In this sense, despite the weak role of the promoters of the participatory 
democracy frame in the national debates, it has appeared that national 
organisations, even those less eager to participate in EU venues, framed 
their activism in terms of the importance of citizens‘ participation of the 
debate on the future of the EU. This is particularly clear when it comes to 
organisations contesting the Treaty on the grounds of ―another Europe‖ 
since they clearly argue that is precisely because the weakness of EU level 
participation opportunities that citizens have to seize the national 
referenda as a way to reshape the EU that they want.  
 
3.1. Coalitions and diffusion: Some organisations are more able to 
communicate than others  
When the question of how does a public sphere where groups play a 
relevant role functions it is decisive to ask which groups play such a role. 
In this context the thesis has found very different communication 
attitudes and skills among the organisations it has considered. The 
coalition that promoted civil dialogue was quite hierarchical and there are 
at least two different roles among the core organisations: some groups 
specialised in relations with the institutions whereas others had a much 
stronger networking and downward facing profile. The organisations which 
had been involved more intensely in the civil dialogue debate 
communicated mainly among themselves and with the EU institutions. 
These organisations did not have a very strong communication profile. On 
the other hand, it was the organisations for which civil dialogue was not a 
core aspect which were communicating more intensely. Organisations 
such as CSCG, PFCS and ETUC networked intensely with core and outsider 
organisations, although they were not at the core of the frame creation 
process. 
 
The existence of these two roles is very explicit in the case of the CSCG, 
which was decisive in promoting the unity of the citizens‘ interest sector 
during the Convention and tried to bring civil society activities closer to 
the citizens via the act4europe campaign. Although it was less successful 
in the second task, it is relevant that it was assumed as a specific task of 
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the coalition organisation. This explains better the role the PFCS. This 
organisation‘s discourse is relatively far from the core group on civil 
dialogue as it puts emphasis on individual citizenship rights, but it 
presents as well very close relations with members of the coalition. 
Besides effects of long term involvement which increase opportunities for 
exchange and trust between organisations, it seems that the PFCS set 
itself the role of enlarging the coalition and the frame. 
 
The analysis provides no evidence of a planned construction of these 
roles, in particular because general diffusion was not an end in itself. 
Consequently it can be argued that a spontaneous division of tasks was 
operated within the coalition with some members specialising in lobbying 
the institutions and others in networking with other organisations and with 
the public. These roles were assumed by organisations according to their 
own ethos and preferred ways of advocacy, the result being that each 
organisation can contribute differently to the coalition.  
 
The implication of this division of tasks is that the frame on civil dialogue 
was not circulated by its stronger promoters. Although this did not mean 
that the frame did not circulate, it may explain its transformation national 
organisations which claimed a role of their own or by used it to frame 
their role in the national debates as a form of citizens‘ participation. 
 
3.2. Collective action and the public sphere: conditions of civil 
society mobilisation 
It has already been said that the Convention did not provide civil society 
organisations with a motivation to mobilise and address the general public 
or their own members and supporters. This can be attributed to two key 
aspects of the functioning of the Convention. Firstly its path dependence 
of ―ordinary‖ EU level discussions in terms of key personnel, agendas and 
internal functioning. As far as civil society relations are concerned it 
tended to reproduce traditional consultation mechanisms albeit in a more 
crowded setting (Pérez Solórzano-Borragán 2007; Monaghan 2007). 
Secondly, the nationalisation of the general public‘s debates on the 
Constitution made it much more difficult to articulate pan-European 
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campaigns on it since "in the EU multi-level setting, important structural 
transformations (such as EU constitution- making) do not translate into 
uniform politicization as long as political opportunities remain bounded to 
the nation state." (Vetters, Jentges, and Trenz 2009, 426). In a nutshell, 
the Convention‘s aftermath did not provide civil society organisations with 
a similarly favourable political opportunity structure and hence 
organisations had little incentives to mobilise their own members and thus 
contribute actively to articulate a pan-European general publics debate. 
 
Furthermore, the nationalisation of the ratification debates did not 
contribute to bring national and EU organisations closer as both assumed 
that general public debates would be decided on national grounds and 
with national political clues and that there was thus no margin for the EU 
level organisations to intervene. Furthermore, it has appeared that it is 
not only the nationalisation but also the politicisation of the debate which 
made European organisations less prone to intervene. In this sense they 
consider that their own members were not interested in issues beyond 
their own sectoral concerns and matters of funding. 
 
The attitude of EU level organisations contrasts strongly with the finding 
that national organisations were present in the Convention and that some 
of them, mostly Spanish organisations, assumed the frame as something 
they could put in practice. The contradiction is even stronger in relation to 
the interest of French civil society for the Constitution (Agrikoliansky 
2007; Dufour 2010). It is on the question of national organisations and 
ordinary citizens‘ interest for EU politics where the perceptions of national 
and European organisations diverge more intensely. It is thus necessary 
to ask which conditions make organisations active in each sphere 
interested or not in European debates. This thesis provides evidence that 
political opportunity structures and resources have to be carefully 
considered before concluding that national organisations are not 
interested (Friedrich and Rodekamp 2011).  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 suggest that beyond a common ethos to keep 
members and citizens aware of their action (expressed as a duty to 
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engage in pedagogy or public instruction), French and Spanish 
organisations chose very different approaches to these debates. In 
general Spanish civil society organisations played or at least considered 
that they played a strong role in the European Convention both via their 
participation in discussions on participatory democracy and in terms of 
involvement in European networks. In comparison they played a much 
smaller role in the national debate. On the other hand French 
organisations followed the Convention closely however without trying to 
actively influence it but were very active in the national debate and it has 
been argued that they had an influence on the result (Dufour 2010). 
Therefore it is necessary to consider firstly what the reason for this strong 
difference is and secondly whether there is a relationship between the 
roles organisations played in each context. Building on social movement 
literature (Tarrow 2004) the structure of political opportunities and 
resources mobilisation are briefly considered to try to explain this. 
The cleavage in choices of involvement at EU and national level cannot be 
explained by the difference between the structure of political capital and 
the overall resources of the organisations of each country. The group of 
organisations from each country seems quite comparable (for both 
countries it contains representative trade unions, feminist, anti-
globalization organisations and organisations representing the third sector 
in general). French organisations include two employers' organisations, 
two "think tanks" and a human rights association (not represented in 
Spain) while the Spanish organisations include three social welfare 
organisations, a consumer and international cooperation organisation ) 
not represented in France. However, as think tanks, human rights 
organisations, consumer and international solidarity are characterised by 
a strong political profile in comparison to interest or leisure organisations 
(Vázquez García 2010) they therefore can be grouped under a common 
profile. It thus seems that the difference between the remaining 
organisations, French employers' organisations and social welfare 
organisations in Spain, cannot by itself explain the difference. Therefore 
the difference should not lay in the overall availability of resources but in 
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how the structure of opportunities described above influenced the 
decisions of the organisations to mobilise them in one context or the 
other. 
From the European point of view, all organisations studied lie outside the 
usual system of relations between the European institutions and civil 
society. No significant differences in terms of availability of European 
resources can be reported (participation in European networks, availability 
of technical expertise or specifically European contacts). Yet stronger 
disposition to mobilise these resources at the EU level has been observed 
among Spanish organisations than French ones. It therefore seems that 
the attitude towards the Convention and to the discourse on participatory 
democracy can contribute to explain involvement at the EU level. 
On the other hand the dependence of civil society organisations on public 
institutions is a major difference between Spain and France. This is either 
related to a delegated role in public policy implementation (welfare in the 
case of ONCE and Caritas) or because they have been created as an 
initiative of public authorities to encourage debates such as the CJE, the 
Catalan Convention or FCCE. The case of the two Catalan organisations 
would confirm that the independence of Catalan civil society‘s from the 
state in contrast with the dependence of most Spanish civil society is a 
myth (Casals Meseguer 2010, 231–232). It seems unlikely that these 
organisations may have been able to challenge the prevailing consensus 
even in a more pluralist setting as ―the lack of salience and a non-
conflictual policy style strengthens the autonomy of [a] small circle of 
actors‖ (Closa Montero 2004, 326). This was almost impossible in the 
context of the almost explicit support to the yes side of the official 
campaigns. On the other hand, the weakness of internal participation 
regarding the involvement of the organisations in EU matters largely 
means that it was almost impossible to see the emergence of contestation 
within organisations. In addition, the importance of social welfare 
organisations or charities in the Spanish case also implies fewer 
opportunities for internal deliberation. These factors seem to have 
"frozen" the Spanish civil society ability‘s to build an alternative 
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perspective on European integration and fostered a weak participation at 
national level (Radaelli and Lucarelli 2004, 9). 
On the other hand it has been noted that the strong internal contestation 
contributed to the activation of French civil society organisations, whereas 
the weak participatory nature of Spanish groups favoured that these 
organisations focused on the EU level. The strong politicisation of French 
civil society, or rather its permeability to political activism, was not a 
weakness in the context of the referendum but may have fostered the 
engagement of political activists disagreeing with their parties‘ orientation 
(Dufour 2010). 
Regarding the first question asked at the beginning of this section the 
political opportunity structure seems more decisive for explaining the 
attitudes of organisations towards the referendum than traditional 
resource-focused explanations (Will et al. 2005; Sánchez-Salgado 2007b). 
In this sense in approximate equality of European resources the weak 
autonomy of Spanish organisations in the national context explains these 
organisations preference to try to influence decisions in the Convention. 
On the other hand French organisations being suspicious of the 
Convention and having a greater capacity for autonomous political 
discourse and greater permeability to politics in the national context seem 
to have presented the national context as the best suited for influencing 
European decisions. 
This explanation is reinforced when the answer to the second question on 
the relationship between national and European participation is 
considered. Participation in the Convention is fundamental to understand 
why Spanish organisations had little incentive to conduct a campaign 
about a text that they had contributed to produce, in particular as their 
political weakness would have granted them little influence. However the 
dissatisfaction of French organisations with the participatory framework 
that resulted from the Convention together with their greater capacity for 
mobilization at the national level reduced the cost of developing a national 
campaign as a way of influence. 
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The attitude in relation with participatory democracy in the EU (Liebert 
2011, 112) and towards national politics, or more precisely the ability to 
participate in national politics as a way to influence the European Union, 
are the variables that best explain the preference of organisations for 
participating in the Convention or in the ratification debates. Thus, 
although of course both scenarios are not incompatible, it seems clear 
that an organisation meeting its goals at the EU level has little reason to 
invest resources in a national campaign, while an organisation dissatisfied 
with the result in the EU may, under certain circumstances, have a 
motivation to challenge it at the national level. 
The main variables that have been identified to explain the difference 
between the preferred levels of involvement of the organisations of each 
country are the attitude towards politics and the degree of involvement in 
discussions at European level. This result calls for a dynamic approach 
taking into account the structural and conjunctural factors influencing the 
organisations decision to invest resources in on or another context rather 
than a static one focusing on resources and political capital (Sánchez-
Salgado 2007b). 
This evidence thus supports the argument that there is a close 
relationship between organisations‘ eagerness to participate in events at 
EU level and their likelihood to engage in protest activities (Liebert 2011). 
In both countries the organisations that contested the Treaty were 
opposed or indifferent to the participatory democracy frame. Similarly it is 
found as well that those organisations more eager to assume the frame 
were supportive of the Constitution (Liebert 2011), although it has 
appeared that this did not mean that they engaged in active campaigns 
for the text in the national debates.  
 
3.3. Models of civil society action in the public sphere  
The questions of why the promoters of the frame were less mobilised 
during the referenda and how ideas circulated among different publics 
even despite weak contacts are directly related to the question of how civil 
society links general publics and European specialised and strong publics 
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(Eriksen 2007). In this sense it is useful to briefly discuss the two models 
on the role of civil society organisations raised in the first chapter. 
 
Two modes of diffusion of the frame on participatory democracy can be 
distinguished. The first one is through strong involvement in the 
Convention. Some national organisations incorporated the frame created 
at the EU level considering it an opportunity for raising their own profile. 
Many of these organisations, most of the Spanish ones or groups such as 
Maisons de l‘Europe or the LDH in France, engaged in national debates on 
the constitution. However their role was not as salient as that of 
organisations arguing against the Treaty because of several dynamics. 
Beyond their own weakness and the fact that they stood by the side of the 
―political establishment‖ thus limiting their window of opportunity, two 
reasons have emerged as constraints for these organisations to mobilise 
all their resources. The first one is that to a large extent they were 
satisfied with the Constitution, thus making their involvement in the 
ratification debate less decisive. Secondly, they tended to have difficulties 
with the articulation of political arguments on the Constitution, as they 
preferred registers focusing on pedagogy or civic education. The frame 
was thus diffused from European specialised publics to national specialised 
publics. In the medium to longer term it may have the effect of 
encouraging national organisations to participate more actively in EU level 
discussions (Bouza Garcia 2012), but this would contribute to an 
enlargement of the specialised publics rather than to a greater role of 
general publics.  
 
This suggests together with the lack of activism of European organisations 
in diffusing the frame that the participatory mobilisation model does not 
respond to these dynamics. Contrary to most examples of social 
movements‘ activism (Ruzza 2004, 31–33), the fragmentation of the 
European public sphere allows civil society organisations to promote ideas 
in specialised publics without extending them to broader publics‘ via 
mobilisation. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that civil society 
organisations can produce a significant contribution to the public sphere 
even in the absence of contacts with their own members or the public 
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(Kohler-Koch 2010a; Buth 2011). In this sense it seems that the 
participatory democracy frame acquired a life of its own because it was 
assumed by the Convention and floated in official explanations of the 
decisions to put the Treaty to referendum. 
 
A second mechanism of circulation of the frame has been identified. It 
consists in the diffusion of the frame among participants in the debate, 
even among those not directly involved in the discussion and despite the 
weakness of contacts between some of these organisations. In this sense 
it is clear that all the participants in national debates argued for the need 
of citizens‘ involvement for a more democratic EU. Arguably this is weakly 
connected to the original frame and can be conceptualised as a frame 
transformation (Snow et al. 1986) operated in the national debate. 
However, there is a clear connection when the broader process is 
considered. Civil society organisations contributed to create the idea that 
existing dialogues can contribute to the legitimacy of the EU (Kohler-Koch 
and Finke 2007), which the Commission endorses and promotes in the 
White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001). The Laeken 
declaration was prepared in the same context as the 2001 paper on 
governance on the wake of the rejection of the Nice Treaty in Ireland 
(Landrin 2007). It is thus not surprising to find very similar ideas on how 
to democratise the EU to those of the White Paper on governance. The 
Laeken declaration focuses on civil society participation as a way to bring 
the EU closer to the citizens. This discourse will float during the whole 
Convention and given its democratic content will make governments 
assume that it will be easily ratified in referenda (Sauger, Brouard, and 
Grossman 2007; Mateo Gonzalez 2008). However this democratic 
argument provided a key window of opportunity to opponents of the 
Treaty to turn the much praised citizen‘s participation against the 
Constitution. 
 
However finding that the frame circulated without contacts between civil 
society organisations and general publics does not mean that specialised 
actors‘ discussions on democracy have a strong potential to spill over to 
the general public (Trenz and Eder 2004). This is so because this finding is 
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undoubtedly related to a specific mobilisation context. Firstly, the 
endorsement by the Convention of the frame on participatory democracy 
was a decisive mechanism for its circulation. It gave actors of the general 
publics, and in particular national organisations, a greater access to the 
frame. The fact that these different actors shared the Convention as a 
public space facilitated the circulation of the frame and related ideas even 
in spite of weak contacts between the actors. The Convention and its‘ 
official discourse were thus the interface replacing more intense direct 
contacts. Secondly, the importance of the referenda for the circulation of 
the frame must be pointed out. It can be suggested that the ideological 
coherence between notions of participatory democracy and referendum 
gave national civil society organisations an increased justification to 
participate in political debates, even though this bridging occurred very 
differently in France and Spain (see chapters 6 and 7).  
 
In terms of the models of civil society activism in the public space that 
were introduced in chapter 1, the answer lays, perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
between. On the one hand there are clear signs that civil society 
organisations can contribute to the public space thanks to their active 
involvement in narrow decision making venues and that the ideas that 
they promote in these venues have the potential of contributing to the 
emergence of a public sphere. On the other hand however it is difficult to 
argue that this followed a deliberative path. There is evidence that the 
circulation of the frame and the adaptation of organisations‘ arguments is 
related to the specific interests of different groups of actors in an 
emerging organisational field rather than to the force of the best 
argument in a rational discussion. Furthermore, the specific mobilisation 
conditions provided by the Convention and national referenda are 
particularly favourable for frame circulation, but can difficultly be 
translated to the day-to-day functioning of the EU. These conditions are 
probably comparable to the way in which ideas circulate between different 
publics in the context of policy crises (Wessels 2010). 
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4. Participatory democracy, EU politics and legitimacy 
The hypothesis formulated in chapter 1 was that the debate on 
participatory democracy was unlikely to contribute to a politically 
contested discussion on European integration because it was promoted 
firstly by an elite public. It was expected that this left little margin for the 
participation of outsiders. Additionally it rested on suggestions that EU 
decision making provides civil society with subtle mechanisms to influence 
the agenda which make them unable to contest afterwards the decisions 
of EU institutions.  
  
And yet it has been shown that this hypothesis had very different results 
in both countries, confirming again the above quote of Vetters et al. about 
the effects of nationally bound political opportunities on the politicisation 
of the EU.  
4.1. Different attitudes to politics 
The thesis has highlighted the different attitudes to politics of Spanish and 
French civil society organisations, and the close relation between this 
variable and organisations‘ ability to have an impact on national publics. 
In this sense it has appeared that Spanish organisations strong 
dependence on public support resulted in a strong avoidance of political 
discussions. Although this did not prevent them from trying to diffuse the 
content of the constitution, and in particular the frame on participatory 
democracy, the need to avoid the politicisation had a relevant effect. With 
the exception of the weak anti-globalisation movement, Spanish 
organisations could not seize the void left by political unanimity as an 
opportunity window for constructing an alternative message. Hence their 
contribution was to a large extent limited to specialised events aiming at 
clarifying the treaty for their members. 
 
On the contrary, French organisations contributed to the strong 
politicisation of the French debate. It is important to highlight the political 
strategy of organisations promoting the rejection of the Treaty. The 
parties promoting the Treaty sought to de-politicise it by pointing out that 
a rejection of the Treaty would amount to a rejection of European 
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integration (Sauger, Brouard, and Grossman 2007; Chopin 2008). In this 
sense, civil society organisations were key in articulating a frame 
generally favourable to EU integration, but nonetheless critical of the 
Treaty. Furthermore, they did take sharp positions on the yes / no axis, 
being even able to influence the position of political parties. This was also 
the result of internal activism by members since the leadership of some 
organisations tried to avoid participating in the debate, most notably in 
the case of the CGT. This is very relevant because it provides a very clear 
example of civil society‘s mobilisation in the context of the participatory 
democracy frame.  
 
The thesis thus contributes indirectly to the debate on the politicisation of 
the EU by pointing to the ―normalisation‖ of criticisms of the EU (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009). It points out that civil society organisations contribute 
to the creation of political frames where EU integration is no longer a 
technical matter that has to be explained (European Commission 2005) 
but rather a political field whose policies have to be discussed and justified 
with political arguments (Liebert 2011, 119). Additionally, it points out 
that rejection of the EU does not necessarily mean not knowing it. In this 
sense it is clear that organisations were contributing to a larger knowledge 
of the EU by citizens. 
 
4.2. Importance of political relevance and institutional obstacles 
to politicisation 
The implication of the thesis‘ findings is that referenda were much more 
relevant for raising citizens‘ attention and fostering debate than the 
opportunities for civil society contribution provided by the Convention.  
This finding, together with frequent quotes in interviews and assessments 
that civil society organisations equate participation with influence, is 
important for assessing the ability of participation to legitimate the EU. 
Although this is not the main aim of the thesis, it turns out that if EU level 
organisations are comfortable with long term involvement in decision 
making venues, it is by participating in salient and more politically 
relevant occasions that national civil society organisations seem able to 
make a contribution to the emergence of a public sphere.  
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Finally, it is relevant as well to consider the ―democratic paradox‖ of the 
debate on participatory democracy. In this sense it has appeared that 
organisations could achieve influence without mobilising their members or 
the public. It could be argued that such model is coherent with the 
pluralistic setting of EU civil society relations, since it seeks not to 
advantage membership over cause organisations and focus on the 
importance of organisations‘ ability to construct causes in the public 
sphere. However this clearly rewards organisations long-term involvement 
in elite settings without requiring any demonstration that they actually 
contribute to enlarge debates. More decisively, there are no mechanisms 
rewarding the ability to mobilise members, although this might change 
with the implementation of the ECI (Bouza Garcia 2012).  
 
The circulation of the participatory democracy frame beyond the 
Convention despite the weak contact between the promoters of such 
frame and the general public cannot be considered as a general model. 
The Convention and ratification debates provided an opportunity for 
circulation, but it has been highlighted that this was strongly favoured by 
the concurrence in a shared public space of organisations that normally do 
not communicate in the public sphere and the political opportunities 
provided by the ratification debate.  
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis provides evidence that the involvement of civil society 
organisations in a number of European consultation venues between 1997 
and 2003 was decisive for the formulation of an article on participatory 
democracy in the European constitution (art. 47). It had an indirect, yet 
non negligible, role in fostering activism by national civil society 
organisations during the Convention and the debates on the ratification of 
the Treaty in Spain and France. These developments can be summarised 
following Snow et al. (1986) classical typology as processes of frame 
bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. 
 
The analysis of the position papers and interviews with members of the 
Convention, officials and civil society organisations‘ representatives 
provides strong evidence that the citizens‘ interests‘ organisations which 
participated in the agenda setting process that preceded the Convention 
sought to institutionalise their role in the EU‘s policy-making process. This 
strategy met opposition by already institutionalised organisations, in 
particular the social partners and divergent attitudes from different 
sectors of the EU institutions. In this sense the attempt of the EESC to 
turn itself into the house of civil dialogue or the lead of different DGs and 
services of the Commission in shaping the civil society consultation 
agenda is paradigmatic of an inter and intra-institutional struggle over the 
rules of civil society consultation (Saurugger 2010). Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the close cooperation between citizens‘ interests groups, 
there were clear attempts among organisations to obtain recognition for 
their sectors and even for their own specific traits besides the broader 
recognition of civil society.  
 
Because of these competition dynamics within a set of recurrent 
exchanges and contacts among a given set of participants which were 
strongly connected despite their diversity, this process has been 
characterised as the emergence of an organisational field of European civil 
society participation, where organisations and institutions had frequent 
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competition and collaboration relations aiming at defining the rules for 
third parties participation and consultation. 
 
The rationale for civil society activism is clearly their self-interested 
promotion of institutionalised access to EU institutions. However as 
suggested by discursive institutionalism literature (V. Schmidt 2010), this 
institutional configuration comes with a series of justificatory frames 
which were decisive in achieving the inclusion of an article on civil society 
consultation in the Treaty. Its success is linked to the ability of 
organisations to use the EU‘s legitimacy debate at the turn of the century 
as a political opportunity structure. The Commission sought to use 
existing structured relations with civil society as a way to obtain input 
legitimacy, and the Convention was mandated to provide for ways of 
bringing the EU closer to citizens. This offered two sorts of influence 
opportunities: an official discourse that provided opportunities for frame 
bridging and a venue for debating treaty reform that provided direct 
access opportunities for organisations to advocate their cause.  
 
The analysis of the debates has shown that the framing of the demands 
by civil society evolved along time in response to the expectations of the 
Commission and then of the Convention. The evolution of the frame seeks 
to adapt an existing system of civil society relations oriented towards the 
production of output legitimacy (Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007) – which 
argues that civil society contributes to the quality of policy making and 
eventually to the EU‘s communication – to a more input legitimacy 
oriented system which frames the consultation of civil society as an 
interface for citizens‘ participation. The most significant evidence of this 
frame bridging between civil society institutionalisation demands and EU 
institutions legitimacy quest is the explicit elaboration of civil society 
organisations‘ consultation as a form of participatory democracy. The 
initiative of formulating civil society consultation as an answer to the 
recognised problem of democratic legitimacy came from the EU 
institutions in the 2000 and 2001 consultations by the Commission and 
the Laeken declaration. Despite the difficulty of some organisations to 
assume the new frame, it has been shown that citizens‘ organisations 
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used this frame to formulate a precise policy proposal, civil dialogue, as 
the remedy to the problem. This was done without substantially modifying 
their demands of access. Furthermore it clearly had two effects: it 
attracted the attention of the Convention because of its coherence with 
the Laeken declaration and it dissolved the opposition of the social 
partners because of its irresistible nature. However the change of venue 
and the evolution of the frame are not neutral to the content of the 
demands (Princen 2009). The frame bridging strategy significantly 
contributed to amplify the frame which was stretched by newcomers and 
the Convention as to include additional participatory mechanisms such as 
the European Citizens Initiative. 
 
Regarding the ways of access to the Convention, interviewees put great 
emphasis on the importance of the formal access mechanisms such as 
hearings and working groups. In particular they suggested that it was 
through these mechanisms and contacts with specific members of the 
Convention that they expressed their demands. However most interviews 
confirm assessments in the literature that these were weak access 
mechanisms. In terms of collective action it has appeared that 
organisations advocating for the institutionalisation of civil society 
consultation created a coalition in order to articulate a strong common 
voice in these formal fora. In contrast to the modest role that the 
qualitative analysis attributed to coalition organisations (such as the PFCS, 
the CSCG and ETUC) because of their difficulty in producing cohesive 
arguments and advocacy out of the differences of their members they 
appear to have played a relevant role in the network. These coalitions 
fostered information diffusion and common action. 
 
The importance of coalitions is shown by the existence of a clear centre – 
periphery cleavage within the organisational field, where those citizens‘ 
interests‘ organisations active for a longer time in the debate tended to 
network much more intensely among themselves than economic or 
regional interests organisations.  
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The agenda setting work and the advocacy of this coalition contributed to 
bring this topic to the Convention. Surprisingly the Commission was far 
less supportive of these demands than it had been during the agenda 
setting process. However organisations managed to include the issue in 
the agenda via alternative channels. The political salience of the 
Convention facilitated the frame amplification process as civil society 
organisations could formulate their demand as a response to the Laeken 
mandate on bringing the EU closer to citizens.  
 
These findings must be discussed against what is known about civil 
society relations with European institutions, since some are clearly 
divergent with well known tendencies. In particular, it is atypical to find 
that the Commission was relatively unsupportive or at least not engaged 
with the participatory democracy agenda during the Convention, since the 
role of this institution as the norm entrepreneur behind the procedural 
norms on civil society consultation is a consistent assessment in the 
literature (Smismans 2003, Kohler-Koch and Finke 2007, Saurugger 
2010). However these assessments are limited to the analysis of the 
Commission civil society relations, where the Commission is in control of 
the agenda, access opportunities, rule setting and financial resources 
(Sánchez-Salgado 2007). However the effect of the change of venue is 
important since organisations were confronted with new rules of the game 
allowing them to play an independent role from the Commission. It thus 
appears that the Commission‘s domination is the normal rule of the game 
but that the change of venue provided a very relevant opportunity to 
organisations. Furthermore it has been shown that contrary to 
assessments pointing out the difficulty of alliances among European 
organisations because of their strong specialisation and the lack of 
accountability of policy-makers (Mahoney 2007), networking and 
collective action by the main members of civil society networks in Brussels 
was a decisive factor. Although obviously this is related to the novelty of 
the Convention‘s venue, it has also been found that the basis of this 
alliance is to be found in cooperation since 1997, which shows that civil 
society organisations have a strong networking potential even in ordinary 
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settings, even though this is more salient in extraordinary processes such 
as the Convention.  
 
That said the process did not break with established practices and 
routines. In this sense it has clearly appeared that far from being a radical 
novelty, the Convention‘s discussion on participatory democracy was 
strongly framed by the previous discussions on procedures for civil society 
consultation. In particular it has also appeared that despite the change of 
venue, the agenda setting process rewarded ―constructive activists‖ in the 
words of an interviewee from the Social Platform, that is, organisations 
trying to obtain improvements on the margins of the institutional agenda 
rather than those trying to radically change it or confront it. This applies 
as well to the most relevant innovation, the ECI. Although according to 
the interviewee this proposal had been brought to the 1996 ICG, it was 
not until a discussion on ―participatory democracy‖ had been engaged for 
a few years that this topic could be brought into a formal rule. 
 
The question is whether this may change with the entry into force of the 
new Treaty article. Whereas the issue is prone to speculation, some 
expectations can be derived from this process. The first one is that the 
legal ground for civil society consultation is likely to decrease the margin 
of discretion of the Commission in the organisation of consultations. 
Furthermore it is expectable that the entry into force of the ECI will open 
the door to more diversity of civil society practices along the lines 
observed during the Convention, with some organisations focusing on 
institutionalised dialogue and others using the ECI (Bouza García 2012). 
 
In accordance with frame analysis theory, frame amplification led to 
expectations on frame extension. The Convention expected civil society 
organisations to present the Treaty in a positive way to their members 
during the ratification phase in exchange of the recognition that they had 
just obtained. However it is in this phase where the specific 
communication difficulties between European segmented publics such as 
the Convention – civil society dialogue and general publics have been 
more significant. It has been clearly shown that organisations did not 
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share these expectations and did not attempt to influence national 
debates either because of their difficulty to communicate with their 
members, pointing out that the Constitution and participatory democracy 
were far too abstract, and to take part in politicised debates. Additionally 
network analysis has shown that the Convention was only a weak meeting 
point for national and European civil society organisations as these 
contacts were limited and channelled by a few organisations, mostly the 
abovementioned coalition groups. 
 
Contrary to other assessments of the role of civil society in the 
Convention, this debate was not marked by a decisive cleavage between 
EU and national organisations. It appears that some national organisations 
having specific resources had direct access to the Convention and some of 
them thought that their demands were taken into account. Significantly, 
almost all national organisations were aware of the new participatory 
democracy frame, although not all of them shared it. It is however very 
interesting that those organisations that shared it, mostly Spanish ones, 
were more active in the Convention, whereas organisations that did not 
have a very strong role in the Convention tend to minimise the 
importance of this mechanism.  
 
The lack of contact between EU and national organisations and the strong 
preference for activism at the EU level of organisations sharing the 
participatory democracy frame would suggest that the frame did not 
circulate beyond European institutions and civil society organisations. It is 
found that the role of each organisation in general publics was strongly 
related to their satisfaction with the participatory frame and the 
Convention and more generally with their attitude towards participation in 
the EU in relation to their general attitude towards politics. In this sense, 
those organisations with stronger EU resources and willing to engage in 
the EU tended to share the participatory democracy frame whereas 
organisations usually absent from EU debates or rejecting EU integration 
tended to assume a much stronger activism in the national debate.  
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However all national organisations contributed to extend the frame during 
the national debates, albeit in a transformed manner. Firstly, they 
adapted it to their own understanding by including national organisations 
and citizens‘ participation in it. More importantly, they put it in practice by 
framing the national debate on the EU constitution as an opportunity for 
ordinary citizens‘ to decide on the future of the EU which would no longer 
be a matter of high politics, which is a way of applying Laeken‘s discourse 
to a yes and no decision by citizens. Finally, they articulated such 
participation.  
 
These findings provide interesting elements for reflecting on the role of 
civil society organisations in the European public space. The thesis 
endorses and adds to several assessments on the structural barriers for 
civil society organisations in playing a more relevant role in the European 
public space. Contrary to expectations, the political salience of the 
Convention and the increased number of actors did not unleash a 
significant public mobilisation. In this sense, path dependence, elite 
domination and expertise requirements are still factors influencing civil 
society‘s perception of stronger outcomes from activism in specialised 
publics than in general ones. Furthermore organisations did not have the 
means nor the intention to contribute to bring their work closer to 
European citizens. This implies a sort of democratic dysfunctioning where 
civil society organisations assumed a role in acting for causes without any 
sort of formal mandate nor any evidence of a social representativeness or 
impact in the public sphere. 
  
And in spite of that it appears that civil society organisations contributed 
to the elaboration of a frame of reference that has marked debates on the 
EU for a decade and resonated strongly among general publics: the notion 
that citizens have to have a stronger and more direct role in EU politics. 
European civil society organisations were one of the actors in the 
construction of this frame and contribute significantly to make it 
operational day to day in the absence of a stronger role for general 
publics. 
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This thesis has shown the self-interested nature of the claims behind the 
notion of participatory democracy. European civil society organisations 
sought to institutionalise their own role and they used the EU‘s legitimacy 
concerns to frame it in an irresistible way. That said the debate on the 
EU‘s legitimacy does not seem to have substantially changed ten years 
after the Convention, making it necessary to ask whether these rules may 
contribute to change the situation and reconnect citizens with the EU.  
 
The first response must obviously be sceptical since it has been shown 
that civil society does not necessarily stand for citizens in the EU since the 
European public sphere is strongly fragmented. Furthermore these 
mechanisms have a relatively minor empowerment potential since they 
are relatively soft since they are limited to non binding consultation and 
initiatives. 
 
And yet these mechanisms may also serve to provide alternatives for the 
expression of alternatives to the European project as it is conducted by 
the European institutions. It has been argued that one of the difficulties of 
the EU is its lack of political readability for citizens. It has clearly appeared 
that one of the barriers to the contribution of participatory tools to the 
legitimacy of the EU is the fragmentation of civil society action between 
different spaces. In this sense discourses, frames and demands have real 
difficulties to circulate between different publics and thus produce a 
contribution to input legitimacy. The entry into force of the new Treaty 
rules may contribute to the emergence of pan-European alternative 
political frames if, as the Convention did, it changes the venues and rules 
of the game and offers significant empowerment opportunities to social 
actors linking different publics.  
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Annex 1: List of interviews 
1. Mr. Jean Luc Dehaene, vice-president of the Convention in charge of 
civil society relations, 09-02-2009, Brussels 
2. Commission civil servant from DG enterprise, 17-02-2009, Brussels 
3. Representative of the Platform of European Social NGOs 06-03-2009, 
Brussels 
4. Mr Alain Lamassoure, member of the Convention, 18-03-2009, Paris 
5. Member of the secretariat of the Convention, Brussels, 03-04-09 
6. Member of the secretariat of the Convention, Brussels 03-04-09 
7. Personal Communication with a member of the Convention, 17-04-
2009, Birmingham 
8. Representative of ATTAC Spain, 23-04-2009, Madrid 
9. Representative of the Platform of European Social NGOs Brussels 04-
05-09 
10. Representative of the European Foundation Centre, Brussels 04-05-09 
11. Representative of COFACE, Brussels 04-05-09  
12. Representative of IRI Europe, 06-04-09, telephone interview 
13. Mr David O‘Sullivan, deputy member of the Convention for the 
Commission, Brussels, 13-05-09 
14. Official of the General Secretariat of the Commission, Brussels, 28-05-
09 
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15. Two representatives of ELO, Brussels 02/07/09 
16. Representative of ACN-Cittadaninza Attiva, 08/07/09, telephone 
interview 
17. Representative of Unice, 08/07/09 telephone interview 
18. Representative of the Civil Society Contact Group, 29/07/09, Brussels 
19. Representative of the Polish NGO Office, 04/09/09, Brussels 
20. Civil servant from the European Economic and Social Comittee, 
07/09/09, Brussels 
21. Representative of CONCORD, 07/09/09, Brussels 
22. Representative of the Pemanent Forum of Civil Society, 26/10/2009, 
Brussels 
23. Representative of ECAS, 29/10/2009, telephone interview 
24. Representative of Red de Ciudadanas de Europa, Madrid, 26/11/09 
25. Representative of ONCE and CEPES, done in Madrid on 30/11/09 
26. Representative of the Permanent Forum of Civil Society, done in Paris, 
on 10/12/09 
27. Representative of CEDAG, done in Paris on 11/12/09 
28. Representative of Medef, done in Paris on 11/12/09 
29. Representative of EUROCOMMERCE, done in Brussels on 05/01/10 
30. Mr Carlos Carnero, former MEP and deputy member of the 
Convention, telephone interview, on 07/01/10 
31. Representative of ETUC, done in Brussels, on 01/02/10 
32. Representative of ADICAE, telephone interview, 07/05/10 
33. Representative of Fundación Luis Vives, done in Madrid on 17/05/10 
Madrid  
34. Advisor to the Spanish Government during the Convention, done in 
Madrid on 21/05/10 
35. Representative of EUROCITIES, 28/05/10, phone interview.  
36 Representative of EEB, done in Brussels, 19/07/10 
37. Mr Klaus Hänsch, member of the Praesidium of the Convention, 
telephone interview, on 17/11/10 
38. Representative of the Forum Civic per una Constitució Europea, 
Barcelona, 22/11/2010. 
39. Representative of the Secretariat of the Catalan Convention, 
Barcelona, 22/11/10 
40 Representative of Caritas España, Madrid, 02/12/2010. 
41. Representative of Comisiones Obreras (CCOO), Madrid, 10/12/2010.  
42. Representative of EAPN Spain, telephone interview on 10/01/2011 
43. Personal communication by email with a representative of the Union 
du Grand Commerce de Centre-Ville on 12/01/2011 
44. Representative of the Consejo de la Juventud de España, Madrid, 
17/01/2011 
45. Representative of the Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris, 25/01/2011 
46. Representative of ATTAC, 02/02/2011, telephone interview 
47. Representative of the CGT, Paris, 07/02/2011 
48. Representative of the LDH, Paris, 07/02/2011 
49. Representative of the Fondation Copernic, Paris, 09/02/2011 
50. Representative of the Fédération des Maisons de l‘Europe, 11/02/2011 
51. Telephone interview with a representative of the Mouvement pour 
l‘Initiative Citoyenne, 12/02/2011 
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Annex 2: List of EU level organisations and available data 
Nombre Sector Data Rationale for 
inclusion 
ACN 
Cittadaninza 
Attiva 
Citizenship Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
CEMR Regional Position papers Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
CPMR Regional Position papers Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
CEDAG Third sector Interview, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
ELO  
European 
Landwoners 
Organisation  
Business 
association 
Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
Eurocommerce Business 
association 
Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
ECAS  Citizenship Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
EFC 
European 
Foundation 
Centre 
Foundations Interview, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
UEAPME Business 
association 
Position papers Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
UNICE Business 
association 
Telephone 
interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
ETUC Trade Union Interview and 
position papers 
Relevance in the 
context of civil 
society dialogue 
Polish NGOs 
Brussels 
Serices for Polish 
organsiations 
Interview, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
Eurocities Regional Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
Eurodiaconia – 
Caritas 
Social sector Position papers Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
EEB Environment Interview and Participation in 
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position papers Convention + 2 
consultations 
CONCORD Cooperation and 
humanitarian aid 
Interview, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
Social Platform Social Sector 2 interviews, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
COFACE Family Interview and 
position papers 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
CEV Centre 
Européen du 
Volontariat 
Volunteering 
promotion 
organisation 
Position papers Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
PFCS – 
Permanent 
Forum of Civil 
Society 
Citizenship 2 interviews, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
Convention + 2 
consultations 
CSCG – Civil 
society contact 
group 
Alliance of 
different 
platforms of 
sectoral NGOs 
Interview, 
position papers 
and networking 
questionnaire 
Relevance in the 
Convention 
IRI – Initiative 
and Referendum 
Institute Europe 
Advocacy for 
participatory 
democracy 
Interview, 
reports and 
networking 
questionnaire 
Relevance in the 
Convention 
 
Annex 3: List of Spanish organisations and available data 
Name Sector Data Rationale for 
inclusion 
ADICAE Consumers 25 minutes long 
telephone 
interview 
5 position 
papers 
Networking 
questionnaire 
Relation with EU 
umbrella group. 
ATTAC Alternative 
globalisation 
30 minutes long 
interview 
List of activities 
in the context of 
the national 
debate 
Importance in 
the coalition 
against the 
constitution.  
Caritas España Catholic Church 
charity 
organisation 
25 minutes long 
interview 
 
Relevance in 
national debate 
and relation with 
EU umbrella 
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group. 
Comisiones 
obreras - CCOO 
Most 
representative 
national trade 
union 
25 minutes 
interview 
Networking 
questionnaire 
Relevance in 
national debate 
and relation with 
EU umbrella 
group. 
Consejo 
Juventud de 
España - CJE 
Publicly 
sponsored youth 
participation 
council  
35 minutes long 
interview 
2 position 
papers 
 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Catalan 
Convention 
Secretariat  
Contact platform 
between Catalan 
institutions and 
civil society 
Entrevista de 25 
minutos  
Informe y 
propuestas a la 
Convención 
europea 
Relevance in the 
context of the 
Catalan debate 
Fòrum Civic per 
a una 
Constitució 
Europea - FCCE 
Ad hoc forum of 
200 Catalan civil 
society 
organisations for 
the EU 
constitution 
Entrevista de 1 
hora. 
Lista de 
actividades en el 
contexto del 
debate nacional. 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Luis Vives 
Foundation 
Third sector 
support 
foundation   
30 minutes long 
interview 
Relation with EU 
umbrella group. 
Spanish 
Government 
advisor 
Advisor of a 
representative of 
the Spanish 
government to 
the Convention  
30 minutes long 
interview 
Participation in 
the Convention 
and the ICG  
Organización 
nacional de 
ciegos españoles 
– Confederación 
empresarial 
española de la 
economía social 
ONCE-CEPES 
Disability and 
social economy 
40 minutes long 
interview. 
1 position paper 
Networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Red Ciudadanas 
Europeas 
RCE 
Feminist 
organisation  
1 hour long 
interview 
5 position 
papers 
Networking 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
the Convention 
European Anti 
poverty Network 
EAPN Spain 
Federation of 
social action 
organisations 
30 minutes long 
telephone 
interview. 
Relation with EU 
umbrella group. 
ACSUR las 
Segovias 
Development 
cooperation 
organisation 
Position paper Participation in 
the Convention 
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Demopunk Anti-
globalisation and 
participatory 
democracy 
website 
Position papers 
in its website. 
Report on IRI 
activities in 
Spain.  
Members of the 
IRI-ERC 
campaigns 
Ecologistas en 
Acción  
Environment and  
alternative 
globalisation 
Position papers 
and manifestos 
in journals and 
website  
Promoters of the 
coalition against 
the constitution. 
 
 
Annex 4: List of French organisations and available data 
Name Sector Data Rationale for 
inclusion 
ATTAC Alter-
globalisation 
organiation 
One hour long 
telephone 
interview  
Position papers 
to convention 
Participation in 
the Convention  
Association de 
femmes de 
l‘Europe 
méridionale 
AFEM 
Network of 
southern 
European women 
organisation 
composed 
essentially of 
French 
organisations 
Position papers 
to convention 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Confédération 
générale du 
travail 
CGT 
Confederation of 
trade unions, 
traditionally 
linked to the 
French 
communist party 
One hour long 
interview 
Position papers 
available online 
and list of 
national 
activities  
Participation in 
the Convention 
Ligue des droits 
de l‘homme - 
Collectif pour la 
défense des 
droits 
fondamentaux 
LDH - CCDF 
Human rights 
defence 
organisation 
50 minutes long 
interview 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Fondation 
Copernic 
Alter-
globalisation 
think tank. 
50 minutes long 
interview  
Position papers 
Members of the 
IRI-ERC 
campaigns 
Fondation Robert 
Schuman 
EU affairs French 
think tank 
One hour long 
interview 
Network 
questionnaire 
Participation in 
the Convention 
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Maisons de 
l‘Europe 
A branch of the 
European 
movement 
providing info on 
the EU 
30 minutes 
telephone 
interview 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Mouvement des 
entreprises de 
France 
MEDEF 
Main business 
organisation in 
France 
25 minutes 
interview and list 
of national 
activities 
Participation in 
the Convention 
Mouvement pour 
l‘initiative 
citoyenne 
MIC 
Participatory 
democracy 
advocacy group 
1 hour long 
telephone 
interview 
Members of the 
IRI-ERC 
campaigns 
Fédération du 
Grand 
Commerce de 
Centre-Ville 
FCCV 
Organisation of 
the downtown 
big retail 
companies.  
Personal email 
communication 
Relation with EU 
umbrella group. 
 
Annex 5 Centrality measures 
id 
closeness 
(std) id 
betweenness 
(std) 
PFCS 0.56 PFCS 0.20 
CSCG 0.52 ETUC 0.15 
Social 
Platform 0.51 IRI Europe 0.14 
ETUC 0.50 Social Platform 0.12 
RCE ES 0.49 CSCG 0.11 
CONCORD 0.47 CEDAG 0.09 
CEDAG 0.45 RCE ES 0.08 
COFACE 0.44 Eurocities 0.09 
IRI Europe 0.43 CCOO 0.07 
CCOO 0.43 EEB 0.05 
CARITAS UE 0.43 ECAS 0.04 
ONCE - CEPES 0.42 FCCE 0.04 
ATTAC Spain 0.40 CARITAS España 0.04 
ATTAC 
EUROPE 0.40 COFACE 0.03 
ECAS 0.40 ATTAC Spain 0.03 
CCDF - LDH 0.40 CONCORD 0.03 
ACN 0.40 UNICE 0.02 
EFC 0.39 Eurocommerce 0.02 
FONDA -
CAFECS 0.39 CARITAS UE 0.02 
EEB 0.38 ONCE - CEPES 0.01 
CJvtdEs 0.37 CCDF - LDH 0.01 
ACSUR 0.37 EFC 0.01 
CGT 0.36 ATTAC EUROPE 0.01 
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ERC 0.36 World social forum 0.009 
CEV 0.35 Ecologistas 0.008 
Eurodiaconia 0.35 ACN 0.005 
CARITAS 
España 0.35 CGT 0.004 
Ecologistas 0.35 F. Copernic 0.001 
World social 
forum 0.35 CEMR 0.0 
PL Office 0.35 CPMR 0.0 
UNICE 0.35 CEP-CMAF 0.0 
Eurocities 0.34 CEV 0.0 
Eurocommerce 0.34 ELO 0.0 
CEP-CMAF 0.34 ERC 0.0 
UEAPME 0.34 Eurodiaconia 0.0 
FCCE 0.33 PL Office 0.0 
F. Copernic 0.33 UEAPME 0.0 
AFEM 0.33 CJvtdEs 0.0 
Maison 
d‘Europe 0.31 ACSUR 0.0 
MIC 0.30 MEDEF 0.0 
Demopunk 0.30 FONDA - CAFECS 0.0 
F. Schuman 0.28 Maison d‘Europe 0.0 
ELO 0.28 MIC 0.0 
F. Luis Vives 0.26 Conv. Cat. 0.0 
MEDEF 0.26 F. Luis Vives 0.0 
CEMR 0.25 Demopunk 0.0 
CPMR 0.25 F. Schuman 0.0 
Conv. Cat. 0.25 AFEM 0.0 
ADICAE 0.02 ADICAE 0.0 
 
Annex 6 In and out degrees 
id indegree (std) id outdegree (std) 
ETUC 0.26 PFCS 0.26 
Social Platform 0.22 CEDAG 0.24 
CSCG 0.2 CONCORD 0.2 
PFCS 0.18 CSCG 0.2 
CEDAG 0.16 RCE ES 0.2 
COFACE 0.16 Social Platform 0.2 
CARITAS UE 0.14 CCOO 0.14 
ECAS 0.12 ETUC 0.14 
World social 
forum 0.12 IRI Europe 0.12 
CCOO 0.1 ATTAC Spain 0.1 
EEB 0.1 ONCE - CEPES 0.1 
IRI Europe 0.1 ATTAC EUROPE 0.08 
ACN 0.08 CARITAS España 0.08 
CONCORD 0.08 CCDF - LDH 0.08 
Eurocommerce 0.08 EFC 0.08 
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UNICE 0.08 UNICE 0.08 
ATTAC Spain 0.06 ACSUR 0.06 
CEP-CMAF 0.06 CGT 0.06 
CEV 0.06 CJvtdEs 0.06 
Ecologistas 0.06 COFACE 0.06 
EFC 0.06 Eurocommerce 0.06 
Eurodiaconia 0.06 FCCE 0.06 
FONDA - CAFECS 0.06 Ecologistas 0.04 
ACSUR 0.04 EEB 0.04 
CGT 0.04 Eurocities 0.04 
CJvtdEs 0.04 MEDEF 0.04 
ERC 0.04 PL Office 0.04 
F. Copernic 0.04 ACN 0.02 
ONCE - CEPES 0.04 ADICAE 0.02 
RCE ES 0.04 ELO 0.02 
UEAPME 0.04 F. Copernic 0.02 
AFEM 0.02 F. Schuman 0.02 
CEMR 0.02 FONDA - CAFECS 0.02 
Conv. Cat. 0.02 AFEM 0.0 
CPMR 0.02 CARITAS UE 0.0 
Demopunk 0.02 CEMR 0.0 
Eurocities 0.02 CEP-CMAF 0.0 
F. Luis Vives 0.02 CEV 0.0 
Maison d'Europe 0.02 Conv. Cat. 0.0 
MIC 0.02 CPMR 0.0 
PL Office 0.02 Demopunk 0.0 
ADICAE 0.0 ECAS 0.0 
ATTAC EUROPE 0.0 ERC 0.0 
CARITAS España 0.0 Eurodiaconia 0.0 
CCDF - LDH 0.0 F. Luis Vives 0.0 
ELO 0.0 Maison d'Europe 0.0 
F. Schuman 0.0 MIC 0.0 
FCCE 0.0 UEAPME 0.0 
 
Annex 7 Codebook 
This annex introduces the codebook followed in the frame analyses by 
providing the rationale followed when deciding what to code as well as a 
sample of the content of the 19 codes. The tables below summarise briefly 
the content of each of the frames in order to highlight the common 
aspects of each that have justified creating such codes. Space constraints 
do not permit reproduction of the entire codebook with the complete 
material coded in each frame. However, this section provides examples of 
the material coded in each of the four consultation periods so as to 
highlight the common aspects. The rationale for choosing these examples 
is to provide an overview of quotes which are representative both of the 
content and the diversity of organisations.  
 
When parts of text which are not continuous are coded in the same frame, 
those are considered as different references, although the number of 
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references has not been considered a main analytical dimension. Since the 
basic analytical dimension is whether organisations contribute to a frame 
or not, references coming from different position papers submitted to the 
same consultation are grouped together.  
 
1. Conceptions of civil society 
 
Table 36 Formal representation 
This frame contains all the statements where organisations claim to 
represent their members or the public. Obviously this contains very 
different conceptions of representation, in that some organisations put 
the emphasis on the fact that civil society has to have formal 
authorisation mechanisms whereas others claim representativeness 
without explicitly arguing for it. Another difference lis that in some cases 
organisations  state the importance of taking representativeness into 
account in consultation processes, whereas in other cases they simply 
claim to be representative. The common aspect of all these codes is that 
organisations claim their ability to speak on behalf of their members or 
citizens because of a formal link between them. 
2000: COFACE 
As representatives of different population groups, some NGOs engage a 
well defined category of citizens: the Commission document cites, as 
examples, disabled or ethnic minorities. (Translated from French by the 
author). 
2001:UNICE 
Reference 1: Genuinely representative stakeholders 
Reference 2: […] bodies speaking on behalf of different components of 
European society, the representativeness of the consulted 
organisations should be assessed.  
2002: EEB 
For organisations that have a broad interest in EU policies and have a 
clear mandate of a large constituency to represent civil society positions 
towards the Commission, opportunities should be created to comment on 
the relevant DG's workplans before they are finalized.  
Convention: CEDAG 
 
CEDAG considers that the nine criteria defined by the ESC could 
constitute a workable definition of European networks: "the 
organisation must: 
- have a permanent existence at community level; 
- procure direct access to the expertise of its members then provide rapid 
and constructive consultation; 
- voice general concerns relating to the interests of European society; 
- consist of bodies recognised at member state level as representing 
particular interests; 
- have member organisations in most EU member states; 
- guarantee the accountability of its members; 
- be authorised to carry out representative functions and to act at the 
European level; 
- be independent and operate to its own mandate, without being bound 
by instructions emanating from external bodies; 
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- be transparent, particularly in terms of finances and decision-making 
structures." 
 
 
Table 37 Alternative representation 
 
Unlike in the previous frame, organisations do not claim an ability to 
represent their members or citizens at large, but rather a cause or a 
specific constituency, generally unable to speak for themselves. In this 
sense it is not a formal link with members, either because they do not 
exist or are unable to cast a mandate, but a qualitative aspect which 
allows organisations to stand up, be it their defence of marginal interests 
or their expertise. Thus some organisations argue that this qualitative 
dimension is another form of representation that should not be excluded 
by a primacy of criteria such as the number of members or formal 
authorisation. 
 
2000: Social Platform 
 
However, the Commission uses the term ‗representativeness‘ 1 with 
relation to NGOs on several occasions throughout the document, 
particularly in section 2.2. Whilst the Platform agrees that geographical 
representativeness is an important feature for European NGOs, it is not 
the role of NGOs to act as elected representatives, but to advance the 
interests of their constituencies. The term ‗representativeness‘, when 
applied to NGOs, thus seems ambiguous because their 
―representativeness‖ is primarily qualitative: it is deep-rooted in the 
nature of the relationships established by NGOs on the ground. NGOs 
promote minority needs and opinion, giving the means of expression to 
some of the ‗voiceless‘ within society, and even advancing the interests 
of those whom by reason of various handicaps (intellectual, cultural, or 
other forms of marginalisation and exclusion) need advocates to defend 
their interests and needs. The Platform therefore prefers to emphasise 
the need for transparency in the functioning of NGOs. Real transparency 
involves knowing who is representing people, groups, actors and ideas. It 
should be the right of minority groups to be represented by the NGO of 
their choice 
 
2001: Caritas Europdiaconia 
 
In any attempt to organise a structured dialogue between institutions and 
civil society there is still a significant part of society which is usually not 
represented in any part of the ―stakeholders‘ dialogue.‖ Churches seek to 
give a voice to those who are not usually heard or, where this is 
impossible, to be their advocates. This involves those who are often 
marginal to mainstream society: the unemployed, the homeless, the 
outcast and uprooted, victims of violence and those who are excluded by 
various political systems. Churches also seek to speak for those whose 
human rights, including the right to religious freedom, are not respected. 
Starting from an ethical view of society as inclusive, churches seek to 
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stand up for that part of society, which is not able to take part in the 
stakeholders‘ dialogue as this term is usually understood. 
2002: CEDAG 
 
A less strict vision of ―representativeness‖, which can not be conceived in 
the same way as the representativeness of public authorities; 
Convention: PFCS 
 
The Union shall guarantee the participation of all, in particular individuals 
and groups in a situation of poverty and social exclusion. 
 
 
Table 38 Against representativeness 
This frame is to some extent related to the previous one. However, 
unlike formal and alternative representation this code refers directly to 
the organisation of consultations. In this sense the previous codes are 
generally but not necessarily linked to representativeness criteria in the 
consultation. However, this code explicitly says that consultation should 
not be associated with representativeness issues. In this sense most 
organisations in this code identify the Commission‘s criteria for 
consultation with formal representation. Thus even organisations 
claiming to represent their members can express their rejection of this 
criterion.  
2000: No references 
2001: Social Platform 
 
Representativeness alone is not a sufficiently precise or appropriate 
standard to measure good NGO practice. We believe that NGOs should 
be judged on the basis of their transparency, accountability, 
representativeness, efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out their 
mandate – all qualities which are identified as necessary for good 
governance in the Work Programme for the White Paper on Governance. 
2002: ECAS 
 
We suggest that the Commission looks again at the ECAS checklist to 
achieve a better balance between requirements about how 
representative an organization is, and what contribution it really has to 
make in the market place of ideas. There is little point in public 
authorities dancing with a representative partner who has nothing to 
say.  
Convention: CEDAG 
 
The European institutions frequently question the representative status 
of organisations of civil society but the debate should rather concentrate 
on accountability (the requirement to render account to their members, 
for example) and the democracy internal to these organisations. 
 
Table 39 CSO link to the public: 
This frame is one of the most frequent and relevant ones, that is, that 
civil society is important for the EU, and should thus be consulted and 
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institutionalised, because of its ability to link the public and EU 
institutions. All the references to communication, information and the 
public are explicit, although relatively abstract, as the concrete ways in 
which organisations promote better public information (see EFC in 2001 
or EEB in the Convention). The references between 2000 and 2002 
concern civil society‘s ability to communicate, whereas during the 
Convention there most contributions become more concrete in that most 
references (9 organisations) elaborate on civil society‘s contribution to 
communication via its participation in consultations with the institutions. 
 
 
2000: CONCORD 
 
In this task the European Commission needs to make full use of all the 
allies it can find to communicate with European citizens and in particular 
it needs to work closely with the organisations of European civil society. 
2001: EFC 
 
The role of civil society organisations as facilitators of information flow 
on EU policy should be encouraged. Foundations themselves have acted 
as information and dialogue facilitators to help address and devise 
effective responses to social, environmental, educational, scientific and 
economic challenges facing European citizens.  
2002: Social Platform 
 
We regret that the role of European NGOs in stimulating debates among 
national NGOs and contributing to the emergence of a European thinking 
has not been highlighted. If consultation is to be effective and useful, 
then the need to fund spaces for discussions both at a national and 
European level should be acknowledged.  
 
Convention: This code includes 9 references which do not merely refer to 
the contribution of civil society to communication, but specifically to civil 
dialogue‘s contribution to communication. Two quotes illustrating the 
compatibility of this framing are provided: 
CSCG: civil society as link to the public 
 
Our principle aim at present is to involve our members into the debate. 
As member states‘ politicians begin to publicly confront the issues raised 
by the debate we have been informing our members so that they may 
be able to make a constructive engagement in their national discussions. 
We are aware that this is a debate which will continue until the 
conclusion of the IGC and it is our intention to be involved in it 
throughout its duration. 
 
EEB: civil society consultation as a link to the public 
 
One way to help the EU become more transparent is to require the 
Commission (and the other bodies) to inform the public when it starts 
work on policy, legislation or other decisions and to invite citizens and 
their organisations to comment on the policy or legislative initiatives. 
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Table 40 CSO promote participation and voice demands 
This frame includes all the references by the actors to their contribution 
to participation, as well as the  promotion of their members and citizens‘ 
demands and values at EU level. Whereas the previous frame refers to 
CSO contribution to downwards communication, this frame brings 
together references to CSO ability to upload citizens‘ preferences to the 
EU level.  
2000: PFCS 
 
The Permanent Forum of Civil Society had been set up more than five 
years ago with the purpose of improving structures at European level for 
NGO cooperation, discussion and action and of influencing the European 
integration process. The question of bringing Europe and its citizens 
closer together had to be considered in this context. 
2001: Polish Office 
 
NGOs, which generally try to address the concerns of the ‗man in the 
street‘, are organisations expecting access to information, an 
understanding by those in authority of what issues could be of concern 
to them, and the right to present positions and complaints at a stage of 
the legislative and regulatory process that allows for influence of that 
process. 
2002: UEAPME 
 
Indeed, their role is not simply to register or collect the opinion of their 
members, but also to find a common position that reflects the opinion of 
the different counties or economic sectors. As such, their opinions are 
more than a simple sum of all the opinions from single enterprises. They 
are the result of a democratic consultation and decision-making process. 
 
Convention: Active Citizenship Network 
 
Reference 1: Protection of citizens‘ rights and the improvement of civic 
participation in public policy-making 
 
Reference 2: This programme seeks to promote the participation of local 
and national citizens‘ organizations in European policy-making; these 
organizations come from the 15 EU countries and the 13 candidate 
countries and have no access to EU institutions. 
Table 41 Expertise as legitimacy: 
This is a relevant frame in the discussion of which about the 
characteristics legitimating European actors. Although the organisations 
contributing to this frame disagree on the importance of 
representativeness, having a measure of expertise, both in the technical 
sense and in terms of knowledge of a field from the grassroots 
perspective, is considered as a prerequisite for any organisation wishing 
to participate in the policy process. 
 
2000: UNICE 
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Ngos' legitimacy is based primarily on the expertise they acquired on a 
day-to-day basis in the field, which enabled them to express informed 
and authoritative opinions on the policies to be implemented at European 
level. 
2001: EEB 
 
NGOs should be judged on the quality of the input they give, not just on 
the numbers of people they represent, or the length of time their 
organisations have existed.  
2002: CEMR 
 
We wish to draw attention also to the fact that our member associations 
have many experts who could add value to Commission expert working 
groups etc., at the early stages of policy development. CEMR offers to 
assist the Commission in co-ordinating such inputs. 
Convention: EFC 
 
The EFC supports a European Union based on multi-level governance, 
where all actors contribute in line with their expertise, for a more 
inclusive and effective approach to policy making and delivery, which 
better reflects the aspirations of citizens. 
 
Table 42 Definition excludes business groups: 
One of the key issues of the discussion is what civil society is, who 
belongs to it and which organisations do not belong into this category. 
This would have as a result that organisations not qualifying as civil 
society would not be entitled to participate in the consultation processes 
under discussion. In this sense a group of citizens‘ interest groups argue 
that social partners are not civil society in that they promote the interests 
of their members and because they already have other means of access.  
 
2000: Social Platform  
 
NGOs are not self-serving in their aims and related values. Their aim is to 
act in the public arena at large, on concerns and issues related to the well 
being of people, specific groups of people or society as a whole. 
2001: Polish Office 
 
The Polish NGO Office believes the Commission‘s lumping together of 
NGOs with social partners to be misleading and confusing. Indeed, the 
work of NGOs more often complements that of governmental structures 
in addressing societal problems, than it does issues that concern the 
social dialogue. By placing NGOs under the heading of civil society 
together with employers‘ organisations and trade unions, it assigns to 
such organisations the cachet of civil society players that we find 
confusing. Civil society, as presented in the White Paper, is everyone that 
is not government, a peculiar amalgam of the second and third sectors 
(business and NGOs). 
2002: Eurodiaconia – Caritas 
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Furthermore the Commission‘s definition seems to have in mind not only 
the social partners but also individual economic lobby organisations. Here 
we find it very difficult to include clearly economic interests within one 
single definition of civil society. The significance of civil society is that it 
consists of organisations, initiatives and civic movements with the aim of 
advocacy. Their work is clearly directed towards the common good, not 
particular (economic) interests. 
Convention: CEDAG 
 
The European Commission lists the following organisations of European 
civil society: trade unions, professional associations, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), religious and denominational communities. CEDAG 
would wish to see express mention made, amongst these 
organisations, of non-profit voluntary organisations, which 
operate in the general interest, in support of social wellbeing and 
sustainable development and in the interest of future 
generations. 
 
Table 43 Definition includes business groups: 
This is the opposite to the previous frame: most of the business 
organisations argue that it does not make sense to create different 
categories within civil society because consultation should be open to any 
stakeholder whose interests may be affected by the policy proposal at 
stake, independently of its legal status and goals as an organisation. 
2000: EUROCOMMERCE  
 
Reference 1: EUROCOMMERCE does not understand why the consultation 
is being limited at first to NGOs. Furthermore, the definition used for the 
term ―NGO‖ in the working document is ambiguous and contradicts, for 
instance, the cover page of the website of the General Secretariat in this 
respect, which uses the term of ―NGO‖ also to cover trade associations. 
 
Reference 2: NGOs, including professional organisations 
2001: UNICE 
 
Genuinely representative stakeholders affected by a decision or 
policy should be offered systematic consultation each time that 
new measures or a revision of existing regulations are envisaged. 
In order to allow an assessment of the source, content and weight of 
responses received from bodies speaking on behalf of different 
components of European society, the representativeness of the 
consulted organisations should be assessed. 
2002: UEAPME 
 
Good and efficient consultation requires in the first place consultation of 
the groups directly concerned and affected, and this should be done 
through their representative organisations according to the proposed 
focused consultation procedures.  
Convention: No references 
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2. Conceptions of participation 
 
Table 44 Consultation improves policy-making: 
This frame contains references to the contribution of civil society 
consultation to the quality of policy-making, by means of providing good 
technical information, facilitating implementation, contributing to 
transparency and balancing various interests. This has implications for 
the legitimacy of the EU that are usually explicitly acknowledged and 
formulated by the organisations.  
2000: No references 
 
2001: UNICE 
 
Comprehensive, timely and structured consultation is a 
prerequisite for a satisfactory legislative process, for evaluation 
of the trade -offs involved in policy-making, and finally, for 
acceptability of rules and policies. 
2002: SOCIAL PLATFORM 
 
The Social Platform and its members are already actively involved in 
different areas of work with all of the EU institutions and have proven to 
be valuable partners in the conception, implementation and monitoring 
of policy. This is particularly true when it comes to innovative ways of 
working such as the open method of coordination which give a good 
example of this partnership. 
Convention: EFC 
 
The EFC supports a European Union based on multi-level governance, 
where all actors contribute in line with their expertise, for a more 
inclusive and effective approach to policy making and delivery, which 
better reflects the aspirations of citizens. 
Table 45 Civil dialogue 
 
This frame contains all the references of organisations to civil dialogue. 
The references are quite diverse, in that some describe or prescribe the 
contents of civil dialogue, others demand its recognition, and others use 
it as a neutral notion. However the common aspect of all these 
references is that they all refer to civil dialogue as a specific form of 
formalised dialogue between European institutions and civil society 
organisations. Civil dialogue is associated with additional legitimacy 
rationales, but all these references present civil dialogue as a legitimate 
mechanism in itself. It is thus a frame justifying the formalisation of civil 
society – EU institutions relations because of the specific contribution of 
civil society to the legitimacy of the EU.  
 
2000: ETUC 
 
Representativeness was the only really indisputable criterion, which 
would become increasingly important if, in the future, a legal basis was 
to be given to civil dialogue. It would perhaps also become necessary to 
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add other criteria, such as the democratic and transparent nature of 
NGOs' organisational structures and internal working methods. 
2001: Social Platform 
 
Three distinct forms of dialogue exist at a European level; the political 
dialogue, the social dialogue, and the civil dialogue. Whilst the first two 
of these dialogues have a structured format, the third, civil dialogue, 
does not, although an ad hoc dialogue with the Institutions does exist. 
We believe that the creation of a structured civil dialogue to complement 
the political and social dialogues should be one of the essential principles 
of a reformed governance process. This call for the creation of a 
structured civil dialogue, however, does not in any way detract from the 
political dialogue, which has a unique importance. Indeed, the 
strengthening of the political process is a necessary corollary to the 
development of a structured civil dialogue. 
2002: CARITAS EURODIACONIA 
 
We argue for a European ―Civil Dialogue‖ that has the same standing as 
the existing ―Social Dialogue‖. 
Convention: CEDAG 
 
The introduction of a civil dialogue recognised by the European treaties 
would not only give legitimacy to the voluntary organisations but would 
also give credibility and legitimacy to the decisions of European 
institutions who would thus be consulting all the interested parties: 
member states, local authorities, companies and trade unions and 
organisations in civil society. CEDAG particularly supports the 
introduction of an article setting out the principle of participative 
democracy in the draft Constitutional Treaty presented by the 
Presidium of the Convention on the future of the EU in October 
2002. 
 
Table 46 Participatory democracy 
This frame gathers all the references to participation as a form of 
democracy potentially contributing to the legitimacy of the European 
Union. The emphasis is not on the intrinsic legitimacy of civil society as 
in civil dialogue but on the virtues of participation. Although most 
organisations associate civil society with participation, participatory 
democracy clearly implies a larger spectrum of actors and mechanisms. 
 
2000: PFCS 
 
Reference 1: encouraging participatory democracy in Europe. 
 
Reference 2: In consequence, there were misgivings about the 
Commission's ability to play an effective role in civil dialogue. The 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, however, 
could ultimately become real partners for NGOs, although this issue was 
linked to the more general one of developing participatory democracy in 
Europe and at European level which was a current topic of debate. 
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2001: CEDAG 
 
CEDAG welcomes the debate initiated by the publication of the White 
Paper from the European Commission. It considers that it is an 
important element of the current debates on democratic deficit, 
participative democracy, civil dialogue and the important role of the 
voluntary sector in the debate on the future of Europe.  
2002: CPMR 
 
A distinction between consultation of civil society, and 
strengthening of the dialogue with local and regional 
government, the elected representatives of civil society, thus 
respecting the distinction that has to be made between participative and 
representative democracy. 
Convention: CONCORD 
 
Sets out the principle of participatory democracy and recognises that the 
Constitutional Treaty should permit ‗citizens' organisations of all kinds to 
play a full part in the Union's affairs‘. Civil Society clearly welcomes this, 
and Civil Society organisations will look forward to participate in shaping 
the conditions for this dialogue. The article should end up providing for 
the highest degree of institutional openness and civil society 
participation in Union affairs. 
 
 
Table 47 CSO consultation as empowerment 
This frame contains basically all the references to institutionalised 
dialogue as a way to make the EU more democratic. This  is quite a 
general frame but it is important since it makes an explicit linkage 
between the role of civil society and the objectives of the institutions, 
legitimacy. In most cases there is a direct association between civil 
society consultation and the legitimacy of the EU, although there are 
relevant references to civil society consultation as a form of 
citizenempowerment and participation. In a sense this frame bridges civil 
dialogue and participation by explicitly elaborating civil society dialogue 
as a form of participation. 
2000: UNICE 
 
As the European dimension made the problems dealt with more 
complicated, dialogue between NGOs and the Commission should 
essentially be envisaged on a sectoral level basis. A horizontal level 
approach bore the risk of too much generalisation and of running 
counter to the main purpose of consultation, which was to bring Europe 
closer to citizens. 
2001: ACN 
 
Reference 1 
Planning an institutional framework able to speak ―on behalf of‖ and act 
―in favour of‖ citizens is very different than work ―together with‖ citizens 
and civil society to develop democracy and protect rights; 
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Reference 2 
the principle of consultation in both phases of policy planning and 
decision making, which compels European Commission to listen to 
citizens‘ proposals, to give them a feedback on these proposals, to 
consult them before taking any decision and to motivate their decision if 
it differs from citizens‘ opinion.  
2002: EEB 
 
It considers the issue of dialogue and participation as both a means to 
improve decisions by themselves as well as improving the democratic 
legitimacy of such decisions. 
Convention: EURODIACONIA - CARITAS 
 
Structured dialogue with civil society will not only facilitate greater public 
participation in the democratic process but also serve to make people 
more aware of their genuine ownership of the European Union. 
 
Table 48 Individual participation rights 
This frame contains all the references to the need of increasing the role 
and the participation of individual citizens in the governance of the EU. 
This, although not always necessarily critical of strategies of 
institutionalised civil society consultation, is explicitly formulated as 
different from dialogue with civil society, and emphasises the importance 
of individual citizenship rights such as access to information, to judicial 
protection or to political initiative.  
 
2000: ACN  
 
In the first part of the paper, containing some general statements on 
NGOs, the relationship between NGOs‘ reality and the construction of 
European citizenship is neglected at all. This lack of a ‗citizenship-based‘ 
vision of the NGOs implies two different risks: 
-the risk of understatement, that is a sectorial, ―single-issue‖ vision of 
the NGOs, leading to a 
misunderstanding of their general mission; 
-the risk of a corporative approach, focused on the relationship between 
EC and NGOs in terms of bargaining for financial resources and not in 
terms of cooperation in policy making. 
 
2001: EFC 
 
- the right to clear and transparent information, in all EU languages, 
delivered early enough to enable adequate internal work to provide 
quality input 
- proposal and initiative rights, beyond the right of petition to the 
European Parliament and consultation of the Ombudsman 
2002: ECAS 
 
Reference 1: There should there be an obligation to consult based on 
citizens‘ right to be heard  
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Reference 2: In its paper, ECAS advocated a ―right to be heard based on 
citizenship, of which all NGO‘s, as organizations of citizens would take 
advantage.‖ 
Convention: EEB 
 
Reference 1: In addition, citizens and their organisations should have the 
right of access to the European Court of Justice to challenge decisions of 
the EU bodies. This is a requirement for the Union as it is signatory to 
the Aarhus Convention. 
 
Reference 2: Art. 34, par. 1: "democratic life‘ is an undefined term. 
While it is a term that could be used as a title of a chapter, it does not 
make clear what exactly are the rights that citizens can deduce from it. 
 
 
The right to public participation in decision-making is firmly 
established in environmental matters (the Aarhus Convention) and is 
a key concept also in the ongoing discussion on good governance in 
the Union. 
3. Position of civil society in the institutional structure of the EU 
 
Table 49 Structure consultation 
This frame includes references by very different types of organisations to 
the need of improving the procedures of dialogue with civil society 
independently of the aims associated with this dialogue. This frame thus 
gathers references to the need to structure the consultation for 
procedural reasons, such as improving transparency, certainty and the 
quality of the process. Obviously these are also associated with different 
goals of the organisations such as introducing representativeness criteria 
or formalising access only for the third sector excluding business 
organisations. However the common aspect of these demands is the need 
to set down clear procedures against the shared perception that dialogue 
tends to take place on an ad hoc basis or at the goodwill of the 
Commission. 
2000: UNICE  
 
For all types of consultations, dialogue procedures could be improved, 
particularly as far as respect of consultation deadlines was concerned. 
These deadlines should also be sufficiently long to let European 
organisations consult their members and thus enhance the legitimacy of 
their points of view. 
2001: EUROCOMMERCE 
 
The use of a mechanism for consulting interested parties, which 
would be set out systematically in a ‗code of conduct‘, seems at first 
sight to satisfy the often-expressed expectation that interested 
parties should be given a key role in the work of devising 
Community policies and standards. 
2002: EURODIACONIA - CARITAS 
 
Good ways for viable forms of dialogue with civil society. We welcome 
283 
 
the laying-down of principles and minimum standards for consultation 
procedure as they give a chance of dialogue being more transparent and 
efficient in composition and the way in which it is conducted. 
Convention: CSCG 
 
Reference 1: The members of the Civil Society Contact Group welcome 
this initiative to engage in a structured dialogue with civil society. 
 
Reference 2: Before proposing any major policy initiatives or legislative 
acts, the Commission shall consult widely on the sustainability 
dimensions of its proposals, except in cases of particular urgency or 
confidentiality. The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure that 
a similar procedure is followed for any major amendments they propose. 
 
Table 50 Recognise CSO 
This is an interesting frame, in that it does not demand the 
institutionalisation of civil dialogue procedures but rather of the role of 
civil society in itself at the EU level. This is a subtle but relevant 
distinction in that it does not recognise a procedure but a sort of actor, 
civil society organisations. In this sense the demand is that civil society 
organisations should have specific rights at EU level, such as a 
consultation status, entitlement to support by the institutions or legal 
personality across the UE. This does not foreclose that some 
organisations demand specific recognition for their sector (associations, 
foundations etc), since the common characteristic of these references are 
demands of recognition of civil society.  
2000: ACN 
 
On the same respect, Active Citizenship strongly supports the idea that in 
the Treaty of the EU NGOs must be recognized as an actor of the 
European governance system. 
2001: EFC 
 
The EFC believes that foundations, and other non-governmental, social 
economy organisations must be acknowledged as partners in their 
own right, with a proper consultative role on European Policy. 
2002: Social Platform 
 
The Social Platform therefore particularly welcomes the emphasis on the 
specific role of civil society organisations and the reference to Article 12 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Convention: Unice 
 
With regard to governance in general, title VI of the first part of the draft 
constitutional Treaty contains an article 34 which sets out the general 
principle of participatory democracy. A clause to the effect that “the EU 
recognises and promotes the involvement of social partners in Europe’s 
economic and social governance, taking into account the diversity of 
national industrial relations systems. The EU promotes and support social 
dialogue between the Social Partners (Management and Labour), 
respecting their autonomy” should be added to article 34. 
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Table 51 Legal rank 
This frame is constituted by all the references to the need to provide a 
legal rank to the structure for civil society consultation. This is a clearly 
different frame from the previous ones, since although the need to 
structure the dialogue is shared by most organisations, not all of them 
agree on the need to institutionalise it with a legal mechanism, and some 
even oppose it as they perceive a strategy by NGOs to create a procedure 
of their own. On the other hand, it is distinct from calls for civil society 
recognition in that it calls for the creation of a legal mandate to consult 
civil society, whereas calls for recognition do not necessarily imply a 
consultative role and thus a mandate.  
2000: CEDAG 
 
The Commission‘s position on civil dialogue is weak. CEDAG understands 
that member state governments must take the initiative on the 
introduction of new Treaty articles. Nevertheless, a clear statement by 
the Commission would give added impetus to the NGOs‘ efforts to gain a 
firm basis in the TEU for future Commission-NGO co-operation. The new 
Treaty article should: 
 
3. Recognise voluntary organisations as partners with the same status 
as the existing Social Partners;  
4. Place an obligation on the EU institutions to consult the voluntary 
sector on policies of relevance to it;  
2001: COFACE 
 
This text shall include an article granting civil dialogue a legal rank 
(translated from French by the author). 
2002: ECAS 
 
The weakness of the Commission‘s approach lies in the statement that 
―neither the general principles nor the minimum standards are legally 
binding.‖ There would be doubts as to whether on this purely voluntary 
basis, the ambitious aims of the communication can be realized and in 
particular: ―the Commission must always ensure in its consultation 
procedures that all relevant interests in society have an opportunity to 
express their views.‖ ECAS proposes that the Commission should keep at 
least an open mind on the question of whether or not there could be a 
relevant legal basis to consultation until the Convention has completed its 
work; as the paper makes clear, consultation becomes a right for Member 
States under the comitology procedures and under certain statutory 
instruments – i.e. only for some interested parties some of the time.  
Convention: EFC 
 
The EFC calls for an article in the Treaty providing a legal base to the 
civil dialogue between EU Institutions and civil society organisations.  
 
Table 52 Extend consultation to other institutions 
This is a straightforward frame, where organisations extend their demand 
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to be consulted by the Commission to other institutions. Generally it is 
recognised that the Commission has consultation structures and practices 
in place but that the need to institutionalise civil society consultation (see 
frames above) extends to the need to extend these procedures to other 
institutions. 
2000: No references 
2001: COFACE 
 
b) This explicit recognition should lead to the gradual construction of the 
conditions and the institutions of this dialogue with all stakeholders. In 
this context, several European institutions must be involved: the 
Commission, the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee. 
2002: EURODIACONIA - CARITAS 
 
Therefore, we recommend working out similar principles and standards of 
consultation between the Parliament and European organisations of civil 
society.  
Convention: CEDAG 
 
CEDAG particularly wishes to see a strengthening of the dialogue 
between civil society and the European Parliament, this being the body 
that represents the citizens of Europe, through more systematic 
consultations, particularly by means of intergroups. 
 
Table 53 Make ECOSOC the place of civil dialogue 
This frame includes all the references by different organisations to the 
possibility or the need to associate the EESC to dialogue with civil society 
organisations. All these references assume that the EESC has as a 
mandate to represent civil society and that it can play a role in the  
dialogue with civil society. 
2000: No references 
2001: COFACE  
 
b) This explicit recognition should lead to the gradual construction of the 
conditions and the institutions of this dialogue with all stakeholders. [...] 
From this point of view, it is possible to reinforce the role of the ESC. 
2002: CPMR  
 
This Communication, which is addressed to civil society – already 
represented via the European Parliament and the institutionalised 
advisory bodies of the Union (ECOSOC and COR), does not challenge the 
role of representative institutions but on the contrary reinforces it; in the 
same way that the social dialogue engaged with the social partners and 
enshrined in the Treaty does not challenge the role of these 
representative bodies. 
Convention: UNICE 
 
The Economic and Social Committee is the place for civil dialogue. When 
discussing its role and status, it is essential to avoid any confusion 
between civil dialogue and social dialogue, which is an autonomous 
process between the social partners and takes place outside the 
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Economic and Social Committee. 
 
Table 54 The EESC does not represent civil society 
The references in this frame point out that civil society is not really 
represented in the EESC as it is dominated by the social partners. In this 
sense, it opposes the previous frame since the EESC does not really 
represent civil society and it cannot be the seat of the institutionalised 
dialogue with organised civil society.  
2000: No references 
2001: EEB 
 
The White Paper views the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) of the 
Community as having a role in representing civil society. This is a 
questionable assumption. The members of the ESC are appointed by the 
Member States and it is dominated by the social partners. The room for 
the ESC to increase the numbers of civil society representatives is limited 
and that still will have to go through member state appointments. The 
ESC is an advisory body to the other Institutions and if the ESC is 
successful in being recognised as the facilitator of the voice of civil 
society, this may in the end reduce the opportunities for environmental 
(and other) NGOs to have direct dialogue with Community‘s decision-
making institutions. 
2002: ECAS 
 
There is only a reference for consultation on more general issues to the 
Economic and Social Committee: this is no viable alternative, in ECAS‘ 
view, to the Commission recognising that it too needs to consult from 
time to time on general issues – as it did indeed, and rather well in 
preparing the White paper on European governance.  
Convention: EEB 
 
We support the call of other NGOs for a structured dialogue, but we 
strongly reject amendments that would give the Economic and Social 
Committee a key role in organising the dialogue between the Institutions 
and civil society. We insist that the Institutions take responsibility for 
such dialogue directly. 
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Annex 8 Coding matrices. 
The tables below summarise the coding of the written documents by 
European organisations from 2000 to the Convention. The content of the 
papers has been coded into 19 general frames, divided in three broadest 
themes: conceptions of civil society in the EU, conceptions of participation, 
and demands in relation to the institutionalisation of civil society 
consultation. The tables express merely the inclusion of a part of one 
organisation‘s demand in one of the codes, not the number of reference or 
the percentage of the paper that it represents. The result is thus a matrix 
containing 76 frames vs. 21 organisations thus resulting in a set of 1596 
positions have been used to build the analysis of the frame expressed in 
the graphs and tables in chapter 2. These are binary matrices where 1 
means that text has been coded in this frame and 0 that none has been 
coded. In total the matrices contain 330 positive positions (20,68% of all 
possible positions). 
For the sake of smooth presentation, the identification of each 
consultation phase (2000, 2001, 20002 and Convention) has been replace 
by 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
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Table 1 Coding presence: conceptions of civil society in the EU 
 
Formal 
representatio
n 
Alternative 
representa
tion  
Against 
represent- 
tativeness 
CSO link to 
the public 
CSO promote 
participation 
and voice 
demands 
Expertise as 
legitimacy 
Definition 
excludes 
business 
groups 
Definition 
includes 
business 
groups 
Consultation 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
ACN 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CEDAG 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
CEV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COFACE 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CONCORD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSCG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ETUC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUROCOMMERCE 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
EURODIACONI
A - CARITAS 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EEB  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EFC 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ELO 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
PFCS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pol. OFFI. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Social Platform 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UEAPME 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
UNICE 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
CEMR 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CPMR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EUROCITIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 6 7 9 6 2 5 1 4 0 6 1 4 5 4 3 
1
0 5 7 
1
1 6 5 6 8 4 2 3 6 1 1 3 2 0 
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Table 2 Coding presence: Conception of participation 
Organisation 
Individual participation 
rights 
Civil 
dialogue 
Participatory 
democracy 
Consultation improves policy-
making 
CSO consultation as 
empowerment 
Consultation 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
ACN 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
CEDAG 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
CEV 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COFACE 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
CONCORD 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
CSCG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECAS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
ETUC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUROCOMMERCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EURODIACONIA - 
CARITAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
EEB  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
EFC 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
ELO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PFCS 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pol. OFFI. 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Social Platform 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
UEAPME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
UNICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
CEMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CPMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
EUROCITIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
TOTAL 1 3 3 6 6 6 3 3 1 6 5 9 0 6 11 4 2 8 4 6 
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Table 3 Coding presence: demands in relation to institutionalisation 
Organisation 
Legal 
rank 
Recognise 
CSO 
Structure 
consultation 
Extend consultation 
to other institutions 
Make ECOSOC the 
place of civil 
dialogue 
The EESC does not 
represent civil 
society 
Consultation 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
ACN 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CEDAG 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CEV 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
COFACE 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CONCORD 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CSCG 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECAS 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ETUC 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EUROCOMMERCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EURODIACONIA - 
CARITAS 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
EEB  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
EFC 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ELO 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PFCS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pol. OFFI. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Social Platform 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
UEAPME 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
UNICE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
CEMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CPMR 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
EUROCITIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 8 5 7 6 4 6 1 11 1 10 8 5 0 4 3 2 0 1 4 1 0 1 5 1 
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Annex 9 Networking questionnaire 
This questionnaire was circulated among interviewees by email 
accompanied of the following introduction: 
 
I would be very grateful if you could take some minutes to complete this 
survey about your contacts regarding participatory democracy during the 
European Convention. I will of course not disclose your name as the 
provider of this information.  
 
You just need to tick with an X the cases corresponding to the organisations 
with which you were in touch regarding participatory democracy in different 
forms.  
 
Table 55 Networking questionnaire 
 
ORGANISATION Exchange 
 of 
opinions 
Common 
position 
Common 
activities to 
promote 
participatory 
democracy 
ACN - Active Citizenship 
Network 
 
   
Eurodiaconia / CARITAS 
Europe 
 
   
CEDAG - European 
Council of Voluntary 
Organisations  
   
CEMR - Council of 
European Municipalities 
and Regions 
   
CPMR - Conference of 
Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of Europe 
   
COFACE (Confederation of 
Family Organisations in 
the European Union) 
   
CONCORD (European 
NGO Confederation for 
Relief and Development) 
   
CSCG - Civil Society 
Contact Group 
   
ECAS - European Citizen 
Action Service 
   
EEB - European 
Environment Bureau  
   
EFC - European    
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Foundation Centre 
ELO - European 
Landowners Organisation 
   
ERC - European 
Referendum Campaign 
   
ETUC - European Trade 
Union Confederation 
   
Eurocities    
Eurocommerce    
Eurodiaconia    
European Volunteer 
Centre- EVC 
   
IRI Europe:  Initiative and 
Referendum  Institute  
   
Permanent Forum of Civil 
Society 
   
Polish NGO Office in 
Brussels 
   
Social Platform    
UEAPME -  European 
Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium-sized 
Enterprises 
   
UNICE -  Union of 
Industrial and Employers‘ 
Confederation of Europe 
   
ORGANISATIONS 
BASED IN SPAIN 
   
ATTAC Spain    
ONCE – CEPES    
Red Ciudadanas de 
Europa 
   
Fòrum Cívic per una 
Constitució Europea (Foro 
Cívico por una 
Constitución Europea) 
   
Consejo de la Juventud de 
España 
   
ACSUR    
Ecologistas en Acción    
CARITAS España    
Plataforma de ONGS de 
acción social 
   
CCOO    
    
    
ORGANISATIONS 
BASED IN FRANCE 
   
MEDEF -  Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France 
   
ATTAC – Association pour    
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la taxation des 
transactions financières et 
l'aide aux citoyens  
CCDF – Collectif pour la 
Citoyenneté et les Droits 
Fondamentaux / Ligue 
des droits de l‘homme 
   
FONDA – CAFECS    
Maison d‘Europe     
Association des Femmes 
de l'Europe Méridionale – 
AFEM  
   
Confédération Générale 
du Travail – CGT 
   
Fondation Copernic    
Mouvement pour 
l‘Initiative Citoyenne – 
MIC  
   
    
    
OTHER EUROPEAN OR 
NATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS – 
Please indicate their 
names 
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Annex 10 Network analysis method and data sources. 
The network analysis has been built on three types of data: questionnaires, 
written documents (official ones and organisations‘ position papers) and 
interviews. The list below includes the organisations which replied to the 
questionnaire:  
European organisations Spanish organisations French organisations 
CEDAG CCOO MEDEF 
CONCORD ONCE – CEPES CGT 
CSCG ADICAE Fondation Schuman  
EFC   
IRI – ERC   
PFCS   
Polish Office   
Social Platform   
 
The data from the different sources have been introduced into a square 
EXCEL matrix containing 47 rows per 47 columns (and thus impossible to 
reproduce here), with each of the organisations as a column and row. This 
allows introducing information about the relation of every organisation with 
the other 46 members of the network. The entries into the matrix have 
been valued from 1 to 3 first according to the possible three types of 
relations identified in the questionnaire: exchanges of opinions, common 
actions and common opinions. In order to carry out individual actor 
centralities and structural similarity measures using the UCINET software 
package these matrices have binarised: as it was explained in chapter 4, a 
separate analysis has been carried out for every kind of relation (thus 
producing 3 matrices). For similar purposes relations have been 
reciprocated for these analyses even though the matrixes were built on 
directed data (A contacts B does not mean B contacting A). However these 
directed data have been used for carrying out the prestige measures 
indicating the differences between those organisations sending and 
receiving more ties from the rest of the network. 
The table below introduces the evidence of networking relations between 
European organizations derived from position papers and interviews. The 
295 
 
table is not square since the matrix only introduces data for the 
organisations for which evidence was available (those included in the rows) 
which may refer to other organisations (in columns).  
296 
 
Table 56 Evidence of networking between European organisations beyond questionnaires (see code for numbers below) 
 
PF
C
S 
CE
DA
G 
E
F
C 
ET
UC 
E
E
B 
CS
C
G 
CE
MR 
CP
MR 
Eu
ro 
cit
ies 
COF
ACE 
UN
IC
E 
EU
RO 
CO
M 
ME
RC
E 
Soc
ial 
Plat
for
m 
IRI 
- 
ER
C 
A
C
N 
CON
COR
D 
CC
OO 
Ecolo
gistas 
en 
acció
n 
AT
TA
C 
Fra
nce 
ATT
AC 
Esp
aña 
C
J
E  
AC
SU
R 
ACN 4                      
CEV  1 1                    
ETUC 
    5 8    7 5, 
7 
7           
EEB             5   5       
CEMR        5 5              
CPMR       5  5              
Eurocities       5 5               
UNICE 
   5, 
7 
     7  7           
Soc Platf 
    5 5,
8 
         5       
EUROCO
M. 
   7      7 7            
COFACE    7       7 7           
CARITAS   6          6          
IRI - ERC 
             5, 
9 
        
CONCOR
D 
    5        5          
FONDA  1                     
ATTAC 4                      
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ONCE    10                   
ATTAC 
ES 
                10 10 10    
ACSUR 5                5    5  
CJE 5                5     5 
Ecologist
as  
                   10   
CCOO 5                    5 5 
 
 
Type of evidence: the evidence always regards a contact from the organization in the column with the organization in the 
column: 
1: Position paper consultation 2000 
2: Position paper consultation 2001 
3: Position paper consultation 2002 
4: Position paper Convention 
5. Common position papers 
6. Interview  
7. Evidence of contacts in the EESC documents 
8: Member of the organisation. 
9. Website of the organisation  
10. Other documentary sources 
 
 
 
